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INTRODUCTION

According to The General Theory of Second Best, if one or
more members of a set of optimal conditions cannot be fulfilled,
there is no general reason to believe that fulfilling more of the
remaining conditions will bring you closer to the optimum than
fulfilling fewer of the remaining conditions. Second-Best Theory
has startling implications for allocative-efficiency' analysis. It im-

1. I substitute "allocative-efficiency" analysis for the standard term "economic-efficiency" analysis to remind readers that the concept is a technical term and that one cannot
assume that choices that increase allocative efficiency are either desirable from any legiti-
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plies that, since two Pareto imperfections can counteract each other,
one cannot assume without further argument that a situation in
which there are more Pareto imperfections 2 will be less
allocatively efficient than one in which there are fewer Pareto
imperfections.
Virtually all economists have responded in one of two unsatisfactory ways to The General Theory of Second Best. The overwhelming majority have ignored the theory3 and assumed that any
decrease in the number or magnitude of Pareto imperfections will
always lead to an improvement in resource allocation. I use the
acronym "FBLE" to stand for the type of first-best-allocative-efficiency analyses that adopt this assumption because "FBLE" resembles the word "fable" and these analyses are based on the "fable"
that a decrease in a particular Pareto imperfection necessarily increases allocative efficiency.
A few economists have rejected such FBLE analyses in favor
of general equilibrium models that determine the most-allocatively-

mate personal-ultimate-value perspective or consistent with our rights commitments. In any
event, in my terminology, a choice is said to increase or decrease allocative efficiency if
the equivalent-dollar gains it confers on its beneficiaries exceed the equivalent-dollar losses
it imposes on its victims. For a critique of the standard economic definition and use of
"the concept of the effect of a choice on economic efficiency," see Richard S. Markovits,
A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of "the
Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency": Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the
Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485 [hereinafter Markovits, A Constructive Critique].
2. Welfare economics delineates seven (arguably eight) conditions whose fulfillment
guarantees Pareto optimality. The statement that an economy is Pareto optimal in the pure
sense indicates that, even if no transaction costs would have to be incurred to reallocate
resources, it would be impossible to reallocate resources in a way that would make somebody better off without making anyone else worse off. The statement that the economy is
Pareto optimal in the impure and somewhat inaccurate sense in which I am using (and
virtually all economists in practice use) this expression indicates that, even if no transaction costs would have to be incurred to reallocate resources, it would be impossible to
effectuate a reallocation that would give its beneficiaries the equivalent of more dollars
than it would take away from its victims. The Pareto-optimal conditions are (1) no monopoly, (2) no monopsony, (3) no externalities, (4) no taxes on the margin of income, (5)
individual sovereignty, (6) no failures to maximize, and (7) no problems caused by consumer surplus or its analogues (usually misdescribed as "no public goods"). The eighth
arguable condition is that no transaction costs need be incurred to fulfill the other seven
conditions. This Article uses the expression "Pareto imperfection" to refer to any departure
from one of the basic seven Pareto-optimal conditions.
3. For a more detailed analysis of the reasons why economists in general ignore The
General Theory of Second Best and some stories that illustrate this behavior, see Richard
S. Markovits, Second Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking:
A Generalizable Critique, a "Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78
IOWA L. REv. 327, 355-66 (1993).
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efficient policy-response to one or more specific Pareto imperfection(s). These economists assume that the economy (1) contains a
small number of other imperfections that can be accurately and
costlessly determined and (2) uses resources in only one or two
different ways. Such highly unrealistic, incomplete general equilibrium analyses can provide many useful insights. However, given
that, in reality, (1) Pareto imperfections abound, (2) data and analysis are inevitably inaccurate and costly, and (3) resources are used
in a great many different ways, it would not be efficient (even if it
were feasible) to use a complete version of this general equilibrium
approach to determine the most-allocatively-efficient response to a
particular Pareto imperfection. I will call the complete version of
this general equilibrium approach "second-best-allocative-efficiency
analysis." "SBLE" is an appropriate acronym for this approach
because SBLE resembles the word "sable," which signifies a beautiful object that is prohibitively expensive, and SBLE analysis
would be prohibitively expensive, given the multiplicity of resource
uses and the inevitable cost and inaccuracy of both data and analysis.
Few economists have given significant thought to the type of
allocative-efficiency analysis that would be efficient to employ in
our worse-than-second-best world in which (1) Pareto imperfections
are pervasive, (2) data and analysis are costly and inaccurate, and
(3) resource-use types are multiplicious. I use the acronym "TBLE"
to stand for the type of "third-best-allocative-efficiency" analysis
that would be ex ante allocatively efficient in such a worse-thansecond-best world. TBLE analysis differs from SBLE analysis in
that it considers the allocative efficiency of the inevitable cost and
inaccuracy of data and analysis when deciding how many resources
to allocate to collecting data and analyzing its significance. TBLE
is an appropriate acronym for this type of analysis because it resembles the word "table" and TBLE analysis is the type one
should bring to the policy evaluation table.
With very few exceptions, the economists and lawyer-economists who have analyzed the allocative efficiency of particular
common law doctrines, legislative or regulatory policies, or legal
institutions have ignored Second-Best Theory altogether and employed FBLE analysis. For example, scholars who have attempted
to analyze the allocatively efficient way to resolve tort law issues
relating to the externalities caused by accidents and pollution have
virtually always done so on the assumptions that (1) no imperfections other than the specific potential externality on which they are
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focusing distort the private incentives of the relevant parties and
(2) the relevant choosers are sovereign (perfectly informed) maximizers.
Second-Best Theory has four implications for the allocativeefficiency analysis of particular tort law doctrines.4 First, SecondBest Theory implies that the allocative-efficiency conclusions generated by even those standard FBLE analyses that are valid on
their assumptions would be guaranteed to be correct only if all
other tort law doctrines were first-best-allocatively-efficien and
the economy contained no other Pareto imperfection. Second, and
more importantly, Second-Best Theory implies that unless one can
account for (1) the various ways in which Pareto imperfections distort the profitability of different marginal choices, (2) the ways in
which such choices may be affected by the relevant actors' errors,6
and (3) the likely pattern of all other types of Pareto imperfections
in the economy, the tort doctrines recommended by FBLE analysis
have no greater likelihood of increasing allocative efficiency than
decreasing it. Third, Second-Best Theory implies that virtually all
the tort law doctrines that FBLE analysis will find allocatively
efficient will be less allocatively efficient than the alternative doctrines that SBLE analysis would find most allocatively efficient.
Fourth, and most contestably, it also suggests that the inevitable
cost and inaccuracy of data and analysis may not preclude us from
increasing allocative efficiency by executing TBLE analyses.
This Article seeks not just to understand the world but to
change it--or, at least, to change the way in which law-and-economics allocative-efficiency analyses are carried out. It demonstrates the importance of Second-Best Theory by explaining why
FBLE tort doctrines will almost certainly not induce sovereign,
maximizing injurers and victims to make allocatively efficient
avoidance decisions if the economy contains one or more imperfections in seller competition (hereinafter one or more "monopolies"),
even if the economy were otherwise-Pareto-perfect.

4. Although the implications apply across all fields of law, this Article focuses only
on tort law doctrines.
5. Hereinafter, the acronyms "FBLE," "SBLE," and "TBLE" will stand for this compound adjective and its counterparts as well as for the noun "first best allocative efficiency" and its counterparts.
6. By "errors," I refer to choices that are not in the broadly-defined interest of the
chooser-choices that may be caused by non-sovereignty, non-maximization, or both.
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Admittedly, I could have used a large number of other types
of Pareto imperfections to illustrate the central point of SecondBest Theory more easily, even in a tort law context.7 Why, then,
the focus on monopoly distortions-the tendency of imperfections
in seller competition in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world to create
divergences between the private benefits, costs, and profits generated by various choices? Four reasons. The first and most important
is to demonstrate that the basic point of Second-Best Theory applies not only when the irremediable imperfection distorts the relevant actor's incentives directly8 but also when the irremediable
imperfection ceteris paribus distorts the relevant actor's incentives
only indirectly.9 Thus, the monopoly distortions in the private benefits, costs, and profitability of a potential injurer's accident-and
pollution-cost-avoidance (APCA) moves are not generated primarily
by the monopoly power of the potential injurer himself. The two
sets of monopolies that are most often relevant to this Article's
analyses are (1) the monopolies of the relevant potential avoider's
factor-market competitors and (2) the monopolies of the factormarket competitors of the potential avoider's factor-market competitors. ° In addition, two other sets of non-avoider monopolies are
relevant: (3) the monopolies of the potential customers of the po-

7. For example, I suspect that readers will comprehend why one cannot assume that
allocative efficiency will increase with the introduction of a tort law doctrine that eliminates some externalities by internalizing to manufacturers the pollution costs their operations would impose on others by polluting any body of water if the law did not also
make the relevant actors legally responsible for the costs they imposed on others by polluting the air. True, in this case, the doctrine that internalized water-pollution external
costs to the polluter might lead manufacturers to increase allocative efficiency by shifting
to less-water-polluting production-techniques or locations, by shifting to the production of
alternative products whose production and consumption were less water-pollution-costprone, by reducing their outputs of products whose production and consumption caused
water pollution, and by doing research into less-water-polluting production-techniques,
locations, and product-variants. However, it will be equally likely that the relevant doctrine will decrease allocative efficiency on balance by giving the relevant actors an artificial incentive to make allocatively inefficient shifts from water-polluting to air-polluting
production-techniques and locations.
8. For an example of an imperfection that distorts a relevant actor's incentives directly, see supra note 7.
9. For instance, the point of Second-Best theory applies when the relevant imperfection is elsewhere in the economy so that its initial distorting effect is not on the relevant
actor.
10. Such secondary monopolies are relevant whenever some of the resources that the
APCA move would withdraw or save would otherwise be used to create new productvariants, distributive locations, or capacity and inventory-to create so-called quality-orvariety-increasing (QV) investments.
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tential APCA researcher" and (4) the monopoly of the factor-market competitors of the potential avoider's customers. 2
My second reason for focusing on monopoly distortions is
related to the first. Monopoly distortions are important to investigate because their investigation reveals the nature of "general equilibrium" analysis. In other words, their investigation teaches readers
about the kinds of feedback relationships that Second-Best Theory
demonstrates should not be ignored.
My third reason is that the extant literature has ignored or
incorrectly analyzed the monopoly distortions in the private profitability of a large number of resource-uses. My discussion corrects
these omissions and errors.
The fourth and final reason for focusing on monopoly distortions is that the failure of economists to deal with these distortions
correctly has led them to generate many conclusions that are highly
inaccurate. Monopoly distortions are substantial and often critical
for the allocative-efficiency analysis of not only tort and environmental law but also the law that affects the distortion in the profitability of research and development (patent, copyright, trademark,
trade secret, antitrust, and tax law).
The analysis that follows is based on the assumption that the
reader is conversant with basic micro-economic and welfare economics terminology, though I have tried to define all terms whose
definitions may have eluded or been forgotten by readers with
limited economics training. However, since readers of this kind of
complicated piece may lose sight of the forest while thrashing their
way through the trees, this Introduction will conclude with an
overview of its argument.
The Article's central argument focuses on the fact that traditional FBLE analyses of tort law assume that the private profitability of accident-and-pollution-cost-avoidance (APCA) moves to
potential tort injurers (1) and victims (V) would not be "distorted"--that is, they would not differ from the allocative efficiency of
the moves in question-if tort law internalized to the relevant
actors 3 what would otherwise be the externalities associated with

11. These monopolies of the researcher's customers are relevant in relation to all
APCA research ("APCAR").
12. The monopolies of the competitors of the potential avoider's customers are relevant
when the potential avoider is a potential APCA researcher whose APCAR project may
generate a discovery that would make it profitable for its users to alter their unit outputs.
13. Note that, by itself, tort law cannot internalize the externalities with which it is
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concerned simultaneously to the relevant Is and Vs. By its very nature, a tort law that
internalizes those externalities to I will simultaneously externalize them from V by requiring the I to pay the V for the loss the V would otherwise have sustained-i.e., by creating a situation in which the V is imposing external costs on the L Unlike a FBLE system of fines on injurers, tort law cannot eliminate externalities. What a FBLE system of
tort law can do, however, is eliminate all externalities that would otherwise critically
distort the avoidance incentives of any I or V. In a transaction-costless world in which all
the other Pareto-optimal conditions were fulfilled, this result would be achieved for many
(probably most) potential torts by either a tort law that combined strict liability for injurers with a contributory negligence rule that was defined and applied in a FBLE way or a
tort law that combined such a FBLE contributory negligence rule with a FBLE negligence
rule. For expositional reasons, the text will continue to assert that a FBLE tort law would
internalize all externalities rather than all critically distorting externalities in an otherwisePareto-perfect economy.
Note that even in a transaction-costless world in which all the other Pareto imperfections are fulfilled, no pure tort law regime in which all payments made by one party go
to one or more other parties may be able to prevent one or more parties from making
allocatively inefficient avoidance choices when the loss the Is impose on the Vs increases
disproportionately with the number of actors who fail to avoid. In particular, in all jointtort situations in which the victim's loss increases disproportionately with the number of
injurers who fall to avoid or in situations in which the loss may be most-allocativelyefficiently avoided by a combination of V-avoidance and I-avoidance and the size of the
loss increases non-proportionately with the number of non-avoiding Vs and Is, any damage
award system one could devise may critically distort some party's or parties' incentives in
some situations. For example, take a case in which I,'s failure to avoid when 12 has
avoided or will avoid will impose $60 of costs on V if V fails to avoid, I2's failure to
avoid when I, has avoided or will avoid will impose $60 of costs on V if V fails to
avoid, and V will suffer a loss of $90 if he and both 1, and I2 fail to avoid. In this case,
no tort rule will always secure allocatively efficient avoidance. Thus, a rule making I, and
12 each pay V $60 if the relevant I fails to avoid will cause misallocation in two such
situations. First, when V cannot avoid efficiently, it will induce an I to engage in
allocatively inefficient avoidance when the cost of avoidance to one of the Is is over $60
and the cost of avoidance to the other I is over $30 (so that his avoidance is allocatively
inefficient, given that his failure to avoid will impose only $30 in additional costs on V)
but under $60 (so that the rule under consideration will induce the I to avoid by raising
the private benefits of avoidance to him to $60). Second, the rule will deter a V from
engaging in allocatively efficient avoidance whenever neither I can avoid for under $60
but the V can avoid for under $90 (so that his avoidance is allocatively efficient, given
that V's avoidance would eliminate $90 in certainty-equivalent accident costs by making
the accident profitable for V (by enabling V to collect $120 for a $90 loss).
A rule making a non-avoiding I liable for $60 if the other I avoids but liable for
$45 if both Is fail to avoid will also sometimes fail to induce sovereign maximizers to
engage in allocatively efficient avoidance. In particular, although this rule will not deter
the V from engaging in allocatively efficient avoidance since it will entitle the V to recover just his actual loss when one or both Is fail to avoid, it will induce an I to engage
in allocatively inefficient avoidance when the cost of avoidance to one I is over $60 (so
that he will not avoid regardless of whether the other I avoids) but the cost of avoidance
to the second I is over $30 (so that his avoidance is allocatively inefficient, given that
his failure to avoid will impose only $30 in additional costs on the V since the other I
will not avoid) but under $45 (so that the second I will find it cheaper to avoid than to
pay the $45 in "damages" the tort rule would require him to pay if he failed to avoid).

1996]

TORT LAW IN OUR WORSE-THAN-SECOND-BEST

WORLD

323

accident-and-pollution costs (hereinafter "AP costs"). This assumption presupposes either that (1) there are no other Pareto imperfections in the system or (2) the other Pareto imperfections do not
change the aggregate distortion in the private profitability of APCA
moves.
The first of these presuppositions clearly is incorrect. The
economy contains many Pareto imperfections that cannot be traced
to tort law doctrines, personnel, or institutions. Virtually no sellers
are perfect competitors; some buyers are monopsonists; many
choices that are not regulated by tort law generate externalities;
there are taxes on the margin of income; individuals and organizations are not always sovereign and sometimes fail to maximize;
and buyer surplus often critically distorts incentives. Moreover,
even if these imperfections could be removed, their removal would
generate substantial allocative transaction costs.
For the second presupposition to be correct, one of two conditions must be fulfilled: (A) none of the other types of Pareto imperfections must distort the private profitability of any APCA 4

A rule making a non-avoiding I, and a non-avoiding 2 individually pay V $30 regardless of whether the other I avoided would also cause misallocation in some circumstances. This rule would fail to induce either I to engage in allocatively efficient avoidance whenever (1) the cost of avoiding to each I was over $30 but under $60 and (2)
the combined cost of their both avoiding was less than not only $90 but also the cost to
V of avoiding. I should point out that in those situations the resulting misallocation will
be reduced by inferior-allocatively-efficient avoidance by V if tort law is revised to enable
a V in this type of situation to recover the cost to him of preventing the loss; currently,
Vs can recover only the cost of mitigating a loss that has occurred, not the cost of preventing the loss or reducing the size of a loss that has not yet occurred. In particular, if
the law is changed to permit such recoveries, V will engage in inferior-allocatively-efficient avoidance (avoidance that is allocatively superior to no one's avoiding but inferior to
the two Is' avoiding) when the cost of avoidance to V is under $90. If the law is not
altered to entitle V to recover the cost of such inferior-allocatively-efficient avoidance, the
resulting misallocation will not be reduced by such avoidance by V, since V will find
such avoidance profitable only if its cost is under $30-the difference between the $90 in
costs the accident will initially impose on him and the $60 in damages he will be able to
collect from the Is-and if the joint cost to the Is of avoiding were under $30, the rule
would not have deterred them from avoiding.
Finally, a rule making a first-acting I who has failed to avoid liable for $60 and a
second-acting I who has subsequently failed to avoid liable for $30 will tend to misallocate resources whenever the cost to the parties of delaying their avoidance or non-avoidance decision is not prohibitive since this rule will sometimes make it profitable for one
or both Is to become the second actor by executing allocatively inefficient delays in their
avoidance decisions.
14. This result could obtain either because the individual imperfections of any given
type perfectly counteract each other in relation to both the private benefits (PB) and the
private costs (PC) of all APCA moves or because the individual imperfections of any
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move or (B) the various individual types of Pareto imperfections
that would individually distort the private profitability of some
APCA moves must cancel each other out. Unfortunately, these
conditions are fulfilled only rarely and fortuitously.
Since, then, the private profitability of some APCA options
would be distorted even if tort law were FBLE, FBLE tort law
would not secure FBLE avoidance in the real world if the relevant
actors were sovereign maximizers. Some sovereign, maximizing
injurers-those who can make APCA choices whose private profitability is "inflated"'5 by the extant Pareto imperfections-will
overavoid from the perspective of allocative efficiency because the
relevant choices are privately profitable though allocatively inefficient. Similarly, other sovereign, maximizing injurers-those who
can make avoidance choices whose private profitability is "deflated"" by the extant Pareto imperfections-will underavoid from
the perspective of allocative efficiency because the relevant choices
are privately unprofitable though allocatively efficient. Nor is there
any reason to believe that the relevant misallocation will tend to be
reduced, much less eliminated, by the relevant actors' non-sovereignty and non-maximization.
This Article illustrates this argument by tracing through the
distorting effects of one type of Pareto imperfection-imperfections
in the competition facing producers and distributors of final goods
and services (hereinafter "monopoly")-on the private profitability
of the different kinds of APCA options available to a potential I
who is a producer or distributor. Parts A through C of this Article
assume that only the I can engage in allocatively efficient avoidance. Some sections of Part D take account of the possibility that

given type generated perfectly counteracting distortions in the PB and PC of every APCA
move.
15. A choice's private profitability is said to be "inflated" if its private profitability
exceeds its allocative efficiency.
16. A choice's private profitability is said to be "deflated" if its private profitability is
lower than its allocative efficiency.
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victim avoidance or joint care by victims 7 and injurers may be
more allocatively efficient than injurer avoidance.
The initial analysis has three components. First, it explains
how monopolies distort a resource's private value for the producer
or distributor who uses it.' The analysis focuses separately on the
four basic ways in which such actors employ resources: (A) to
increase the unit output (UO) of a good they already produce; (B)
to create an innovative or non-innovative quality-or-variety-increasing (QV) investment;19 (C) to execute a production-process-research (PPR) project" that seeks to discover a cheaper way to
produce a relevant quantity of an existing product; or (D) to produce leisure (Le) 2'

17. Before proceeding, I should point out an ambiguity in the term "victim" in this
context by elaborating on the difference between the actual victims of accidents and pollution and the victims that tort law has traditionally held to be entitled to recoveries (hereinafter the "legally entitled victims" of accidents and pollution). In practice, the law of
torts has excluded some of the actual victims of accidents and pollution from the category
of "legally entitled victims." Most obviously, tort law has excluded (1) the family and
friends of the immediate victims (with the partial exception of the victim's spouse, who
may be entitled to recover for the loss of his or her consanguinity) and (2) witnesses of
horrific accidents that injure them psychologically without placing them at any physical
risk. Less obviously and more relevantly for our purposes, when the economy is not
otherwise-Pareto-perfect, traditional tort law also excludes other victims of tortious acts
such as (3) consumers (who, as a group, would have obtained more consumer surplus had
the entitled victim not been disabled by an accident or one or more pollution events) and
(4) taxpayers and the beneficiaries of government expenditures (who, as a group, would
also have been better off had a "legally entitled victim" who was disabled been more
productive and hence paid more taxes).
This fact that tort law doctrine recognizes as "legally entitled victims" only a subset
of the actual victims of accidents and pollution demonstrates that tort law doctrine is not
FBLE. In practice, this tendency of tort law doctrine to ceteris paribus deflate the private
profitability of APCA to potential injurers by not entitling all victims to recover is exacerbated by the fact that tort law doctrine does not allow even legally entitled victims to
recover all the various types of losses they sustain.
18. In other words, the analysis explains how the relevant monopolies cause the private
benefit a resource yields its employer to diverge from the allocative benefit it generates
when he uses it.
19. Quality-or-variety-increasing investments are investments that enable their maker to
offer an additional or superior product-variant, to operate an additional or superior distributive outlet, or to increase his average speed of supply throughout a fluctuating-demand
cycle by increasing his capacity or inventory.
20. The expression production-process research (PPR) refers to research that attempts to
discover a more profitable (and presumptively and usually more-allocatively-efficient) method to produce some quantity of a given good. Although such research may attempt to
discover less-AP-cost-prone production-processes that reduce AP costs, much PPR is undertaken solely to reduce non-AP costs.
21. Although this analysis accounts for the fact that some of the resources that APCA
consumes and saves are respectively withdrawn from and allocated to the production of
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Second, the initial analysis explains why such private benefit
distortions generate distortions in the private cost and private benefits of APCA moves to the potential avoider. Thus, it explains that
since the private cost (PC) of an avoider's withdrawing a resource
from an alternative use is infinitesimally higher than the private
benefit (PB) it yields its alternative user while the allocative cost
(LC) of the avoider's withdrawing the resource equals the
allocative product or benefits (LB) it would generate in its alternative user's hands, any distortion in the private benefits that resources confer on employers who put them to unit-output-increasing,
QV-investment-creating, or PPR-executing uses will convert into a
distortion in the private cost of avoidance to the extent that the
APCA move withdraws resources from such alternative uses. Similarly, it explains that, for the same reason, any distortion in the
private value to its alternative user of a resource saved by a "resource-saving" APCA move will cause a distortion in the component of the PB that the move generates associated with its saving
resources, AP costs aside. Further, the Article explains that since
any distortion (A) in the private value of a unit of output to its
producer, of a QV investment to its owner, or of a PPR project to
its owner will cause a distortion (B) in the private value of a marginal unit of labor to an employer who would use the labor respectively to increase his unit output, create a QV investment, or execute a PPR project and hence in the gross wage of the supplier of
that labor, ceteris paribus (monopoly) distortions (A) in the private
value to their business owners of units of output, QV investments,
or PPR projects will produce (monopoly) distortions (B) in the
private benefits that avoidance yields avoiders to the extent that the
avoidance would prevent the disablement of workers for whose lost
gross wages the potential avoider would be liable if he failed to
avoid.
Third, the Article explains why the net monopoly distortion in
the private costs, private benefits, and private profitability of the
different types of APCA choices available to a producer or distributor are unlikely to be zero. This analysis focuses separately on

leisure, it ignores the fact that some of the natural resources that APCA consumes and
saves are non-replenishable natural resources withdrawn from or saved for future uses of
all kinds. Admittedly, monopoly may well distort the private benefits of saving such resources for future uses. However, I have ignored this possibility both because the percentage of the relevant resources in this category is small and because the sign of the monopoly distortion in their private value is uncertain.
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four different sets of APCA options that may be available to producers or distributors: (1) shifting to a known, less-AP-cost-prone
production-process or to a less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or
location whose unit output has a dollar value to its consumers
equal to that of the more-AP-cost-prone alternative to the latter's
possibly different consumers (assuming equal unit output levels);
(2) shifting to the production of a known, less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location whose average dollar value to its consumers
is higher or lower than that of the more-AP-cost-prone alternative
to the latter's consumers; (3) reducing the unit output of an APcost-generating product; and (4) doing research into less-AP-costprone production-processes, product-variants, or locations (APCAR).
The foregoing analyses are based on armchair assumptions
about (1) the proportions of resources that APCA choices of each
type consume and save that are withdrawn from and saved for
unit-output-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses and (2)
the absolute monopoly percentage-distortion in the private benefits
that resources generate for their employers by increasing their unit
outputs, creating QV investments, or executing PPR projects. They
conclude that, ceteris paribus, monopoly "inflates" the private
profitability of certain of the above APCA options and deflates the
private profitability of other APCA options. This conclusion implies
that there will be some overavoidance and some underavoidance in
a non-perfectly-competitive economy even if tort law doctrine,
personnel, and institutions are FBLE and there are no non-tort-lawgenerated Pareto imperfections other than imperfections in seller
competition. It also implies that departing from FBLE tort law
could increase allocative efficiency if appropriate departures could
be designed and implemented without incurring prohibitive -transaction costs. I want to emphasize at the outset that these general
conclusions are only very weakly dependent on the armchair assumptions adopted by this Article. Although the monopoly distortion in the private profitability of all types of avoidance moves
could be zero, such an outcome would be both fortuitous and
remarkable. Indeed, it would be almost equally surprising if the
monopoly distortion in the private profitability of the four sets of
avoidance options that I distinguish all had the same sign or, indeed, even had different signs from those I conclude they have.
Before proceeding, I want to anticipate and rebut the contention that the argument of this Article is a minor variant of the oftmade (but incorrect) argument that tort law falls to provide monopolists with adequate avoidance incentives. As I have already indi-
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cated, I do not argue that imperfections in price competition faced
by a potential avoider will cause him to make misallocative negative APCA decisions: mostly, the monopolies on which this Article
focuses are not monopolies of the potential avoider whose avoidance incentives are being analyzed. Indeed, when the potential
avoider's own monopoly is most relevant to the monopoly distortion in the private profitability of an avoidance move-namely
when the avoidance move is a reduction in unit output-the
avoider's monopoly tends to encourage his avoidance artificially.'
After completing its analyses of the monopoly distortion in the
private profitability of the various APCA options that are likely to
be available to producers and distributors, this Article examines the
significance of the conclusion that, in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect
world, monopoly would distort the private profitability of virtually
all types of APCA moves. It concludes that (1) FBLE tort law will
fail to prevent (indeed, in one sense will cause) a great deal of
AP-cost-related misallocation in a world that is imperfectly competitive but otherwise-Pareto-perfect; relatedly (2) in such a world
appropriate departures from FBLE tort law and appropriate changes
in "extemality-'regulating"' institutions might very well increase
allocative efficiency even if transaction-cost consequences are taken
into account; and (3) the results of this analysis have implications
for the allocative efficiency of a wide range of policies outside the
fields of tort and environmental law.
To accomplish these objectives, the Article is divided into four
parts. Part A defines the basic vocabulary and sets out the conceptual structure that this Article uses. Part B examines the relationships used to establish that "monopoly" will distort the private
profitability of different APCA moves in different directions, even
if tort law doctrine, personnel, and institutions are FBLE and there
are no non-tort-law-generated Pareto imperfections in the economy
other than imperfections in seller competition. Part C analyzes the
monopoly distortion (MD) in the private profitability (Pit) of a
marginal APCA move (AAPCA)-MD(PrpcA)-for the four different classes of avoidance moves I previously indicated may be
available to producers or distributors. It analyzes the relevant distortions that monopoly would generate if tort law doctrine, personnel, and institutions were FBLE and the only non-tort-law-generat-

22. That is, it tends to inflate rather than deflate the private profitability of the avoidance move.
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ed imperfections in the economy were imperfections in seller competition. Finally, Part D presents a very preliminary analysis of the
tort-law policy-implications of the preceding analysis. In particular,
Part D analyzes its predecessor's implications for the right way to
analyze the allocative efficiency of (1) shifting from strict liability
to negligence, (2) any proposed proximate cause rule, (3) supplementing tort awards with distortion-offsetting fines and subsidies,
(4) creating administrative agencies to collect data on Pareto imperfections and serve as court masters on distortion issues in tort
trials, and (5) any worker-health-and-safety regimes set up by a
joint labor-management committee on worker health and safety.'s
A.

The Vocabulary and Conceptual Structure of this Article

This Article investigates the relevance of imperfections in
seller competition for the TBLE way to analyze the allocative efficiency of any tort law doctrine or institution that would alter the
amount of externalities that various actors generate. As the Introduction indicated, the Article uses a so-called "distortion analysis"
approach to analyze this issue. Both for this reason and because I
believe that distortion analysis is the TBLE method for analyzing
all allocative-efficiency issues, Part A defines the basic vocabulary
of distortion analysis, investigates the policy relevance of the concept of the aggregate distortion in the private profitability of a
marginal choice, and examines the TBLE way of predicting the
allocative efficiency of a policy by examining its consequences for
the mean (and variance) of the distribution of aggregate distortions
in the private profitability of the marginal choices it affects.
1. The Basic Vocabulary of Distortion Analysis
In distortion-analysis terminology, the private benefits that a
choice confers on the chooser (PB), the private cost that a choice
imposes on a chooser (PC), and the private profits a choice yields
a chooser (Pic) are said to be "distorted" when they differ from

23. This Article also contains four appendices. Appendix A explains why it will be
easier to predict the effect of a policy on the aggregate distortion in the private profitability of marginal choices in some (so-called "additive") cases than in other (so-called
"non-additive") cases. Appendix B illustrates a technical issue that critically affects the
text's conclusion that the monopoly distortion (MID) in the private benefits (PB) yielded
by a marginal QV investment (QV)-MD(PBQv)--is deflated. Appendix C analyzes why
and when monopoly will cause APCA-related misallocation by deterring producers who
are potential APCA researchers from undertaking allocatively efficient APCAR. Appendix
D contains a table of acronyms and symbols used throughout this Article.
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their allocative counterparts-the allocative benefits they generate
(LB), the allocative costs they generate (LC), and their allocative
efficiency (LE). Specifically, a PB, PC, or P~r figure is said to be
"inflated" when it exceeds its allocative counterpart and "deflated"
when it is lower than its allocative counterpart.
The distortion analyses I execute distinguish two basic types
of distortions: (1) the aggregate distortion in some figure
(XD)-the net distortion in the PB, PC, or PrT generated by all the
relevant Pareto imperfections in the economy acting in concert-and (2) seven individual-Pareto-imperfection-generated distortions (one for each type of Pareto imperfection)-the distortion that
would be created by each particular type of Pareto imperfection if
no other type of Pareto imperfection were present in the system.
This Article is primarily concerned with two types of individualimperfection-generated distortions: (1) the monopoly distortion
(MD) in various figures, which would be generated by imperfections in seller competition if no other type of imperfection were
present in the system and (2) the externality distortion (XD) in
various figures, which would be caused by the externalities attributable to certain tort law imperfections in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect
world. Obviously, if the economy contains only one type of Pareto
imperfection, the distortion of that type will equal the aggregate
distortion in the figure. Thus, in an economy in which the only
Pareto imperfections are imperfections in seller competition, MD
will equal XD.
In the text that follows, the private figure whose distortion is
being referred to is indicated in parentheses following the MD,
XD, or YD, and the type of choice that is involved is indicated by
a subscript to the figure in parentheses. For example, YXD(PBAPcA)
stands for the aggregate distortion in the private benefits yielded by
a marginal ("A" stands for marginal in the sense of "last") APCA
move, and MD(PC CA) stands for the monopoly distortion in the
private cost of a marginal APCA move. In all, the text distinguishes six different types of resource uses:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

accident-and-pollution-cost-avoidance uses (APCA);
APCA-research-executing uses (APCAR);
unit-output-increasing uses (UO);
production-process-research-executing uses (PPR);
quality-or-variety-increasing investment-creating uses
(QV); and
(6) leisure-producing uses (Le).
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Distortion analysis uses two other sets of terms worth noting.
First, distortion analysis distinguishes "additive" cases from "nonadditive" cases. The former are cases in which the relevant E1D can
be expressed as a sum of the individual-Pareto-imperfection-generated distortions. The latter are cases in which ED does not equal
(MD + XD + . . . ), the sum of the individual Pareto-imperfectiongenerated distortions. Indeed, in non-additive cases in general, the
individual Pareto-imperfection-generated distortions do not even appear as arguments in the relevant aggregate-distortion formula.
Second, in additive cases, distortion analysis distinguishes between "offsetting" and "compounding" Pareto imperfections or
distortions. Imperfections or distortions are compounding when they
have the same sign and offsetting when they have the opposite
sign. Different imperfections of the same type as well as imperfections of different types may compound each other in relation to
some types of resource uses and offset each other in relation to
other types of resource uses. In any event, this distinction between
additive cases and non-additive cases is important because, as Appendix A demonstrates, it is far easier in additive cases than in
non-additive cases to predict the effect of a choice on the mean of
the relevant YXD distribution and hence on allocative efficiency.
2. The Allocative-Efficiency Relevance of XD(PrCA...) Figures
This section's analysis assumes that all relevant choosers are
sovereign maximizers. Although this assumption is often unrealistic,
it is compatible with this Article's analyses of the aggregate distortion in the private profitability of marginal choices, which assume
either that the only type of Pareto imperfection in the economy is
monopoly or that the economy contains at most two types of
Pareto imperfections-irremediable monopolies and remediable
externalities.
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When the Marginal Choice Is Marginal in the Sense
of
24
Being Infinitesimally Small as Well as Being Last

When the last choice is marginal in the sense of being infimitesimally small as well as in the sense of being last, its private
profitability is zero-assuming the choosers are sovereign maximizers.' The fact that marginal Prt is zero for infinitesimally small
24. All APCA decisions with which we are concerned can be either infinitesimally
small or incremental. Thus, a producer who is considering reducing AP costs by reducing
output can achieve this result to a lesser or greater extent by reducing output
infinitesimally, somewhat incrementally, or totally (by shutting down). Similarly-graduated
options will be available to a producer who is considering reducing AP costs by shifting
his production to a less-AP-cost-prone or more-AP-cost-prone product-variant since the
shifts can be infinitesimal, incremental, or total. The same point will also apply when the
change the producer is contemplating involves (1)shifts to less-AP-cost-prone or more-APcost-prone locations or production-processes or (2) increases or decreases in the amount of
APCAR he executes.
For some purposes, it will be useful to make a further distinction within the
incremental category, namely to distinguish among "lumpy", "serial", and "partly-lumpy
and partly-serial" incremental choices. An incremental decision will be said to be "lumpy"
if a smaller change would have been unprofitable. A decision by an injurer who had
previously done no APCAR to undertake some such research will be lumpy if, because of
economies of scale in research, a smaller research expenditure would have been
unprofitable despite the fact that the expenditure he made was profitable. Similarly, a
decision by an injurer who had previously produced no units of a less-AP-cost-prone
product to shift to a less-AP-cost-prone product-variant will be lumpy if, because of
economies of scale in the production or distribution of the variant, a smaller shift in
output would have been unprofitable despite the fact that the more substantial shift he
made was profitable. An incremental decision will be said to be "serial" when it can be
broken down into a series of individually-profitable infinitesimal decisions. For example, a
decision by an injurer who is already engaged in APCAR to increase his APCAR
expenditures by an incremental amount will be serial if the incremental change he made
can be broken down into a series of profitable infinitesimal additions to his APCAR
budget. Similarly, a decision by an injurer who is already producing some units of a lessAP-cost-prone product-variant as well as some units of a more-AP-cost-prone productvariant to make an incremental shift in his production to the less-AP-cost-prone productvariant will be said to be serial if each individual unit-shift in production was individually
profitable. Finally, an incremental decision will be "partly-lumpy and partly-serial" if only
an incremental change would have been profitable but the actual change was larger than
the minimum incremental change that was profitable. For example, a decision by an
injurer who had previously produced no units of a less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or
done no research into less-AP-cost-prone product-variants, locations, or productionprocesses would be partly-lumpy and partly-serial if economies of scale in production or
research made it unprofitable for him to produce one unit of the less-AP-cost-prone
product-variant or to spend one dollar on AP-cost-related research, but the actual number
of less-AP-cost-prone units he chose to produce or the actual investment he chose to
make in APCAR research was larger than the minimum amount that would have been
profitable (particularly when the increase over the minimum-profitable level could be
broken down into a series of profitable infinitesimal decisions).
25. This proposition reflects the fact that sovereign maximizers will continue to make
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last choices is significant in the current context because it implies
that for such choices LEA... = -7-D(PtA ... ). Thus, the fact that the
extant Pareto imperfections have inflated the private profitability of
a last, infinitesimally small choice-that YXD(P7tA... ) > 0-implies
that the choice was allocatively inefficient-that LEA... for that
choice was negative-if we assume that the relevant chooser was a
sovereign maximizer. Similarly, if the relevant chooser is a sovereign maximizer, the fact that the extant Pareto imperfections have
deflated the private profitability of a last, infinitesimally small
choice-that YD(PrA... ) < 0-will imply that the last positive
choice that was made was allocatively efficient. This conclusion
does not imply that all choices of the relevant type that were made
were allocatively efficient. To the contrary, the fact that LEA ... > 0
for the last, infinitesimally small choice implies that some
misallocation is present since it implies that if additional,
infinitesimally small, positive choices were practicable, one or more
allocatively efficient choices of this type had been rejected.
The preceding discussion has two important implications. First,
although the value of a positive XD(PA ... ) for a last, infinitesimally small choice will equal the amount of allocative inefficiency
that the choice generated for a sovereign maximizer, it will equal
the total amount of misallocation generated by the relevant type of
choice only in the rare case in which the last, infinitesimally small
choice of the relevant kind is the only allocatively inefficient
choice of that kind that was made. In most situations, the Pareto
imperfections that critically inflated the private profitability of the
last, infinitesimally small choice also critically inflated the private
profitability of various intra-marginal, infinitesimally small choices
of the relevant kind. Hence, when XD(PrcA... ) is positive for such
a choice, the total amount of misallocation generated by choices of
the relevant kind will normally exceed YD(PKcA...) when the
chooser is a sovereign maximizer.
Second, although the absolute value of a negative YD(PtA...)
for a particular kind of last, infimitesimally small choice will equal
the misallocation generated by the first additional choice of the
relevant kind that the XD(PA... ) caused to be rejected, it will not
usually equal the total misallocation the relevant kind of choices
generated. This conclusion reflects the fact that in most such cases

additional, infinitesimally small choices of a particular type until the last such choice just
breaks even. By definition, PitA... a LE __ + ,D(Prt... ).
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the actual choices made will diverge more than infinitesimally from
their allocatively efficient counterpart.
Three additional points need to be made at this juncture:
(3) ceteris paribus, the amount of misallocation generated
by infinitesimally small choices of any type will tend to increase with the absolute value of YD(PtA ... ) for that type
of choice;
(4)
by
for
the

ceteris paribus, the amount of misallocation generated
a given increase in the absolute value of XD(PrA...)
any last, infinitesimally small choice will increase with
original absolute value of the relevant D(Pn,...); and

(5) the amount of misallocation generated by resource-use
choices of a given type will increase not only with the
mean but also with the variance of the distribution of
YD(PtA... ) figures for the various marginal choices of that
type.
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Diagram I

Diagram I illustrates all five preceding points when the relevant
choice is a decision whether to produce an additional unit of output. Diagram I's four curves each describe the identical conditions
that prevail in five separate "industries" (industries 1-5). DDnmi.5 is

the industry demand curve in each of the industries. It is assumed
that each industry is either a pure monopoly or contains more than
one seller, all of whom face identical DD and MC curves. If we
assume that (1) the relevant buyers are non-monopsonistic sover-

eign maximizers, (2) their consumption of marginal units generates
no externalities or buyer surplus, and (3) their valuation of the
units is not wealth-elastic over the relevant range, the height of
DD . 5 at any quantity indicates the marginal allocative value of
the unit (MLV)as the net equivalent-dollar gain generated by the

26. If the consumption of the unit generates no externalities, the unit's allocative value
will equal its value to its consumer. If the purchase of the unit generates no buyer surplus and no loss for the buyer (because he is a consumer sovereign), the allocative value
of the unit will equal its cost to its buyer. And if the buyer is not a monopsonist, the
cost of the relevant marginal unit to him (and hence its allocative value on our other
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unit's consumption. In distortion analysis vocabulary, this MLV is
termed the allocative benefits generated by the relevant marginal
unit's production (LBAuo). Assuming in addition that there are no
taxes on the margin of income (for example, no sales taxes),'
DD1,r will also indicate PBAoo if the industry is perfectly competitive (so that each seller faces a horizontal demand curve at the
price indicated by the height of the DDND curve where DDND cuts
MC from above).
MRINDI 5 is the industry marginal revenue curve for each of the
industries. M,,,.5 is constructed on the conventional (often unrealistic) assumption that the members of the industries engage in
"single pricing"--i.e., set a single price for their product that all
buyers must pay for each unit they purchase. As Diagram I indicates, if the industry is purely monopolistic, MRIND equals PBAuo.
The expression PBAOo in Diagram I indicates this fact (the superscript "M" stands for "monopolist").
The MC curve in Diagram I indicates the (private) marginal
cost of producing marginal units of output. In distortion-analysis
notation, the MC of a particular unit is denoted as the PCoo.
Finally, the MLC curve in Diagram I indicates the marginal
allocative cost of producing units of output in each industry-the
opportunity cost of using the relevant resources to produce the unit
of output. As Subsection B.2(B) demonstrates, MLC may differ
from MC not only because the relevant unit's production generates
externalities but also, inter alia, because the unit's production withdraws resources from alternative uses that would have yielded their
alternative employer private benefits that were distorted by his own
or someone else's monopoly. Indeed, each of the various types of
Pareto imperfections can cause MLC to diverge from MC. In the
distortion-analysis notation that this Article uses, the MLC of a
particular unit is represented as LCAuo.

assumptions) will equal its price. The cost to a non-discriminating monopsonist (a buyer
who faces an upward-sloping supply curve) of all units other than the first unit he purchases exceeds the unit's price because, in order to buy the relevant unit at its price, he
must pay a higher price for the intra-marginal units he purchases. Hence, when the above
conditions are fulfilled, a marginal unit's allocative value will equal the price its consumer
paid for it. The no-wealth-elasticity of demand assumption is necessary because reductions
in price could otherwise affect the dollar valuation of intra-marginal units by altering their
consumers' real wealth.
27. If there are sales taxes, the net private benefits that even a perfect competitor (for
whom MR is not less than price) can obtain by producing the marginal unit will be less
than the price its buyer paid for it.
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For expositional reasons, Diagram I assumes that the relevant
DD (and hence MR) curves are linear and that the MC and MLC
curves are not only linear but horizontal. The text will indicate the
relevance of these simplifying assumptions to any conclusion the
diagram is used to illustrate.
Before Diagram I can be used to illustrate the five points made
earlier in this section, it is necessary to use it to represent
Y-D(PBuo),
WD(PCuo), and D(PrAuo). In Diagram I, the fact that
XD(PBAuo) = (PBAuo - LBAuo)< 0 (where zero is italicized to distinguish it from the letter "0") is indicated by the difference between
the height of the DD. = LBAuo curve at the relevant output and
the height of the MRD = PBAuo curve at that output. If the industry in question is purely monopolistic or perfectly competitive, this
difference will equal the difference between two of the curves
Diagram I contains. In particular, if the industry is purely monopolistic, the relevant MR
curve is MR. = PBAOo, the output is
ON (the output at which PBAuo cuts MC from above), and the
relevant XD(PBAuo) is (JN - AN) = -AJ = -$14. If the industry is
perfectly competitive, the relevant MRF curve has the same
height as Diagram I's MC curve at the output at which the relevant DDwD cuts the industry MC curve from above, the output is
OV, and the relevant XD(PBAuo) = IV - IV = 0.
However, if the industry is neither purely monopolistic nor perfectly competitive, the analysis is somewhat more complex. In such
circumstances, the analysis will have to rely on the fact MR will
equal MC at any equilibrium output (given the assumption that
each producer is a sovereign maximizer who can adjust his output
infinitesimally). Thus, if the industry equilibrium output is OS, the
firm MR curves for the marginal producers must equal KS at their
equilibrium outputs; if the industry equilibrium output is OT, the
marginal producers' firm MR curves must equal LT at their equilibrium outputs; and if the industry equilibrium output is OU (the
allocatively efficient output at which MLV = MLC-i.e., at which
LBAUo = LCAuo), the firm MR curves for the marginal producers
must equal MU at their equilibrium outputs. Hence, if competitive
conditions in the industry are such that the sum of the identical
MR curves for the identical marginal producers intersect MC at
height KS at output OS, YXD(PBUo) = KS - BS = -BK = -$12.
Likewise, if the competitive conditions in the industry are such that
the sum of the identical MR curves for the identical marginal
producers intersect MC at height LT at output OT,
,XD(PBUo) = LT - CT = -CL = -$10. Finally, if the competitive
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conditions in the industry are such that the sum of the identical
MR curves for the identical marginal producers intersect MC at
height MU at output OU, XD(PBUo) = MU - HU = -HM = -$6.
Fortunately, it is easier to use Diagram I to illustrate
XD(PCuo). In particular, XD(PCuo) at any output equals the difference between the height of the MC and MLC curves. Assuming
that MC and MLC are both horizontal, YD(PCuo) = -EJ = -FK =
-GL = -HM = -DI = -$6 at the ON, OS, OT, OU, and OV outputs
in which we are interested.
Since YD(P7rAUo) = XD(PBuo) - XD(PCuo), Diagram I can be
used to illustrate XD(PrtAuo) without much additional work. Thus, if
the industry is purely monopolistic so that its equilibrium output is
ON, YD(PrUo) = -AJ - EJ = -AE = -$14- (-$6) = -$8. If the industry is perfectly competitive so that its equilibrium output is OV,
ED(PtAuo) = 0 - (-DI) = DI = -(-$6) = $6. If the relevant industry
is sufficiently monopolistic for its equilibrium output to be OS,
,D(PrCo)= -BK - FK = -BF = -$12 - (-$6) = -$6. If the relevant
industry is sufficiently monopolistic for its equilibrium output to be
OT, XD(Pr:Ao) = -CL - (-GL) = -CG = -$10 - (-$6) = -$4. If the
industry is only sufficiently monopolistic for its equilibrium output
to be OU, XD(Ptcuo) = -HM - (-HM) = -$6 - (-$6) = 0. Finally, if
the industry is perfectly competitive so that its equilibrium output
is OV, XD(PntAuo) = 0 - (-DI) = DI.
Now that these diagrammatic terms of reference have been
established, Diagram I can be used to illustrate the five propositions previously articulated about the allocative-efficiency relevance
of YD(PtA ... ) information for marginal choices that are infinitesimally small. The first such proposition is that when the members
of the set of relevant decisions diverge more than infinitesimally
from their allocatively efficient counterparts, the value of a positive
XD(PtA...) will be lower than the total misallocation due to the
imperfections that generated the positive Y-D(PrTA...) in question,
even though the misallocation generated by the last choice will
equal the -D(PrA... ). Diagram I presents only one situation in
which the marginal unit-output producer is affected by a positive
Y'D(PiLAuo): the situation in which the relevant industry is perfectly
competitive, the equilibrium output is OV, and the associated
,.D(PtAuo) is (0- [-DI] = DI = $6 > 0). In this case, although the
amount of misallocation generated by the production of the last
unit of the product equals YXD(PTrAuo) = DI = $6, the total amount of
unit-output misallocation that the relevant imperfections cause
equals the larger amount indicated by area HDI-the area between
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the MLC = LCAuo curve and the MLV = LBAuo curve between the
allocatively efficient output OU and the actual output OV.
The second proposition is that when the members of the actual
set of decisions diverge more than infinitesimally from their
allocatively efficient counterparts, the absolute value of any negative XD(PtcA... ) will be less than the allocative inefficiency caused
by the imperfections that generated the negative XD(PrA... ), even
though the misallocation caused by the first positive decision rejected will equal the absolute value of the XD(PrA ... ). Thus, if we
focus on the pure monopoly situation portrayed in Diagram I, in
which the equilibrium output is ON and YXD(PicAUO) is AE = -$8,
the total amount of misallocation caused by the relevant industry's
unit-output
decisions
is
indicated
by
area

AHE > AE = IXD(PcUO) I though the amount of misallocation
caused by the relevant producer's failure to expand his output by
one unit equals AE = IXD(P7ruO) I.
The third proposition is that, ceteris paribus, the amount of
misallocation caused by infinitesimally small choices of a particular
type tends to increase with the absolute value of XD(PtA... ) or the
mean of the distribution of the absolute XD(PrA ... ) figures for

marginal choosers. Thus, in Diagram I, as IXD(PrAuo)j increases
from 0 to CG to BF = DI to AE, the associated misallocation increases from 0 to area CHG to area BIF = area HDI to area AHE.
Of course, not all things are always equal. For example, if the two
Y-D(Piuo) figures are respectively positive and negative, more
misallocation may be associated with a lower positive YD(PrAuo)
figure than with a higher negative XD(PrAuo) figure if DD. is
convex to the origin to the left of the allocatively efficient output
and concave to the origin to the right of the allocatively efficient
output.
The fourth proposition is that the amount of misallocation
generated by any given increase in the absolute value of
XD(PTiA...) for any infinitesimally small choice will increase with
the original absolute value of YD(PcA ... ). Thus, in Diagram I,
although the increase in IXD(PAuo)I associated with a shift of

output from
OT to OS-(BF-CG)= I-$61 - 1(-$4)1 =
$2-equals the increase in absolute IYD(PurAuo) I associated with
the shift from OS to ON-(AE- BF)= 1-$81- 1-$61 = $2, the
misallocation

caused

by

the

latter

$2

increase

in
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IYXD(PicAuo) I-area ABFE-exceeds the misallocation caused by
the former $2 increase in IX-D(Pt.o) I-area BCGF.'
The fifth proposition that Diagram I illustrates is related to the
fourth: the amount of misallocation generated by resource uses of a
given type will increase not only with the mean but also with the
variance of the distribution of YD(Prc,... ) figures for the marginal
choices in question. If misallocation is increased more by a rise in

IX-D(P7c...)I from $6 to $8 than by a rise in IYD(Pir...)I
from $4 to $6, a situation in which one marginal chooser faces an
IYD(PnA... ) I of $8 and one of $4 is likely to be associated with
more misallocation than a situation in which two marginal choosers

face IYD(Prt ... )ls of $6. This conclusion has important policy
implications. It implies that policies will tend to increase allocative
efficiency not only when they reduce the mean but also when they
reduce the variance of the relevant distortion distribution. For example, a policy that lowers I ,D(PrtA... ) for one marginal chooser from $8 to $6 while raising it for another marginal chooser
from $4 to $6 will increase allocative efficiency more on the former account than it will decrease it on the latter. Thus, in Diagram

I, a policy that converted a situation in which IXD(Pru o)I for

two industries were respectively $8 = AE and $4 = CG into one in
which the two industries' IYD(Ptcuo) I figures were both BF = $6
would reduce the amount of misallocation from area AHE plus
area CHG to two times area BHG-i.e., it would reduce
misallocation by area ABEF minus area BCGF.
In short, when the choices are marginal in the sense of being
infinitesimally small, one can predict the effect of a policy on
28. This result reflects the fact that since the latter increase in D(PF'7ro) was from $6
to $8 while the former was from $4 to $6, the various decisions to raise unit output the
latter increase in 1D(PAuo) deterred would have been more allocatively efficient than
were the decisions to raise unit output the former increase in .D(Pitauo ) deterred. In other
words, these decisions would have increased allocative efficiency by $6 to $8 per unit
rather than by $4 to $6 per unit. To provide a numerical example, assume that the relevant DD is linear with a slope of one and the relevant MLC is horizontal (so that the
DD forms a 45-degree angle with the horizontal MLC curve). In this case, an Y-D(Pxuo)
of one dollar will be associated with a misallocation-triangle that is an isosceles right
triangle whose legs have a length of one and whose area ([l/2]bh) is (1/2)($l)($1) = $.50;
an YD(PITuo) of two dollars will be associated with a misallocation-triangle that is an
isosceles right triangle whose legs have a length of two and whose area is
(1/2)($2)($2) = $2, and an XD)(Pit uo) of three dollars will be associated with a
misallocation-triangle that is an isosceles right triangle whose legs have a length of three
and whose area is (1/2)($3)($3) = $4.50. Thus, the increase in £D(Prt~,) of $1 from $2
to $3 will raise misallocation by $2.50, while the increase in 7_D(PltUo) of $1 from $1 to
$2 will raise misallocation by only $1.50.
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misallocation by predicting its effect on the mean and variance of
the distribution of IYD(P;...)j figures for the relevant last
choices. For example, one can predict the effect of internalizing the
external costs that unit-output producers generate on the amount of
misallocation that their production decisions cause by analyzing the
impact on the IXD(P7;Auo)js distorting the private profitability of
all marginal unit-output choices. The effects of such a policy can
be investigated diagrammatically by analyzing how the policy affects the relevant IYD(Pcuo)js by raising the relevant MCs toward or above the associated MLCs and by raising equilibrium
prices in the affected industries as well (since the producers will
pass some or all of any increase in marginal costs on to their
customers29).
(B)

When the Marginal Choice Is Incremental Rather than Infinitesimally Small

When the last choices of a particular type are incremental
rather than infinitesimally small, PrA ... may not (indeed, usually
will not) equal zero, even when the choosers are sovereign maximizers. When choices are lumpy, the fact that a last decision yield-

29. The standard analysis of this "pass-on" issue assumes that sellers set across-theboard prices (which apply to each unit that all potential buyers of their product may
purchase) and ignores the possibility that a policy of internalizing external costs to producers may affect the prices they charge in special ways when the producers who are
well-placed to supply any given buyer would generate different amounts of external costs
when supplying him. The standard analysis concludes that perfect competitors will pass on
all of any increase in marginal costs that such an internalization would generate and that
a pure monopolist would pass on less than all of any such increase in his marginal
costs-a percentage of the increase that is determined primarily by the elasticity of the
demand curve he faced over the relevant range. In fact, when the different possible suppliers of a given customer would generate different amounts of external costs when supplying him, the internalization policy might lead to a price increase that exceeded the
actual supplier's cost increase. This result would obtain when the internalization policy
increased the marginal costs of the original second-best-placed potential supplier of the
relevant buyer by more than it increased the marginal costs of that buyer's original bestplaced supplier in circumstances in which the cost increases would not make a rival supplier of the relevant buyer whose costs would not be affected by the internalization policy
(because he produced a very different product) best-placed or second-best-placed to supply
him. This result would also obtain if the internalization policy changed the positions of
the relevant suppliers in various ways that increase the ability of the best-placed supplier
to contrive oligopolistic margins. For an explanation of some of the terminology in this
footnote and a more detailed account of the price theory on which it builds, see Richard
S. Markovits, International Competition, Market Definition, and the Appropriate Way to
Analyze the Legality of Horizontal Mergers under the Clayton Act, 64 CmtC.-KENT. L.
REV. 745, 760-62, 778-83 (1988).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

ed positive profits does not guarantee that any additional positive
decisions of the same kind would be profitable. When PrA... does
not equal zero, LE,... does not equal -I ID(PrtA...)I. Hence,
when the relevant last choices are incremental, the fact that their
private profitability is distorted does not guarantee the presence of
misallocation even if the choosers are sovereign maximizers. For
example, the fact that an incremental choice's profitability is inflated does not guarantee that the choice was allocatively inefficient-that (LEA... < 0)--even if the relevant choosers were sovereign maximizers: the distortion will have "critically inflated" the
private profitability of the choice (making it profitable even though
it was allocatively inefficient) only if FD(PItA... )> ILEA... I and
LEA... < 0. In all other cases, the distortion will simply have made
an allocatively efficient choice more privately profitable than
allocatively efficient. Similarly, the fact that the imperfections
deflated an incremental choice's profitability does not guarantee
that the least unprofitable choice of that kind to be rejected was
allocatively efficient. The distortion will have critically deflated the
private profitability of the rejected choice (making it unprofitable
even though it was allocatively efficient) only if the relevant
17XD(PrtA... ) was bigger than the associated LEA... > 0. In all
other cases, the relevant distortion will have made it more profitable than allocatively efficient to reject an allocatively inefficient
choice.
These conclusions imply that policies reducing IYD(Pit,...)I
for incremental last choices will be less likely to reduce the
amount of misallocation generated than policies that reduce
IYD(PrtA...)I for last, infinitesimally small choices. Thus, some
policies that reduce IJ D(PrTA...)I for incremental choices will not
reduce misallocation at all for the simple reason that the original
distortions did not cause any misallocation in the first place. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, the higher IYD(PtA...) I for a last incremental choice of any kind, the greater the probability that its removal would eliminate resource misallocation by altering the last
decision of the relevant kind and perhaps by altering one or more
intra-marginal or extra-marginal decisions of the relevant kind as
well. Also, ceteris paribus, the higher IYD(PrtA... )j for the last
choice of any kind, the greater the weighted-average-expected
amount by which any reduction in its magnitude would reduce
resource misallocation." Hence, even when the marginal choices
30. Thus, the higher a negative F.D(PtA... ), the greater the probable allocative effi-
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are incremental, policies that reduce (increase) the mean of the

distribution of IXD(PA ... )I figures for incremental marginal
choices of a particular kind should be assumed to reduce (increase)
the relevant type of misallocation on that account.
For analogous reasons, policies that reduce (increase) the variance of the distribution of IYD(P~rvA...)I figures for marginal
choices also reduce (increase) the relevant type of misallocation on
that account when the marginal choices are incremental as well as
when they are infinitesimal. Admittedly, since policies that change
the IJD(PjrcA...)j for incremental marginal choices are less likely
to reverse intra-marginal or extra-marginal decisions when the
choices are incremental, policies that reduce the variance of the

relevant IYD(PcA ... )I distribution are less likely to reduce the
type of resource misallocation of the relevant type when the choices are incremental. However, since policies affecting IXD(PnA...)I
for incremental marginal choices will sometimes cause originallynon-marginal allocatively inefficient decisions to be reversed, policies reducing the variance of the IXD(Pn,...)j distribution for
incremental choices will still tend to reduce the relevant type of
resource misallocation on this account.
Hence, regardless of whether the marginal choices are infimitesimal or incremental, information on the effect of any policy on the

mean and variance of the distribution of IXD(7cA...)j figures for
all marginal choices of the relevant type will be highly relevant to
the impact of the policy on the amount of misallocation generated
by the type of choice in question.
3. Predicting the Effect of a Given Change in a Particular Individual-Pareto-Imperfection-Generated Private-Profitability Distortion
on the Mean of the Distribution of Relevant iED(P7CA.)[
Figures
The conclusion that one can predict a policy's effect on a
particular type of misallocation from information about its impact
on the mean of the IX.D(P7rt...)j distribution for marginal choices
would not be very useful if it were always impossible or prohibitively expensive to obtain such distortion-impact information. The

ciency of any choice whose profitability was originally critically deflated that the distortion-reducing policy would induce. Similarly, the higher a positive XDtA.), the greater
the probable allocative inefficiency of any choice whose profitability was originally critically inflated that the distortion-reducing policy would deter.
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earlier discussions in this Article provide no basis for optimism on
this issue."
In fact, however, I believe that it will usually be possible to
predict the effect of a policy on the mean (and variance) of the

relevant

IYD(Pnc... )j

distributions at non-prohibitive cost. Admit-

tedly, such predictions tend to be more cost-effective in additive
rather than in non-additive cases since, in additive cases, it will
frequently be possible to generate the relevant conclusions without
calculating IXD(Prtc... )j for the relevant choices before and after
the policy-interventions.3 ' However, it will often be cost-effective
to analyze the effects of a policy on a particular type of
misallocation by predicting its impact on the mean and variance of
the associated jYXD(Pit,...) distribution even when the case is
non-additive. In particular, in such cases, it will be TBLE to adopt
the following five-step procedure:

31. The Introduction's discussion of the effect of a policy that would internalize waterpollution externalities on XD(Pr,... ) if air-pollution externalities were not internalized
should have revealed the difficulty of predicting whether a policy that would reduce without eliminating a particular type of Pareto imperfection would reduce the distortion which
that type of imperfection would cause in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world in the private
profitability of each of the various types of marginal choices to which it was relevant.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. And Subsection A.2(A)'s closing remarks about
the way in which an external-cost-internalizing policy would affect D(P
... ) in an
economy that also contained imperfections in seller competition also suggested the complexity of the relevant analysis. See supra note 29 and the accompanying text.
32. More specifically, in additive cases, it will often be possible to generate the relevant conclusions from information on two sets of factors: (1) the correlation between the
individual-Pareto-imperfection-generated private-profitability distortion that can be reduced
or eliminated and the private-profitability distortion that would be present if the target
distortion were eliminated (the remaining distortion) and (2) the relative absolute size of
the eliminable and remaining distortions-the frequency with which the absolute eliminable
distortion was lower than, higher than but less than twice as high as, and more than
twice the absolute remaining distortion.
In the tort law context, 7£D(P,...) for production-process choices is an additive
case, £D(PrtA.)
for product-variant or location choices that affect the value of the
"good" to consumers has strong additive elements though it is not an additive case, and
,_D(Pntuo) is a purely non-additive case. The relevance of the distinction between additive
cases and non-additive cases is explained in detail in Appendix A.
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(1) develop formulae3 3 for the YD(Pc,...) for each of the
types of avoidance decisions whose profitability-distortion
will be affected by the policy choice in question-formulae
that are more complex versions of the formulae for
XD(PrcAuo), YD(PAQv), and YD(P7rp) this Article either
explicitly formulates or informally discusses (versions that
are more complex because they take account of all the
Pareto imperfections that can individually distort the private
profitability of the choices rather than just the relevant
monopoly and externality imperfections);
(2) create a TBLE list of the marginal decision-makers for
each relevant type of resource-use choice;
(3) generate a TBLE estimate of the pre-policy YD(PnA..)
distribution for the marginal choices in each relevant resource-use category and derive a TBLE estimate of the prepolicy mean and variance of the relevant YD(PKcA...) distributions;
(4) generate a TBLE estimate of the likely post-policy
XD(PA...) distribution for the marginal choices in each
relevant resource-use category and derive a TBLE estimate
of the mean and variance of the relevant D(PrA ) distributions; and
(5) compare the pre-policy and post-policy mean and variance estimates and generate allocative-efficiency conclusions
from these comparisons.
I do not assume that this approach will be cheap. However, I
do think that it will be both cheaper and, for other reasons as well,
more cost-effective than many are disposed to believe. It will be
cheaper because I am proposing that TBLE (not perfect) data be
collected on a systematic (not case-by-case) basis by experts (not
amateurs). It will be more cost-effective not only because it will be
cheaper but also because the same Pareto-imperfection data that is

33. For some formulae of this kind, see Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy
Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy
Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1976) and Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for
Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and
Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975
Wis. L. REv. 950 [hereinafter Markovits, A Basic Structure].
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relevant to tort and environmental law and policy analysis will also
be relevant to regulated-industries, antitrust, tax, and research law
and policy analysis. In any event, the analysis that follows assumes
that some procedure of the type described is the TBLE method to
predict the allocative efficiency of any tort-law or tort-policy decision.
B. MD(PBuo), MD(PBQv), and MD(PB ..
R) and Their
Implications for the Value of the Monopoly Distortion in Various
Components of MD(PCAPCA) and MD(PBPcA) as Well as for
MD(PCapca), MD(PBpca), and MD(Pcpca) on Balance
The phrase "monopoly distortion" refers to the amount by
which monopoly would cause the private benefits, costs, or profits
of some choice to diverge from their allocative counterparts if the
economy were otherwise-Pareto-perfect. Part B analyzes three interrelated monopoly-distortion issues. Section 1 analyzes the way in
which monopoly distorts the private benefits that a producer obtains from a marginal unit of output, a QV investor obtains from a
marginal or last incremental QV investment, and a PPR investor
obtains from a marginal PPR project or project-expansion, and
hence the private benefits from the resources used to produce the
unit of output, create the QV investment, or execute the PPR project. Section 1 also analyzes the way in which these monopoly
distortions in the private value that resources generate in nonAPCA uses distort various components of PC..cA and PBa,cA.
Section 2 then analyzes the likelihood that MD(PCaJCA),
MD(PBPCA), and MD(Prc,,cA) will be zero on balance.
The analysis distinguishes between (1) avoidance moves that
are "resource-consuming" in the sense that they involve shifts to
options that are more expensive, AP costs aside, and (2) avoidance
moves that are "resource-saving" in the sense that they reduce nonAP costs. 4 The private non-AP-cost savings that a "resource-say-

34. Although some types of avoidance moves, such as shifts to product-variants for
which the product-variants' production and consumption are jointly less-AP-cost-prone, may
be either "resource-consuming" or "resource-saving," other types will clearly be either
".resource-consuming" or "resource-saving." In the one direction, AP-cost-liability-induced
shifts to known, less-AP-cost-prone production-processes are always "resource-consuming."
Even if the relevant injurers were not liable for the AP costs they generated, they would
have used the less-AP-cost-prone production-process had it been less expensive, AP costs
aside. In the other direction, AP-cost-liability-induced APCA reductions in unit output are
always "resource-saving."
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ing" APCA move enables its maker to realize are classified as a
cA in the text that follows.
PBA rather than a negative PCa,
1.

MD(PBAUO), MD(PBAQV), and MD(PBAP.R) and Their

Implications for the Monopoly Distortion in Various Components
of MD(PCvcA) and MD(PBAPcA)
(A) MD(PBuo) and Its Implications for the Monopoly Distortion
in One Possible Component of PCpcA and Two Possible
Components of PBvA
The monopoly distortion in the private value to monopolists of
the resources used to increase unit outputs is clearly negative. This
conclusion reflects five facts or relationships. The first is
definitional: MD(PBuo) =_PBAuo - LBAuo. The second is that PBAuo
(the value of the relevant unit of the good [G] to its producer)
equals the conventional marginal revenue (MR) he obtains by selling the marginal unit of the good. This relationship will obtain if
(A)(1) the relevant sale generates no promotional learning-by-doing
or strategic retaliatory or predatory advantages, (2) does not reduce
the profits the seller realizes by selling other products (by taking
sales from them or generating costly responses by rivals), and (3)
does not yield joint economies that increase the profits he makes
when selling other goods, or (B) the preceding three effects cancel
each other out. The third is that since our current otherwise-Paretoperfect assumption guarantees that the consumption of the marginal
unit of any product will generate no externalities, LBAuo equals the
value of the unit to its consumer. The fourth is that since our
current otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumption guarantees that the
consumer is a maximizing, sovereign non-monopsonist and that his
consumption of the unit generates no consumer surplus, the value
of the unit to its consumer equals its price (PG). 5 The fifth is

35. This argument reflects the following three relationships: (1) if the consumer in
question is a sovereign maximizer, the value of this unit to him will equal the sum of
the costs he would be willing to incur to obtain the unit (since given our "no-buyer-surplus" assumption we can ignore the wealth-elasticity-related complications that might arise
if the consumer obtained surplus on his purchase of the unit); (2) if the consumer realizes
no consumer surplus on the purchase of this unit, the private value he obtains from consuming it (and hence the allocative value of the units being consumed by him on the noexternality-of-consumption assumption) will be equal to the cost he incurred to purchase
it;and (3) if the consumer is not a monopsonist, the cost he incurred to purchase the
unit will be equal to the price he paid for it. By way of contrast, the cost to a monopsonist who cannot discriminate perfectly and costlessly of purchasing an additional unit of a
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that, at least to the extent that monopolists face downward-sloping
demand curves and cannot costlessly engage in perfect price discrimination, PG for a monopolist exceeds MR 0 . These five relationships demonstrate that the monopoly distortion in the private value
of the marginal units of output to their seller MD(PBuo) is negative-since monopoly tends to cause PBAUo = MR, to be less than
LBAuo = Po, MD(PBuo) = MRuo -PAuo < 0.
Diagram I can be used to illustrate this conclusion. If we assume that its DD and MR curves represent the curves faced by an
individual firm, Diagram I reveals that MR = PBAUo is less than
DD = LBAuo for a single-pricing seller who faces a downward-sloping demand curve in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy. In other
words, MD(PBuo)< 0. In particular, it reveals that on its assumptions MD(PBuo) at the relevant seller's equilibrium output (ON) is
JN - AN = -AJ.
This conclusion that MD(PBuo) is negative has immediate
implications for the distortion in the PC of any resources that a
"resource-consuming" APCA move withdraws from a monopolist's
UO-increasing uses. It also has implications for the distortion in
the PB that a "resource-saving" APCA move generates for the
avoider by saving resources that are subsequently devoted to UOincreasing uses by a monopolist. In particular, the negative
MD(PBtuo) causes a negative distortion in those components of
PC,,cA for a "resource-consuming" APCA move that reflects the
relevant APCA decision's withdrawal of resources from UO-increasing uses by a monopolist."

good at a given price will exceed its price since such a monopsonist will either pay
higher prices for his intramarginal units when he purchases a marginal unit at a higher
price or incur other sorts of costs to avoid such an outcome or both.
36. This conclusion can be derived from the following three relationships:
(1) the PC to an AP-cost avoider of withdrawing a resource from such a use
equals (actually, infinitesimally exceeds) its private value (PB) to the UO-increasing monopolist, which in turn equals its marginal revenue product for him
(MRP), which equals its marginal physical product for him (MPP) multiplied by
(if we assume for simplicity that MPP = 1) the marginal revenue he obtains by
selling the unit of the good G that the relevant resource would enable him to
sell (MI.);
(2) the allocative cost (LC) of an AP-cost avoider's withdrawing a resource
from a UO-increasing use (the marginal allocative product [MLP] of that resource in that use) equals the allocative value that the resource would have
generated by increasing the UO of the monopolist-which equals its MPP multiplied by (on the MPP = 1 assumption) the value of the unit it would produce
to its consumer (not its value to its producer), which on our otherwise-Pareto-
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Similarly, the conclusion that MD(PBAuo) is negative has immediate implications for the distortion in two components of the PB

that APCA moves may generate. First, the negative MD(PBuo)
deflates the component of PB,.A of any "resource-saving" APCA
move that reflects the fact that the APCA move would save resources that would subsequently be devoted to increasing the unit

output of a monopolist. 7
Second, the conclusion that MD(PBuo) is negative also implies
that monopoly deflates the component of PBcA that reflects the
tendency of the APCA move to reduce the damages that the poten-

tial injurer must pay by preventing a disabling injury to a worker
employed by a monopolist to increase his unit output.
(B)

MD(PBAQv) and Its Implications for the Monopoly Distortion
in One Possible Component of PCmA and Two Possible
Components of PB _A

Roughly speaking, the conclusion that MD(PBAQv) is negative
reflects the fact that, to the extent the use of the marginal QV

perfect assumption equals Pa (not MR0 ); and
(3) P. exceeds MR. since the relevant seller is a monopolist (who presumably
faces a downward-sloping demand curve and cannot practice price discrimination
perfectly and costlessly).
37. Once more, this conclusion that monopoly will deflate the relevant component of a
"resource-saving" avoidance move's PB,,, to the extent that the saved resources would
be subsequently devoted to UO-increasing uses by a monopolist reflects three relationships:
(1) the private benefits an AP-cost avoider obtains by saving a resource that its
monopolistic alternative user will use to increase his UO equal (infinitesimally
exceed) its MRP = MPP(MP 0 ) for the monopolist;
(2) the allocative benefits that the AP-cost avoidance generates by saving the
resource in question equal its MLP = MPP(Pr) in this alternative user's hands;
and
(3) P0 and hence the relevant MLP exceeds MR, and hence the relevant MRP
when the alternative user of the resource in question is a "monopolist" who
faces a downward-sloping demand curve and cannot price discriminate perfectly
and costlessly.
38. More specifically, since the conclusion that MD(PBUo) implies that monopoly
deflates the wages that such a potential victim would have earned had he not been disabled by deflating the private value of his output to his employer, it implies concomitantly that monopoly deflates the component of PB*e, that reflects the APCA move's
tendency to reduce the amount of wages that will be lost by those of the potential
avoider's potential victims who are employed by monopolists to increase their unit outputs.
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investment consumes resources that would otherwise have been
used to increase a monopolist's UO, PBAQv 31 exceeds LBAQV' because the PC of the marginal QV investor's using his QV investment4' is less than the LC42 of his using his QV investment.
This conclusion is rough because imperfections in goods-seller
competition distort PBaQv in several ways other than by deflating
the PB of the marginal units of old products that will be foregone
when the relevant QV investment is used. At least two such sets of
complications need to be considered.
The most important of these additional ways that a monopoly
may distort PBAQv relates to consumer surplus. One might say that
our current assumptions imply that the tendency of monopoly to
distort PBAQv by causing the sale of the new product to generate
consumer surplus must be ignored.43 However, the connection between monopoly and consumer surplus is too important to ignore.
If we attribute the consumer surplus distortion in PBAQv to the QV
investor's monopoly, the consumer surplus generated from the sale
of the new product that the relevant QV investment creates will
tend to deflate PBAQV. This result reflects the fact that such consumer surplus is part of LBAQV but not of PBAQv. However, although consumer surplus offsets the tendency of monopoly to
inflate PBAQV by deflating PBuoo, it does not offset it fully.'

39. PBAQV is the private profits that the QV investor can realize once he has created
his QV if, instead of costlessly destroying it, he uses it to produce and sell units of his
new product, to make sales from his new outlet, or to increase his average speed of
service through time.
40. LBQv is the allocative-efficiency gains generated by the use of the QV once it has
been created.
41. The PC of using a QV investment are the PC to the QV investor of the resources
he combines with his QV to produce actual units of his new product, to operate his new
outlet, or to make use of his new capacity or inventory. These PC infinitesimally exceed
the PB these resources would otherwise have yielded the producer of the marginal units
of old products that are foregone when the QV investment is used.
42. The LC of using the QV is the LB that would have been generated by the marginal units of the old products sacrificed when the QV is used.
43. This assertion reflects the fact that our current otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumption
guarantees that no problems will be caused by consumer surplus or its analogues.
44. This conclusion reflects four facts:
(1) the amount by which monopoly inflates the PBQv by deflating PBAuo of the
old products whose outputs are reduced when an already-created new product is
produced equals the number of units of old products that are foregone when
the new QV investment is used multiplied by the average (P - MR) gap of the
foregone (marginal) units of old products that are sacrificed when the QV investment is used-i.e., multiplied by the average difference between the heights
of the relevant old products' demand and marginal revenue curves between the

1996]

TORT LAW IN OUR WORSE-THAN-SECOND-BEST

WORLD

The second set of additional ways in which monopoly may
distort PBAQv relates to various factors that cause QV-investment
competition to be less than perfect.45 To the extent that the relevant marginal QV investment would reduce the profits that the
relevant QV investor expects to realize on his pre-existing projects
in the arbitrarily designated portion of product-space (ARDEPPS)
both directly' and indirectly,47 "monopoly" in the form of mo-

relevant old products' respective pre-AQV-use and post-AQV-use outputs;
(2) the amount by which consumer surplus deflates PBQv equals the number of
units of the new product that will be sold multiplied by the average gap between the height of the new product's demand and marginal revenue curves
between the vertical axis and its actual output;
(3) the characteristics of the demand and marginal revenue curves of the new
product that affect the relationship between their relative heights at different
outputs are similar to their weighted-average counterparts for the old products
whose UOs will be reduced when the new QV investment is used. Two sets of
factors are most important in this context: the convexity or concavity of the
relevant demand curves and the various factors that influence the profitability of
conventional or perfect price discrimination for the sellers of the new and old
goods. These factors are likely to be similar for the new product and the
weighted-average old product whose outputs drop when the new QV investment
is used because most of the relevant output-reduction will be suffered by product-rivals of the new QV investment; and
(4) at least in the typical situation in which sellers engage in single pricing,
the difference between the height of any related pair of demand and marginal
revenue curves increases as the output at which it is being measured rises.
In other words, since (I) the average (P - MR) difference for the marginal or last units
of output of the old products whose outputs are reduced when the new QV investment is
used controls the amount by which monopoly inflates PBQV by deflating the private cost
of using the new QV investment by deflating PBuo for the old products and (2) the
average (P - MR) difference between the vertical axis and the actual output of the new
product that the new QV investment creates controls the amount by which consumer
surplus deflates PBzQv, the fact that there is no reason to believe that the demand curve
for the new product will differ from its weighted-average counterpart for the relevant old
products and the fact that the former average (P - MR) difference will be larger than the
latter average (P - MR) difference if the new and relevant old demand curves are identical imply that monopoly inflates PBAQV more by deflating the private value in their alternative uses of the resources that the use of the QV investment consumes than it deflates
PBv by causing the use of that QV investment to generate consumer surplus. Appendix
B presents a detailed illustration of this argument and conclusion.
45. These factors cause QV investment in a given arbitrarily designated portion of
product-space (ARDEPPS) not to reach the level that would result in the ARDEPPS' most
profitable QV investments' yielding only normal rates of return over their lifetimes.
46. A QV investment reduces the profit yield of the investor's pre-existing projects
"directly" when it takes more sales and hence profits from these projects than would have
been captured by any rival QV investment it deterred.
47. A QV investment reduces the profit yield of the investor's pre-existing projects
"indirectly" when it induces more damaging non-retaliatory responses from rivals than
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nopolistic QV-investment disincentives or natural oligopolistic QVinvestment disincentives' will tend to deflate PBAQv. Similarly, to
the extent that the marginal QV investment would induce rivals to
retaliate, "monopoly" in the form of partially-distorting49 retaliation barriers to QV investment" will also tend to deflate PBQv.
However, even in conjunction with the consumer surplus deflation
of PBQv, these deflations will rarely cause MD(PBAQv) to be negative. This conclusion reflects the fact that (1) the antitrust laws
have largely eliminated retaliation barriers to QV investment and
(2) few marginal QV investors actually face monopolistic or natural
oligopolistic QV-investment disincentives. Indeed, because I think
that (1) almost all marginal QV investors who have pre-existing
projects in the relevant ARDEPPS operate in situations in which
their failure to make a marginal QV investment will induce a potential competitor to enter or an established rival to expand and (2)
such investor's marginal QV investments reduce the profits yielded
by their pre-existing projects less than those profits would otherwise be reduced by the QV investments of others their marginal
QV investments deter, I suspect that across all cases, imperfections
in QV-investment competition tend to inflate rather than deflate
MD(PBAQv). Hence, even if the presence of monopoly-related consumer surplus distortions 'in PBAQv is admitted, MD(PBAQv) will
almost certainly be positive."

would have been made to any rival QV investment it deterred.
48. Natural oligopolistic QV-investment disincentives arise when a QV investment induces a decision by a rival to make a QV investment he would not otherwise have made
by enabling him to expand without inducing the QV investor to expand in response.
49. Retaliation barriers are only partially distorting because the transaction costs of
making retaliatory communications and carrying out retaliatory threats are allocative as
well as private, and many acts of retaliation are allocatively costly, transaction costs aside.
For example, even if a retaliator would not have to incur any transaction costs to blow
up his target's factory, such a retaliatory act would be allocatively costly. Similarly,
though perhaps less obviously, even if a retaliator did not have to incur any transaction
costs to offer a retaliatory price-cut, such an act of retaliation would generate allocative
costs by creating resource misallocation to the extent that the retaliator ends up making
the sale in question since the fact that he was privately worse-placed than his target to
obtain the relevant buyer's patronage (a fact that is implied by the retaliatory character of
his price) creates a presumption that he was allocatively worse-placed to supply the relevant buyer as well.
50. Retaliation barriers (also called contrived oligopolistic QV-investment disincentives)
arise when rivals choose to make responses whose profitability is critically inflated by
their tendency to deter future competition.
51. Indeed, if one relaxes the otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumption sufficiently to permit
consideration of the effects of tax law, innovation law, and tort law on MD(PBQV), the
likely monopoly distortion in PBAQv will probably be even more positive. This conclusion
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Diagram II can be used to illustrate this conclusion. In Diagram II, DDN and MRN indicate the demand and marginal revenue

curves that the relevant QV investor will face when selling his
"new" product (hence the subscript "N"), MCN indicates the mar-

ginal cost curve the QV investor will face, and MLCN indicates the

reflects the fact that monopoly helps producers obtain and take advantage of favorable
legislation, administrative rules, and judicial holdings by eliminating or reducing the freerider problem that sometimes precludes a group of producers from incurring the amount
of lobbying and litigating expenses that would be in their collective interest Ceteris paribus, therefore, a monopolist will be more able than his collective competitive counterparts
to profit by making the expenditures that will enable him to secure and take advantage of
(1) tax law provisions (such as accelerated-depreciation and immediate-expensing provisions), (2) copyright, trademark, patent, and trade secret laws, and (3) tort law rules that
either inflate PBQ or reduce the extent to which PBQv for innovative QV investments is
deflated by free-rider externalities. For a detailed analysis of these sorts of possibilities in
the context of an analysis of MD(PB ,,J, see Richard S. Markovits, Imperfections in
Competition, Pro-Competition Policies, and Research Misallocation: A Distortion and Policy Analysis (1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For a complete analysis
of the aggregate distortion in the private profitability of QV investments, see generally
Markovits, A Basic Structure, supra note 33, at 1009-32.
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marginal allocative cost he generates when producing successive
units of his product. 2 If one assumes that the marginal QV investor faces no retaliation barriers, no monopolistic QV-investment
incentives, and no monopolistic or oligopolistic QV-investment
disincentives (and that his use of his QV investment generates no
standard joint economies or diseconomies), then PBAQV (represented
by the area HFBA) is greater than LBAQV (represented by the area
DFH) because the deflated-factor-input-cost inflation of PBAQV (area
HFBA) exceeds the consumer surplus deflation of PBAQV (area
DFH).53
The same arguments that lead to the conclusion that the negative MD(PBuo) converts into a negative monopoly distortion in
some of the components of both PCAcA and PBCA lead to analogous conclusions for the positive MD(PBAQV). Thus, the positive
MD(PBQv) inflates the private cost of any resources that any "resource-consuming" APCA move withdraws from QV-creating uses
by a firm that would have bid the resources it would have used to
produce units of its new product away from "monopolists." Similarly, the positive MD(PBQv) inflates the component of the private
benefits that any "resource-saving" APCA move generates for its
maker by enabling him to save resources that are then used to
create a QV investment whose use withdraws resources from UOincreasing uses by a monopolist. The positive MD(PBAQv) also
implies that monopoly inflates the component of the private benefits that any APCA move generates for its maker by reducing the
damages he has to pay to those potential and actual victims who
were employed to create QV investments whose use would reduce
the unit outputs of goods produced by monopolists by preventing
or reducing the consequences of accidents and pollution that would
have reduced the wages its victims earned.

52. MLC is calculated on the assumptions that the production of product N withdraws
the resources it consumes from the production of rival old products "0," that DD o and
MR o are identical to DDN and MR, and that the production of N reduces the unit output
of each of N's product-rivals by one.
53. The fact that area HFBA is twice area DFH in Diagram II is an artifact not only
of the above-listed assumptions but also of the fact that DDNo is linear and intersects the
y-axis at a 45-degree angle. There is no reason to assume that the substitution of more
realistic assumptions would critically affect the text's qualitative conclusion.
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MD(PB pR) and Its Implications for the Monopoly Distortion
in One Possible Component of PCAcA and Two Possible
Components of PBc

Even on our otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumption, monopoly
may distort the PB a given PPR discovery generates both by mak-

ing it profitable for them to increase their UOs (when it lowers the
MC the discovery-user must incur to increase his output above its
original equilibrium level) and by reducing the costs that the
discovery's users must incur to produce their pre-PPR outputs.
Each of these possibilities will now be analyzed in turn.
Monopoly tends to deflate the PB a production-process discovery enables its users to obtain by making it profitable for him to
expand his unit output because the monopolist's own monopoly
will tend to deflate the MR he obtains on the extra units more
than the monopoly of his factor-competitors will deflate the private
cost to the discovery-user of the extra UO.54

54. This conclusion reflects the following three propositions:
(1) if the discovery-user withdrew all the resources he used to increase his UO
from unit-output-increasing uses by others, his own monopoly would on the
average deflate his own PB,, o by the same percentage as the monopoly of his
factor-competitors would deflate PCuo for him by deflating PBAuo for them
sincence his P/MC ratio in general equals their weighted-average P/MC ratio;
(2) to the extent that the discovery-user withdraws some of the resources he
uses to increase his UO from the "production" of leisure, the monopoly percentage-deflation in PCuo for him-MD(PCAu)/PCud-tends to be lower than
the monopoly percentage-deflation in his PBAUo--(MD(PBu)/PBAUo-because
monopoly does not deflate the private cost to him of the resources he withdraws from the production of leisure inasmuch as leisure-producers are not
monopolists; and
(3) to the extent that the discovery-user withdraws some of the resources he
uses from QV creation and PPR execution, the monopoly percentage-deflation
in PC,o for the discovery-user tends to be lower than the monopoly percentage-deflation in PBAuo for him. Even if the weighted-average monopoly percentage-deflation of PB~np--MD(PB J0/PBa1.-is higher than the weighted-average
monopoly percentage-deflation of PBAuo for the PPR executers and UO producers from whom the discovery-user withdraws the resources he uses to increase
his output, the effect of any such difference will be more than offset by the
fact that monopoly inflates PBQV and hence the cost to the UO-increasing
discovery-user of bidding resources away from QV creation.
This last point will be particularly forceful if, as I believe, far more of the resources
that a PPR-discovery user employs to increase his UO are withdrawn from QV creation
than from PPR execution since far more of our society's resources are used to create QV
than to execute PPR projects.
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The sign of the monopoly distortion in the component of
PBPPR that reflects the discovery's tendency to reduce the PC that
the discovery's users must incur to produce their pre-PPR UOs is
complicated to analyze. The preceding demonstration that
MD(PBuo) is negative and that MD(PBAQv) is positive does make
it likely that monopoly will distort this component of PBeR by
distorting the private-cost savings that PPR discoveries enable their
users to achieve on their pre-PPR UOs. However, it is difficult to
predict the net effect of the former two monopoly distortions. On
the one hand, the fact that MD(PBuo) is negative implies that
monopoly will tend to deflate the private-cost savings that a PPR
discovery enables its users to achieve when producing their prediscovery outputs to the extent that the resources the relevant discovery enables its users to save when producing their pre-discovery
outputs are subsequently used to increase the unit output of a monopolist. On the other hand, the fact that MD(PBQv) is positive
implies that monopoly will tend to inflate the private-cost savings
that a PPR discovery enables its users to achieve when producing
their pre-discovery outputs to the extent that the resources the
discovery enables its users to save when producing their pre-discovery outputs are subsequently used to create QV investments by
firms that would bid the resources they would employ to use those
QV investments away from UO-increasing uses by "monopolists."
The net effect of the monopoly distortions in PBAuo and PBAQv
on the distortion in the private benefits that a PPR discovery enables its user to obtain on his original output depends on (1) the
percentage of the resources that the discovery enables its user to
save that he originally withdrew respectively from UO-increasing
and QV-creating uses and (2) the relative absolute size of the
monopoly percentage-deflation of PBAuo versus the monopoly percentage-inflation of PBQv. Because I believe that (1) the percentage
of any saved resources originally withdrawn from or devoted to
UO-increasing uses was or will be far higher than the percentage
of the saved resources originally withdrawn from or devoted to
QV-creating uses55 and (2) the ratio of the above two percentages
far exceeds the ratio of the absolute monopoly percentage-inflation
of PBAQv to the absolute monopoly percentage-deflation of PBAuo

55. I base this belief on the fact that far more resources are devoted to UO-increasing
uses than to QV-creating uses.
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(which is probably less than one), I conclude that monopoly also
deflates the cost-saving-related component of PBApR.
To illustrate the preceding analysis of the MD in the cost-saving-related component of PBAPR, I will develop examples that
reveal the factors that determine the relevant percentage-distortions
and the percentage of the resources saved by the use of the discovery that the marginal PPR project generates that will be devoted
respectively to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing
uses. In addition, the examples will illuminate the reasons for believing that the monopoly distortion in the cost-saving component
of PB~pR is negative.
The easiest monopoly percentage-distortion to analyze is
%MD(PBuo). This monopoly percentage-distortion will depend
solely on the P/MC ratio of the sellers. I will assume that sellers
do not price discriminate and that P is 25% higher than MC and
MR
throughout
the
economy.
On
this
assumption,
%MD(PBuo) = -25%.
The determinants of %MD(PBAQv) are far more complex. The
value assigned to %MD(PBAQv) in the following text reflects all the
following assumptions:
(1) the price of each product is 25% higher than its marginal cost and marginal revenue throughout the economy,
and, concomitantly, %MD(PBAuo) = -25%;
(2) each marginal QV investor withdraws all the resources
consumed by the use of his investment from the production
of one unit of each of the old products whose production
the use of the marginal QV investment reduces;
(3) the relevant marginal QV investors and the sellers from
whom they withdraw the resources they use to produce
actual units of the new products that their marginal QV
investments create face identical linear demand curves that
intersect the vertical axis at a 45* angle;
(4) all relevant sellers practice single pricing;
(5) all marginal QV investors face horizontal marginal cost
curves;
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(6) each producer in the economy sells 201 units of his
product at a price of $10 5 per
unit and faces constant mar6
ginal costs of $8 per unit;
(7) the total variable cost of producing each product in the
economy (and hence, inter alia, of using the QV investment) is therefore 201($8)= $1608;
(8) the relevant marginal QV investors face no monopolistic or natural oligopolistic QV-investment disincentives, no
retaliation barriers to QV investment, and no monopolistic
QV-investment incentives;
(9) the private non-QV fixed cost of producing each product in the economy (and hence, inter alia, of using each
marginal QV investment) is $102;
(10) the operating profits that each product in the economy
generates (inter alia, that each marginal QV investor realizes by using his QV investment rather than costlessly destroying it) are $300 = $2010 - $1608 - $102; and
(11) the private cost of creating each product in the economy (inter alia, of each marginal QV investment) is also
$300.57
On these assumptions, the monopoly power of the firms from
which the marginal QV investor bids away the resources his investment consumes will deflate the cost to him of using his QV investment by 25% of $1710 (the cost to him of using his QV investment equals $1608 + $102) or $427.50. In the other direction,
the consumer surplus generated by the marginal QV investor's use
of his QV investment will deflate the private benefits of his using
his QV investment by $202 (one-half the amount by which it de56. These specific assumptions will be consistent with our premise that all actors are
sovereign maximizers if we assume that each unit of distance along the horizontal axis
stands for one unit of output and each unit of distance along the vertical axis stands for
one cent. In this case, our assumption that the relevant demand curve is linear and has a
slope of one (intersects the vertical axis at a 45* angle) implies that each seller would be
able to sell 200 units of his product at $10.01 per unit. The marginal revenue each seller
will
be
able
to
obtain
by
selling
his
marginal
(201st) unit
is
201($10) - 200($10.01) = $2010 - $2002 = $8, which equals the assumed marginal cost of
that unit.
57. This assumption is consistent with the assumption that the new investment in question is marginal in that it implies that the relevant investors just break even on the marginal QV investments.
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flated the variable cost of using the QV investment in question).
Hence,
MD(PBAQv) = -$202 - (-$427.50) = $225.50,
and
%MD(PBAQv) = $225.50/$300 or approximately 75.17%.
The final %MD that needs to be determined is %MD(PB~po. I
will assume for simplicity that of the resources that will be saved
by the discovery generated by the marginal PPR project, 80% will
be saved for unit-output-increasing uses, 20% for QV-creating uses
and none for PPR-executing uses. If I proceed on the basis of the
previous
conclusions
that
%MD(PBuo) = -25%
while
%MD(PBAQv) = +75.17% and focus on a PPR discovery that will
reduce the costs its users have to incur to produce their pre-discovery outputs by $250, the preceding assumptions that 80% of the
saved resources will be subsequently devoted to UO-increasing uses
and 20% to QV-creating uses imply that monopoly will deflate the
reduced-cost-of-producing-the-pre-discovery-output
component of
PBppR by (25%)($200) - (75.17%)($50) = $50 - ($37.58) or approximately $12.42. This represents a percentage-distortion of approximately (-3.105%) of the relevant private benefits. If we revise the
initial assumption that none of the resources the PPR discovery
saves will be used to execute a PPR project by reducing the percentage of the saved resources devoted to creating QV investments
from 20% to 15% and increasing the percentage devoted to executing PPR projects from zero percent to five percent, both the monopoly distortion and the monopoly percentage-distortion in this
component of PBpR will have a somewhat higher absolute value.
Thus, if %MD~R is (-6%), MD(PBpp) will approximately equal
(-25%)($200) + (75.17%)($37.50) + (-6%)($12.50) = (-$50 +
$28.125 - $.75) = -$22.625, and %MD for this component of
PBIIPR will approximately equal (-5.66%). This conclusion is consistent with the assumption that %MD(PBpR) is (-6%) since, as
Section C.3 will show, the profits the discovery enables its makers
to achieve by increasing their unit outputs are probably deflated by
more than 5.66%. 5

58. This particular conclusion is an artifact of the numerical assumptions I have used,
such as the assumption that more of the saved resources are devoted to UO-increasing
uses than to QV-creating uses and the assumption that the absolute value of the negative
MD(PBuo)IPBAuo is higher than the absolute value of the positive MD(PB Qv)/PBQv. Still,
I doubt that any realistic variations in assumptions would change my conclusion that the
sign of the component of MD(PB,r, that reflects the tendency of monopoly to distort
the amount by which a given PPR discovery will enable its users to reduce the private
cost of producing their pre-discovery outputs is negative. Since, as I have already shown,
monopoly also tends to deflate PB.
by deflating the PB that PPR discoveries enable
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I have now explained why I think monopoly will deflate both
the profits-from-increasing-unit-output component of PBI,,PR and the
cost-savings-on-original-unit-output component of PBpR. Admittedly, monopoly may also ceteris paribus distort PB,,pR in other ways.
Even on our current assumptions, an independent discovery-user's
monopoly may deflate PB,,PR by enabling him to obtain surplus
when buying the right to use the discovery (by giving him monopsony power). In addition, the monopoly power of the labor unions that represent the production-process researcher's employees
may deflate PBpR by enabling those employees to share any profits--or worse yet, any operating profits-the research would otherwise yield. Moreover, in the real world, in which other Pareto
imperfections may be present, the monopoly power of the production-process researcher may deflate PB,,PR by enabling prospective
production-process researchers to secure favorable tort law and
environmental law provisions. 9 It may also inflate PBpR by enabling them to secure favorable innovation law (patent, copyright,
trade secret, and trademark law) and tax law provisions by eliminating what might otherwise be critical public-goods-type problems
that would preclude them from engaging in the amount of lobbying
and related activities that would be in their collective private interest.

is almost always negative.
their users to obtain by expanding their Uos, MD(PBP,,)
59. Indeed, since in practice a potential injurer's failure to engage in APCAR is never
assessed for negligence, monopoly currently does deflate PBAP for all projects that might
discover production-processes whose use would reduce external accident-and-pollution costs
to all production-process researchers who are liable for any otherwise-external accidentand-pollution costs they might generate if and only if they are held to be negligent for
generating them. Appendix C explains this claim.
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Diagram III illustrates the preceding analysis of MD(PB~pp) for
a marginal PPR project. It illustrates the analysis when the production-process researcher is the only user of his discovery and the
use of the new production-process discovery reduces only the marginal costs of production. Specifically, Diagram III assumes that
the use of the discovery reduces MC from MCo to MC, while reducing MLC from MLCo to MLCN (where "0" stands for "old"
and "N" for "new").
The construction of Diagram III is based on two assumptions
that respectively will and may affect the qualitative conclusion that
monopoly deflates both the profits-from-increasing-unit-output and
reduced-cost-of-producing-original-output components of PBPR. The
assumption that clearly is critical is that the monopoly imperfections deflate the MC of using either the old production-process or
the new one the PPR discovers. Thus, MCo <MLCo, and
MCN < MLCN.

The assumption that may be critical in individual

cases (though it is neutral across all cases) is that the pre-discovery
output of the potential discovery-user (CD, the output at which MR
cuts MCo from above) equals the allocatively efficient output (GH,
the output at which MLV = LBAuo cuts MLCo from above). Diagram II also reflects two additional assumptions that, while not
critical to the qualitative conclusions, will affect the quantitative
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conclusions to which it leads. First, the MLC curves are 50%
higher than their MC counterparts (the monopoly percentage-deflations in the MCs are 50%). Second, the PPR discovery enables its
user to reduce his marginal costs by 50%.
Diagram mI illustrates the fact that-if we ignore the tendency
of monopoly to distort the private profitability of PPR by enabling
potential discovery-users to profit from using the discovery, researcher-employees to share what would otherwise be the
discoverer's profits, or potential discoverers to obtain or take advantage of distorting tort and environmental law, innovation law,
and tax law provisions-MD(PB,,p) is negative. Thus, in Diagram
I, both the profits-from-increasing-unit-output component of PBAIpR
and the reduced-cost-of-producing-the-original-output component of
PB~pR are deflated. In particular, the allocative-efficiency gains
generated by the increase in output the discovery makes it profitable for its users to execute (area HLMI-the area between the
MLV = LBAoo curve and the MLCN curve between the pre-discovery output OA [the output at which MR cuts MCo from above]
and the post-discovery output OB [the output at which MR cuts
MCN from above]) exceed the private profits the output-increase
yields the discoverer (area DKE-the area between the MR = PBAuo
curve and the MCN curve between outputs OA and OB). Since
MLCo exceeds MCo by the same percentage by which MLCN exceeds MCN, both the per-unit and total reduction in allocative cost
exceed the per-unit and total reduction in private cost by the same
(50%) percentage by which the relevant MLC curves exceed their
MC counterparts. Thus, the per-unit reduction in MLC-GJ--exceeds the per-unit reduction in MC--CF-by 50%, and the
allocative-cost
savings
on
the
original
output
(area
GHIJ = [GJ][OA]) exceed the private-cost savings on the original
output (area CDEF = [CF][OA]) by 50%.'
The negative MD(PBpR) affects various components of PC,,,,,
and PBAPcA in the same way that the negative MD(PBuo) affected
the counterpart components of PCcA and PB11cA. Thus, the negative sign of MD(PBPPR) implies that monopoly deflates those com-

60. Once more, although the fact that the percentage-deflation in question is 50% is an
artifact of the assumption that monopoly deflates MC by 50%, the qualitative conclusion
that monopoly deflates the cost-savings-on-original-output component of PB11R reflects
nothing more than the realistic assumptions that led me to conclude that monopoly deflates MC. In any event, in the case presented in Diagram III, MD(PBo.J = -(HLMI
-DKE) - (GHIJ - CDFE) < 0.
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ponents of PCpcA that reflect the additional non-AP costs that a
"resource-consuming" avoidance move generates to the extent that
it withdraws resources from PPR-executing uses, while it deflates
two possible components of PBmACA. These components are those
that reflect that (1) the tendency of a "resource-saving" APCA
move to save resources that are subsequently devoted to executing
a PPR project and (2) the tendency of any type of APCA move to
reduce the damages that the potential injurer must pay by reducing
the amount of wages that his activity causes PPR-executing victims
to lose by disabling them (to the extent that the potential victims
functioned by executing PPR projects).
This completes my explanation of why and how (1) monopoly

distorts PBAuO PBAQv, and

PBIpR

and (2) these monopoly distor-

tions convert into distortions in various possible components of
PCAA and PBAA A.
2. The Reasons for Concluding that Monopoly Virtually Always
on Balance
Distorts PCAPCA, PBA,_A and Pir~c,
The above demonstration that monopoly distorts various components of both PCecA and PBAmA does not itself establish that
monopoly distorts PC,,cA, PBAA,, or Pir, for either intra-marginal or marginal (last) APCA moves on balance. As Second-Best
Theory should remind us, the monopoly distortions in the various
components of either or both PC.ApCA and PBCA could perfectly
counteract each other, and even if MD(PCtcA) and MD(PBCA)
were not zero, the on-balance monopoly distortions in the PC and
PB of a given move or all APCA moves could perfectly counteract
each other. This section explains why MD(PCpCA), MD(PB c,),
and MD(PcAcu,) are zero only rarely and fortuitously.
The fact that monopoly inflates and deflates various possible
components of the private cost of APCA in different circumstances
does not guarantee that it distorts PC,,A. If some of the resources
that APCA would "consume" would otherwise be used either to
increase the unit output of a monopolist or to execute a PPR project and some would be used to create a QV investment whose use
would attract resources away from the production of marginal units
of a monopolized good, monopoly might have no net distorting
effect on PCApcA- However, since the relevant imperfections will
perfectly counteract each other only fortuitously, this result would
be exceedingly unlikely to occur in practice.
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Similarly, monopoly may not produce any net distortion in
PB~AApc despite the fact that it distorts various individual private
benefits that particular APCA moves generate for the avoider since
the individual distortions may cancel each other out. MD(PB,,,)
for a "resource-saving" APCA move would be zero if (A) the
amount by which monopoly deflated the components of the PB of
such a move's value it deflated6 equaled (B) the amount by
which monopoly inflated the components of the PB of that move's
value it inflated.62 Because (A) will equal (B) only rarely and fortuitously, MD(PBAPcA) will equal zero only rarely and fortuitously.
Finally, MD(PircAA) could be zero despite the fact that monopoly distorted the private value of various components of both
PCPA and PB,,cA. Indeed, monopoly would fall to distort PTrCMc
if either of two sets of conditions were fulfilled: (1) monopoly did
not distort either PC,,,cA or PBtc on balance in that the distortion it generated in the various components of each cancel out, or
(2) monopoly produced perfectly counteracting distortions in
PCAcA and PBAc^. We have just seen that the first of these two
sets of conditions will be fulfilled only rarely and fortuitously. It
should be apparent that the second set is unlikely to be fulfilled
more often.
This section has demonstrated that even in an otherwise-Paretoperfect world in which, inter alia, tort law doctrine, personnel, and
institutions are all first-best-allocatively-efficient, monopoly will
distort not only various components of PCA and PB,PCA but
also PCACA, PB1APCA, and PrAA overall for both non-marginal
and marginal APCA moves.

61. Monopoly deflates two components of the PB such a move generates: (1) the PB
it generates directly by reducing the amount of resources the avoider uses (AP costs
aside) by deflating the private value of the resources it would save even if it did not
reduce AP costs to subsequent users who would put them to unit-output-increasing or
PPR-executing uses (by deflating the original private cost of the saved resources to the
avoider) and (2) the PB it generates indirectly by reducing the damages for which the
avoider is liable by deflating the gross wages of those unit-output-increasing or PPR-executing workers whose disablement it would prevent (by deflating the related damages the
avoidance move would obviate the avoider's paying).
62. Monopoly inflates two components of the PB such a move generates: (1) the PB it
generates directly by reducing the amount of resources the avoider uses (AP costs aside)
by inflating the private value of the resources it would save even if it did not reduce AP
costs to subsequent users who would put them to QV-creating uses (by inflating the original private cost of the saved resources to the avoider) and (2) the PB it generates indirectly by reducing the damages for which the avoider is liable by deflating the gross
wages of those QV-creating workers whose disablement it would prevent.

1996]

TORT LAW IN OUR WORSE-THAN-SECOND-BEST

WORLD

365

C. MD(PzrAApcA) = XD(Pt , cA) for Different Types of Last Marginal APCA Moves or Last Incremental APCA Moves That Break
Even in an Otherwise-Pareto-PerfectEconomy That Does Contain
Some Imperfections in Seller Competition

On the assumption that the tort law system is FBLE and that
the economy does not contain any monopsony, externalities not
covered by tort law, taxes on the margin of income, human errors,
or critically distorting buyer surplus, Part C analyzes the tendency
of monopoly to distort the private profitability of various types of
APCA moves. Because avoidance moves differ in ways that substantially affect both the analysis of and the magnitude of the
monopoly distortion in their private profitability, Part C analyzes
separately the monopoly distortion in the private profitability of
various types of avoidance moves. More specifically, three differences among the various types of avoidance moves are critical in
this respect. First, some are "resource-consuming" in the sense that
they would increase the amount of resources the avoider used (AP
costs aside), others are "resource-neutral," while still others are
"resource-saving" even if they would not affect AP costs. Second,
shifts to less-AP-cost-prone product-variants or locations may be
shifts to product-variants or locations whose average dollar value to
their consumers is higher than, equal to, or lower than the average
dollar value of their more-AP-cost-prone alternatives to their different consumers. Third, the percentage of the resources that resourceconsuming APCA moves must draw from QV-creating and PPRexecuting uses may be higher than, the same as, or lower than the
percentage of all resources in the economy devoted to QV creation
and PPR execution.
Part C groups avoidance moves according to whether they vary
along these three dimensions. In particular, for the above three
reasons, it is necessary to focus separately on (1) shifts to a
known, less-AP-cost-prone production-process or to a known, lessAP-cost-prone product-variant or location whose average dollar
value to its consumers equals the average dollar value of its relevant more-AP-cost-prone alternative to its probably different consumers, (2) shifts to a known, less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or
location whose average dollar value to its consumers is higher or
lower than its counterpart to the presumably somewhat different
consumers of its relevant more-AP-cost-prone alternative, (3) decisions to reduce unit output or shut down altogether, and (4) deci-
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sions to do AP-cost-avoiding research (APCAR) into less-AP-costprone production-processes, locations, or product-variants.63
All the analyses that follow are based on six sets of assumptions:
(1) The APCA decision in question is a positive, last incremental APCA decision of the relevant type that just breaks
even-i.e., whose PC equals its PB-or a last infinitesimally small APCA decision-whose PC also equals its PB.
(2) One percent of any resources that APCA withdraws
from alternative uses are withdrawn from the "production"
of leisure.
(3) (A) Eighty percent of the economy's traditional factors
of production are devoted to increasing UO, fifteen
percent are devoted to creating QV, five percent are
devoted to executing (non-AP-cost-avoiding) PPR, and
a negligible percent are devoted to APCAR; and
(B) Any traditional factors of production that APCA
saves by reducing AP costs will subsequently be devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing
uses in 80-15-5 proportions.
(4) Resources are somewhat specialized in terms of their
likely functional-categories of use. In particular, the kinds
of individuals who possess the technical knowledge and
skills relevant for APCAR are more likely to be put to
alternative QV-creating uses (in which they would design
physically new product-variants) or to PPR-executing uses
(in which they would discover production-processes that are
not AP-cost-avoiding) than to UO-increasing uses.
Relatedly, the kinds of individuals who are able to discover
locations that are rendered profitable by their cost versus
AP-cost-proneness trade-off are more likely to be put to
alternative QV-creating uses (in which they would discover
distributive-outlet locations whose cost versus attractivenessto-consumers trade-off makes them profitable) or to non-

63. These positive APCAR decisions can be further differentiated according to the
probability that the average dollar value to consumers of any less-AP-cost-prone productvariant or location that is discovered will be higher or lower than the average dollar
value to consumers of the more-AP-cost-prone alternative that the discovery will replace.
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AP-cost-reducing PPR-executing uses (in which they would
discover locations whose cost-of-inputs versus attractiveness-to-consumers trade-off makes them profitable) than to
UO-increasing uses.
(5) At various times, the analyses that follow are based on
two more specific assumptions about the degree to which
the resources that are devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses are specialized to the type of
use. In particular, at various times the following assumptions are made:
(A) A higher percentage of the resources that are devoted to PPR-executing and APCAR-executing uses
than to QV-creating uses are technical or locationknowledgeable resources. This reflects the fact that
many of the resources used to create QV investments
are "non-technical" (are used to package and promote
new product-variants that may not be physically distinctive). Only those resources creating the relatively small
percentage of QV investments that develop physically
distinctive product-variants or novel distributive outlets
are likely to be "technical" resources in the relevant
sense.
(B) Despite assumption (5)(A) and the assumption that
the resources APCA saves by reducing AP costs will
be devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPRexecuting uses in 75-20-5 proportions, it is assumed
that the net resource flow to or from QV-creating uses
generated by the execution and AP-cost-reducing consequences of any given positive APCA decision is larger
than the net resource flow to or from PPR-executing
uses generated by the APCA decision. This reflects a
judgment that the fact that far more resources are devoted to QV creation than to PPR execution in our
economy outweighs the "fact" that many of the resources used to create QV investments are "non-technical."
(6) The monopoly percentage-distortions in the private
value of marginal UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPRexecuting uses are respectively (-25%), (+75%), and
(-6%). Part B delineated assumptions under which each of
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these figures would be approximately correct.'
All of the above assumptions are plausible and few of my
conclusions about the sign of MD(PrMpcA) for particular types of
APCA decisions would be affected by plausible variations in them.
More importantly, my conclusion that MD(PxctA) is significantly
different from zero for all (or at least many) types of APCA business-decisions (the conclusion that is critical for my Second-Best
critique of FBLE tort law) is almost certainly not sensitive to plausible variations either in the above assumptions or in the other assumptions that the preceding paragraphs have delineated or both.
1. The Relationship Between (A) MD(PBuo), MD(PBAQv), and
MD(PB pR) and (B) the MD in the Private Profitability of
Decisions to Reduce AP Costs by Shifting to a Known,
Otherwise-More-Expensive Production-Process-MD(PCps)---or to
a Known, Less-AP-Cost-Prone Product-Variant or Location Whose
Average Dollar Value to Its Consumers Equals the Average Dollar
Value of Its More-AP-Cost-Prone Alternative to Its Possibly
Different Consumers
Tables IA and IB respectively illustrate the analysis of the monopoly distortion in the private cost and private benefits of a last
incremental shift to a less-AP-cost-prone but otherwise-more-expensive production-process ("PPS" stands for "production-process
shift") that will yield $100 in both PCs and PBs to the shifter. The
Tables also apply to the analysis of "product-variant or location
shifts" (symbolized as "VLS" where "VL" stands for "productvariant" and "location") to less-A.P-cost-prone product-variants or
locations whose average dollar value to their consumers equals the
average dollar value of their more-AP-cost-prone alternatives to the
latter's presumably-somewhat-different consumers. This equal-consumer-evaluation assumption is indicated by the equation
"ACEO = 0," which states that the change in the consumer evaluation of the units of output is zero.

64. See supra pp. 357-59.
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MD(PCpps) or MD(PCvLs)
When ACEuo = 0
CostCategories

(1)
PCAs

(2)
%MD(PC)
for PC in
Indicated
Category

(3)
MD(PC) for
PC in Indicated Category

(A)

Resources
Withdrawn
from UOIncreasing
Uses

(83%)$99
$82.17

=

-25%

-$20.5425

(B)

Resources
Withdrawn
from QVCreating
Uses

(13%)$99
$12.87

=

+75%

+$9.6525

(C)

Resources
Withdrawn
from PPRExecuting
Uses

(4%)$99
$3.96

-6%

-$.2376

(D)

Resources
Withdrawn
from Leisure
Production

(1%)$100
$1

0%

$0

(E)

TOTAL

$100

=

=

-$11.1176

Table IA focuses on MD(PCps). The entries in the various
cells of Rows A, B, and C respectively present information relating
to the resources that the execution of a switch to a less-AP-costprone but otherwise-more-expensive production-process would withdraw from UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses.
The entry in Row D presents information relating to the resources
such a shift would withdraw from the "production" of leisure. The
entries in the various cells of Row E present information about
various totals.
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Column 1 of Table IA indicates the percentages of the non-APcost-related PC that such a production-process-shifting avoider
would have to incur to use the less-AP-cost-prone production-process that reflect the additional resources that the shift would require
him to withdraw respectively from UO-increasing, QV-creating,
PPR-executing, and Le-producing uses. Since we are assuming that
PC,,s = $100, the percentage figures also indicate the dollar-private-costs in each category, and the entry in cell ID is $100. The
specific entry in cell 1D reflects the assumption that 1% of the
resources will be withdrawn from the "production" of leisure. The
specific entries in cells 1A, 1B, and IC reflect the assumption that
the economy's traditional factors of production are devoted to UOincreasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses in 80-15-5 proportions and the assumption that (AP costs aside) UO increases are
more likely to withdraw resources from UO-increasing uses and
less likely to withdraw resources from QV-creating uses and PPRexecuting uses than one would predict from the percentages of all
traditional factors of production devoted to the different use-categories.
Thus, Table IA indicates that 83% rather than 80% of the
resources that are not withdrawn from the "production" of leisure
are withdrawn from UO-increasing uses, 13% of these resources
rather than 15% are withdrawn from QV-creating uses, and 4% of
these resources rather than 5% are withdrawn from PPR-executing
uses. The entries in cells 1B and 1C of Table IA also reflect the
assumption that the 4% of the relevant PCs that reflect resources
withdrawn from PPR-executing uses is 25% below the percentage
one would predict from the percentage of all traditional factors of
production (5%) assumed to be devoted to PPR execution, while
the 13% of the relevant PCs that reflect resources withdrawn from
QV-creating uses is only 13(1/3)% below the percentage one would
predict from the percentage of all traditional factors of production
assumed to be devoted to QV creation (15%).65 Finally, the entries in cells 1B and 1C of Table IA are consistent with the assumption that the net resource flow to or from QV-creating uses
generated by a given APCA decision is larger than the net resource
flow to or from PPR-executing uses.' Thus, the absolute amount
($1.98) by which the PC of the resources withdrawn from QV-

65. For an explanation see (5)(A) in the preceding list. See supra p. 367.
66. For an explanation see (5)(B) in the preceding list. See supra p. 367.
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creating uses ($12.87) falls below what one would have predicted
($14.85) from the percentage of all uses in that category is higher
than the absolute amount ($.99) by which the PC of the resources
withdrawn from PPR-executing uses ($3.96) falls below what one
would have predicted ($4.95) from the percentage of all resources
in that category.
Column 2 of Table IA indicates the monopoly percentage-distortion in the PB of resources in the different categories of use and
hence in the PC to the production-process-shifting avoider of any
resources he withdraws from the category of use. The specific
entries in Column 2 are dictated by the assumption67 that the monopoly percentage-distortions in the private benefits generated by
marginal UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses are
respectively (-25%), (75%), and (-6%) or by the fact that
monopoly does not distort the PB of leisure since that good is consumed by its "producer."
Column 3 of Table IA indicates the absolute number of dollars
by which monopoly distorts the PC to the production-process-shifting avoider of the additional resources his shift requires him to
withdraw from the row-indicated category of use (or in the case of
cell 3E, from all use-categories combined). The entries in any cell
of Column 3 are equal to the product of the entries in Columns 1
and 2 of the same row. As the entries in Column 3 indicate, on
the basis of our assumptions, monopoly deflates PCpps by
-$20.5425 by deflating by 25% the PB to their alternative users of
the $82.17 of resources (measured in PC terms) that the execution
of such a production-process shift would withdraw from UO-increasing uses. Monopoly inflates PC,,, by $9.6525 by inflating by
75% the PB to the alternative users of the $12.87 of resources
(measured in PC terms) that the execution of such a productionprocess shift would withdraw from QV-creating uses. Monopoly
also deflates PCps by $.2376 by deflating by 6% the PB to their
alternative users of the $3.96 of resources (measured in PC terms)
that the execution of such a production-process shift would
withdraw from PPR-executing uses. Consequently, monopoly
deflates PCpps by $11.1176 by distorting the PB in their relevant
alternative uses of the extra resources such a shift would consume.

67. Refer to assumption (6) in the preceding list. See supra pp. 367-68.
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Table 1B

MD(PBPs) or MD(PBv.) When ACEJo -0
BenefitsCategories

(1)
PB in Indicated Category

(2)
%MD(PB)
MD(PB)/PB

(3)
MD(PB.Ps)
for PB in
Indicated
Category

(A)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
UO-Increasing Uses

(80%)$90
$72

=

-25%

-$18

(B)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
QV-Creating
Uses

(15%)$90
$13.50

=

+75%

+$10.125

(C)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
PPR-Executing Uses

(5%)$90
$4.50

-6%

-$.27

(D)

Prevented P,
S, & ,-ATE

(10%)$100
$10

0%

$0

(E)

TOTAL

$100

=

=

-$8.1475

Table IB presents analogous information for the private benefits
that such a shift to a less-AP-cost-prone production-process would
generate by reducing AP costs. Table IB contains a different Row
D, whose inclusion reflects the fact that some of the AP costs that
the shift would avoid do not reflect its saving traditional factors of
production by preventing the total or partial, permanent or temporary disablement of workers. In particular, Row D reflects the fact
that part of the PBs that any APCA move generates reflects its
preventing the victims' pain and suffering as well as any illnessrelated or injury-related reductions in their ability to obtain enjoyment from a given amount of resources, for which the potential
injurer would be liable. Cell 1D of Table IB reflects the assump-
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tion that 10% of the $100 of PB..s reflects the fact that the avoidance move would reduce the avoider's expected liability by reducing the amount of pain, suffering, and reductions in the ability to
enjoy (hereinafter "P, S, & I.ATE") he causes. The entries in cells
1A, 1B, and 1C reflect the related fact that only $90 of the PBs
consist of saved traditional factors of production and the assumption that those saved factors will be devoted in 80-15-5 proportion to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses. Like
their counterparts in Table IA, the entries in cells 2A, 2B, and 2C
of Table LB are dictated by the assumption that the monopoly percentage-distortions in the private value of marginal UO-increasing,
QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses are respectively (-25%),
(75%), and (-6%). The (0%) entry in cell 2D reflects the fact that
monopoly does not distort the PB that the avoidance move generates by reducing P, S, & .1ATE.
The entries in Column 3 of Table LB are also analogous to
their counterparts in Table IA-the entries also equal the product
of the entries in Columns 1 and 2 of their row. As the entries in
Column 3 indicate, on our assumptions, the fact that monopoly
deflates by 25% the PB to a producer of increasing his unit output
marginally implies that it will deflate PB1,s in our example by $18
on this account since we are assuming that $72 of the resources
the relevant production-process shift saves (measured in PC terms)
are saved for subsequent marginal unit-output-increasing uses. Similarly, on our assumptions, the fact that monopoly inflates by 75%
the PB to a marginal QV investor of creating a QV investment
implies that it will inflate PBpps in our example by $10.125 on
this account since we are assuming that $13.50 of the resources the
relevant production-process shift saves are saved for subsequent
QV-creating uses. Again, on our assumptions, the fact that
monopoly deflates by 6% the PB that a marginal production-process researcher obtains by executing his marginal PPR project
implies that it will deflate PB~,s in our example by $.27 on this
account since we are assuming that $4.50 of the resources that the
relevant production-process shift saves are saved for subsequent
PPR-executing uses. Consequently, monopoly deflates PBps by
$8.1475 by distorting the PB that their alternative employers will
obtain from the traditional factors of production that the production-process shift saves by reducing AP costs.

68. Refer to (3)(B) in the preceding list of assumptions. See supra p. 366.
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When combined with its predecessor, this conclusion implies
that monopoly inflates the private profitability of the last incremental shift to a less-AP-cost-prone but otherwise-more-expensive production-process. As demonstrated by our example, since
MD(Picpps) = MD(PBJps) - MD(PCpps) = -$8.1475 - (-$11.1176), it

follows that MD(Pnps) = +$2.9701.69
In the case Table I illustrates, the monopoly distortion would
have critically affected the decision. In particular, it would have
induced the actor to make the production-process shift despite the
fact that the relevant shift to a less-AP-cost-prone but otherwise
more-expensive production-process was allocatively inefficient.
Specifically, in the case Table I presents, monopoly makes the relevant shift break even despite the fact that, in the absence of the
monopoly distortion in its profitability, the shift would have yielded a $2.9701 loss.
Admittedly, this analysis ignores an additional consideration
discussed in Section C.3 that tends to undercut both this section's
specific "inflation" conclusion and, more importantly, its conclusion
that MD(PcMps) is likely to differ significantly from zero. In particular, Table lEB ignores those PBs that any production-process shift
that reduces marginal costs generates by making it profitable for
the avoider to expand his unit output. This omission is important
because, as Section C.3 argues, monopoly tends to deflate those
profits by a higher percentage than it deflates the other PBs.7"
This fact is significant because it implies that the substitution of
these PBs for a sufficient portion of the PBs listed in Rows A
through D of Column 1 of Table IB to keep total PB... equal to
$100 will tend to increase the total MD(PBPPS) above the $8.1475
entry in cell 3E of Table IB and concomitantly will tend to de-

69. Basically, this result reflects three assumptions: (1) the percentage of the traditional
factors of production that the relevant shift consumes that is withdrawn from UO-increasing uses (83%) is higher than the percentage of the traditional factors of production that
the shift saves that is subsequently devoted to UO-increasing uses (75%); (2) some (1%)
of the resources that the relevant shift consumes are withdrawn from the production of
leisure (whose PB monopoly does not distort); and (3) some (10%) of the savings that
the shift generates reflects its prevention of P, S, & ,-ATE (whose PB monopoly does not
distort).
70. See infra p. 382.
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crease MD(Ppps).7' However, I suspect that this consideration

will not affect the sign of the MD(Pic).

71. Some explanation may be useful. Given the analysis' assumption that the prevailing
tort law regime is FBLE, the type of production-process shift this section discusses will
be made only if it reduces the average total cost that the production-process-shifting
avoider incurs to produce the unit output previously produced with his more-AP-cost-prone
production-process. Although such a shift may not make it profitable for the avoider to
increase his UO, it will probably do so since production-process shifts that reduce average
total costs will tend to reduce MCs as well and a shift that reduces the avoider's MC
will tend to make it profitable for him to increase his UO. On the other hand, although
Section C.3 demonstrates that the MD(Pt) for the shift-induced increase in UO will be
negative to the extent that the extra units of output the shift induces the avoider to produce are produced with resources withdrawn from the production of leisure, the creation
of QV investments, and the execution of PPR in the kinds of proportions I am assuming,
it is not entirely clear that the percentage-deflation of those profits will be higher than the
percentage-deflation of the other private benefits the production-process shift will generate.
Still, my statement that Table IB's estimate of the relevant MD(PB )j is too low and
that my original conclusion about MD(PntA)
exaggerates its size are supported by the
fact that monopoly probably deflates the private profitability of a marginal increase in unit
output whose production generates no externalities by a higher percentage than it deflates
the private profitability of the other components of PIAC..
To see why this is the case, recall that we are assuming that (1) 1% of the resources used to produce the relevant unit of output are withdrawn from the "production" of
leisure, (2) 83% of the remaining 99% of the resources used are withdrawn from other
kinds of unit-output production, (3) 13% of the remaining 99% of the resources used are
withdrawn from QV-investment creation, and (4) 4% of the remaining 99% of the resources used are withdrawn from PPR execution. Also recall, as reflected in Column 2 of
Table IB, that (1) %MD(PBu) =0, (2) %MD(PBj ) = (-25%), (3) %MD(PB Qv)=
(+75%), and (4) %MD(PBp) =(-6%). Then, analyze the implications of these
assumptions for the monopoly distortion in the private profitability of a unit-output expansion that costs the expander $100 and generates $110 in incremental revenue for him. The
assumption that %MD(PBuO) = (-25%) implies that the monopoly percentage-distortion in
the private benefits generated by the last unit of output produced is (-25%) and that the
monopoly percentage-distortion for the successive intra-marginal units of output the
expansion produced is successively lower in absolute terms. It would therefore be
consistent with our other assumptions to assume that the monopoly percentage-distortion
for all the benefits generated by the relevant output-expansion would be (-23%) or, in
tbsolute dollar terms, (-$25.30) = (-23%)($110).
As Table I reveals, all the above assumptions taken together imply that monopoly
deflates the private cost of the relevant unit-output expansion by $11.1176. Hence, monopoly deflates the private profitability of the relevant unit-output expansion by
(-$25.30) - (-$11.1176) = (-$14.1824) and the monopoly percentage-distortion in this
component of the private profitability of a shift to a less-AP-cost-prone production-process
therefore is (-$14.1824/$10)(100%) = (-141.824%). To the extent that Table IB does
underestimate the absolute value of the negative MD(PBs), our original conclusion about
MD(Pir, overstates the amount by which monopoly inflates the private profitability of
such a shift, ceteris paribus.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

2.

The Relationship Between (A) MD(PBUO), MD(PBQv), and
MD(PBapR) and (B) the MD in the Private Profitability of
Decisions to Reduce AP Costs by Shifting to a Known, Less-APCost-Prone but Otherwise-Less-Profitable Product-Variant or
Location Whose Average Dollar Value to Its Consumers Is
Different from the Average Dollar Value That Would Be Placed
on Its More-AP-Cost-Prone Alternative by the Consumers of That
Alternative Product-Variant or Location-MD(PnrAs)
This section analyzes MD(Prttvs)-the monopoly distortion in
the private profitability of a marginal shift to a less-AP-cost-prone
product-variant or location whose average dollar value to its consumers is different from the average dollar value of its more-APcost-prone alternative to the latter's consumers. Two such cases are
distinguished. Tables IIA and IIB illustrate the case in which the
consumers of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location
place a lower average dollar value on it than the consumers of the
more-AP-cost-prone product-variant placed on that product
(ACEoo < 0). In this case, the unprofitability of the less-AP-costprone alternative in a world in which the AP costs would not be
internalized is assumed to reflect either (1) a combination of this
lower evaluation and the greater non-AP cost of producing the
less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or of operating from the lessAP-cost-prone location (AP costs aside) or (2) the fact that the
lower evaluation of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location is absolutely larger than the amount by which its production
or use reduces costs (AP costs aside).
Tables ILA and IIIB then illustrate the case in which the average dollar value placed on the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant
or location by its consumers is higher than the value that the consumers of the relevant more-AP-cost-prone alternative would place
on that product-variant or location (ACEu0 > 0). In this case, the
non-AP cost of producing the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or
of using the less-AP-cost-prone location must be higher than the
non-AP cost of producing the more-AP-cost-prone product-variant.
Otherwise, the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant would not be
otherwise-unprofitable. Indeed, the extra non-AP costs must exceed
the extra revenue that the producers can obtain because the average
dollar value of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location to
its consumers is higher than the average dollar value placed on its
more-AP-cost-prone alternative by the latter's presumably-somewhat-different consumers.
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The analyses of both the negative- and the positive-change-inconsumer-evaluation cases initially ignore the significance of the
possibility that the product-variant or location shift may alter the
number of units of output that the avoider chooses to produce. The
examples on which the following analyses focus resemble in many
respects the example that the previous section employed to investigate MD(Pirt s) and are based on many of the same assumptions. In fact, the only difference between the preceding and current section's assumptions relates to the consumer-evaluation differences. Thus, the current section's negative-change-in-consumerevaluation case (Tables HA and UIB) assumes that the actual consumers of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location place a
$20 lower value on the relevant output of the less-AP-cost-prone
product-variant or location than would be placed on the more-APcost-prone product-variant or location by its consumers (so that the
other PBs total $120). The current section's positive-change-in-consumer-evaluation case (Tables IIIA and IDB) assumes that the
consumers of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location
place a $20 higher value on the output of that product-variant or
location than would be placed on the output of the more-AP-costprone product-variant or location by its consumers (so that the
other PBs total $80).! 3
Since these non-zero-change-in-consumer-evaluation assumptions
do not affect any part of the analysis of the distortion in the cost
of the avoidance moves in question, Tables HA and IA would
differ from Table IA only in their overall headings and the headings of column (1). To convert Table IA into Table HA, one need
only substitute the overall heading "MD(PCvs) When ACEuo < 0"
and the column (1) heading "PCAvs When ACEuo < 0" for their
Table IA counterparts. The same substitutions will convert table IA
into Table HA, except that "CEuo > 0" should be substituted for

72. In particular, the examples of this section continue to assume that (1) the relevant

PC and PB both equal $100; (2) 1% of any additional resources that the shift consumes
would be withdrawn from leisure production; (3) any additional (traditional) factors of
production that the execution of the shift in question would consume would be withdrawn
in 83-13-4 proportions from UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses; (4)
MD(PB,Jo), MD(PBQv), and MD(PB,,) are respectively (-25%), (75%), and (-6%); (5)
the traditional factors of production that would be saved by the product-variant or location
shifts with which we are now concerned would be devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating,
and PPR-executing uses in 80-15-5 proportions; and (6) 10% of the PBs that the shifts in
question would generate would reflect their tendency to reduce P, S, & ,.ATE.
73. Both sets of tables also assume that the shifts in question will not affect the
amount of buyer surplus the relevant avoider's sales generate.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

"ACEuo < 0" in the two headings. For this reason, Tables HA and
IIA have not been reproduced here. In any event, as Table IA
indicates, MD(PCv.s) is (-$11.1176) in both our negative-changein-consumer-evaluation case and our positive-change-in-consumerevaluation case.
Table 11B

MD(PBvs) When ACE
BenefitsCategories

o

<0

(1)
PB in Indi-

(2)
%MD(PB)

(3)
MD(PB) for

cated Category

for PB in
Indicated
Category

PB in Indicated Category

(A)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
UO-Increasing Uses

(80%)$108
$86.40

=

-25%

-$21.60

(B)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
QV-Creating
Uses

(15%)$108
$16.20

=

+75%

+$12.15

(C)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
PPR-Executing Uses

(5%)$108
$5.40

=

-6%

-$.324

(D)

Prevented P,
S, & ,ATE

(10%)$120
$12

=

0%

$0

(E)

ACE,,

(-$20)

0%

$0

(F)

TOTAL

$100

-$9.774

By contrast, since Tables fiB and IIB are affected by the nonzero-change-in-consumer-evaluation assumptions, they differ both
from Table IB and from each other. The critical difference between
Tables JiB and IB is Row (E) of Table UB, which reflects the $20
negative-change-in-consumer-evaluation assumption: ACEuo repre-
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sents the difference between (1) the dollar value that the consumers
of the units would place on the output of the less-AP-cost-prone
product-variant if the shift to the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant
did not change the number of units of different products produced
and (2) the dollar value that the consumers74 of the more-AP-costprone product-variant would place on the number of units of the
more-AP-cost-prone product-variant they originally consumed.
Table IIB differs in several other related respects from Table
IB. First, Table fIB also contains entries in cells 2E and 3E that
indicate respectively that there is no monopoly percentage-distortion
and no monopoly dollar-distortion in the ACEuo.75 Second, the
presence of the (-$20) entry in cell 1E makes it necessary to increase the absolute value of the entries in cells lA-D and 3A-D in
Table fIB by 20% since the remaining entries in these cells must
now total $120 rather than $100 to make the net PB in the case at
hand total $100. Third, and most significantly, the negative-changein-consumer-evaluation assumption we are making changes the
amount by which monopoly deflates PB. It increases MD(PB) from
its -$8.1475 value in the case of PB,,s (see cell 3E in Table B)
to -$9.774 in the current PBAvIs case (see cell 3F in Table

IIB) 76

Once more, the tendency of the shifts on which we are now
focusing to enable the avoiders to increase their profits by increasing their unit outputs is significant because monopoly may deflate
these private profits by a higher percentage than it deflates the
other benefits generated by these shifts. If this tendency were taken
into account and the entries in cells 1A, 1B, and 1C were reduced
accordingly, MD(PBjvLs) might be absolutely higher and
MD(PirtvLs) might be absolutely lower than the entry indicated in
cell 3F of Table IJB.
More specifically, if we continue to ignore the likely monopoly
deflation of the profits that the shift would enable the avoider to

74. These may be somewhat different consumers.
75. ACE,, represents the change in the consumer evaluation of the relevant units of
output caused by the product-variant shift or location-shift in question.
76. Both these calculations ignore the possible tendency of the shifts to benefit the
avoiders by making it profitable for them to increase or decrease their unit outputs. Our
current assumption that these shifts are to the production of product-variants that are less
attractive to consumers may seem to counter this tendency. However, our implicit assumption that the reductions in average dollar value is the same for each unit of the good and
that the producers reduce their prices by the reduction in the average dollar value of their
output when they make the shift eliminates this counter-tendency.

380

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

obtain by increasing his unit output, the information in Table JIB
indicates that MD(PBvLs) equals -$9.774. The information in Tables IIB and 1A indicates that MD(PircLs) = MD(PBvLs) MD(PCAPs) = -$9.774- (-$11.1176) = (+$1.3436). In contrast, if
we take account of the likely monopoly deflation of the shift-induced-UO-increase-related component of PBvS, MD(PBVLs) will
be more negative than -$9.774 and MD(PrcAVLS) will therefore be
somewhat less than +$1.3436 and, indeed, may even be negative.77
Three conclusions can be drawn from Table 10B if we ignore
the discovery's tendency to enable its users to increase their profits
by expanding their UOs and the possible tendency of monopoly to
deflate these profits by a higher percentage than it deflates the
other components of PBAvs. First, on the assumptions on which
Table UIB is based, MD(Pnr&VLS) and XD(Pitrm) are both +$1.3436.
Second, monopoly would cause $1.3436 in resource misallocation
by inducing the producer to make the above incremental shift to
the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location since that decision misallocated resources by $1.3436 in that its allocative costs
were $100+$11.1176=$111.1176 while its allocative benefits
were $100 + $9.774 = $109.774. Third, the total amount of
misallocation that monopoly would cause by inducing various producers to shift to less-AP-cost-prone but less-highly-valued productvariants or locations is probably higher than $1.3436."

77. This conclusion contrasts strongly with Section C.A's conclusion that MD(PxM,,,s) is
somewhat below (+$2.9701)-a conclusion based on Tables IA and IB and an assessment
of the likely significance of monopoly's tendency to deflate the private profitability of any
production-process-shift-induced increase in UO, which Table I ignored. Of course, this
substantial difference is an artifact of the substantial proportion of PBA,.s that Table lIB
assumes ACEm constitutes.
78. Of course, if we consider the possibility that MD(PBV.s) may be affected by the
tendency of the relevant shift to induce the avoider in question to increase his unit output, IM(Prxvt,) will be somewhat less positive (and could conceivably be zero or negative) since MD(PBvLs) will be more negative than (-$9.774). Also, the second and the
third conclusions will have to be altered accordingly.
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MD(PBTs) When ACFo > 0
(2)
%MD(PB)
for PB in
Indicated
Category

(3)
MD(PB) for
PB in Indicated Category

BenefitsCategories

(1)
PB in Indicated Category

(A)

PreventedAP-Cost resources
Devoted to
UO-Increasing Uses

(80%)$72
$57.60

=

-25%

-$14.40

(B)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
QV-Creating
Uses

(15%)$72
$10.80

=

+75%

+$8.10

(C)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
PPR-Executing Uses

(5%)$72
$3.60

=

-6%

-$.216

(D)

Prevented P,
S, & IATE

(10%)$80
$8

=

0%

$0

(E)

ACEuo

+$20

0%

$0

(F)

TOTAL

$100

-$6.516

Table IIIB illustrates the case in which ACEuo > 0. As the entry
in cell 1E indicates, consumers of the less-AP-cost-prone productvariant or location are assumed to value the units they consume of
that product-variant $20 higher than the consumers of the moreAP-cost-prone product-variant would have valued the units of that
product-variant that they would have consumed.79 Once more, the
entries in cells 2E and 3E are zero because monopoly does not dis-

79. This assumes that the number of units in question are the same. Table liB also
reflects an assumption that the relevant shift will not affect the amount of buyer surplus
the avoider's relevant sales generate.
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tort the ACEuO. The entries in cells 1A-D and 3A-D of Table HIB
are 20% lower (in absolute terms) than their counterparts in Table
IB because the $20 in PBs attributable to the positive change in
consumer evaluation requires a 20% reduction in all other PBs
(given our assumption that in both cases total PB = $100). The
absolute value of the entry in cell 3F of Table IB (-$6.516) =
MD(PBAvs) is lower than the absolute value of the counterpart
entry in cell 3E of Table LB (-$8.1475) = MD(PBs) because the
preceding changes require this result. Like its counterpart in Table
IB, the (-$6.516) entry in cell 3F of Table IIB is probably too
low because Table IIIB ignores the profit-from-induced-unit-output
component of the relevant PBs and hence the significance of the
possible tendency of monopoly to deflate that component of PBAvs
by a higher percentage than the weighted-average percentage by
which it deflates the other components of PBAvLs.
These increases in consumer evaluation make M(Pniv,) for a
shift to a less-AP-cost-prone and more-highly-valued product-variant or location differ from its counterpart for a shift to a less-APcost-prone production-process. Thus, if the actual consumers of the
units of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location place a
value on those units that is $20 higher than the value that the
consumers of the units of the more-AP-cost-prone product-variant
or location place on those units, then MD(P.tAV s) will be somewhat
lower than (+$4.6016) rather than somewhat lower than (+$2.9701)
as it was in our APCA-shift-in-production-process example, or
somewhat lower than (+$1.3436) as it was in the ACEuo < 0 case.
In this ACEUO > 0 case, then, monopoly (1) would cause somewhat
less than $4.6016 in resource misallocation by inducing the relevant producer to make the shift and (2) might well cause a great
deal of additional misallocation by inducing the producer and other
producers to make other similar shifts to less-AP-cost-prone product-variants or locations.
3. The Relationship Between (A) MD(PBuo), MD(PBAQv), and
MD(PB1PPR) and (B) the MD in the Private Profitability of Choices
to Reduce AP Costs by Reducing UO or Shutting Down
Altogether-MD(Pic~uo)
This section analyzes MD(Pnrto) for UO reductions that are
AP-cost-avoiding. Although it also employs the distortion-analysis
approach we have used to analyze the MDs that are relevant for
other APCA options, it begins by employing the traditional welfare
economics approach to analyzing the factors that determine whether
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a particular good is overproduced or underproduced with our current assumptions. Since this section is ultimately concerned with
the MD(Pn) of reducing AP costs by reducing UO, any conclusion
that monopoly causes UO to be overproduced or underproduced,
that monopoly inflates or deflates Pxtu o, implies that the private
profitability of reducing AP costs by reducing UO is distorted by
the monopoly in the opposite direction.
Roughly speaking, traditional welfare economics has analyzed
MD(Picto) on four assumptions: (1) the total amount of resources
devoted to non-leisure UO production is exogenously determined;
(2) all actors are sovereign maximizers; (3) no buyers are
monopsonists; and (4) there are no externalities of consumption.
On these assumptions, the traditional analysis has demonstrated that
imperfections in seller competition will lead to the overproduction
(underproduction) of a given good (X) only if the ratio of its price
to that of its weighted-average substitute (Y) 0 is higher or lower
than the marginal rate at which the economy can transform Y into
X. 8' This conclusion reflects two "facts." First, if consumptionacts affect only the individual engaged in consumption and that
individual can be relied on to maximize his own interests,
allocative efficiency will be maximized if the rate the individual
can trade Y for X equals the rate that the economy can transform
Y into X (MLCx/MLCy). Second, if a consumer is not a monopsonist, the rate at which he can trade Y for X will equal Px/Py.
Moreover, traditional welfare economics also demonstrates that
if there are no externalities of production, no taxes on the margin
of income,82 no monopoly or monopsony in input markets,83 no
problems caused by differences in the monopoly power that X's
and Y's factor-market competitors possess in the goods markets in
which they operate, and no problems caused by consumer surplus,
then MLCx/MLCy will equal MCx/MCy. 4 Traditional welfare
80. This formulation ignores the role of X's and Y's complements. See infra note 85.
81. This marginal rate is the number of units of Y the economy can produce with the
resources it can save by reducing its output of X by one unit or, more generally,
MLx--marginal allocative cost of X-divided by MLCy.
82. Taxes on the margin of income are relevant because they may distort the PC of
labor or other inputs.
83. Monopoly or monopsony in input markets are relevant because they also distort the
PC of labor or other inputs.
84. MLCx/MLC, will equal MCx/MCy because producers will have to pay for all of
the resources they use, alternative users of the same resource will have to incur the same
cost to use it, and the relative private costs of various inputs will equal their relative
allocative costs in general.
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economics concludes that, if the total amount of resources devoted
to the production of goods other than leisure is exogenously determined, the unit output of each product will be allocatively optimal
if all the above conditions are fulfilled and P/MC is the same for
all products.85
These conclusions can easily be explained in distortion-analysis
terms. Within the structure of distortion analysis, the critical question is whether the existing imperfections tend to make the Pic of
producing an additional unit of output diverge from its allocative
efficiency. Ceteris paribus, the fact that the price of the good (X)
exceeds its marginal cost-and hence the marginal revenue generated by its sale-implies that the PBs of producing the incremental
unit(s) are less than their allocative counterparts. For this reason,
MD(PBuo) and MD(PrCAuo) tend to be negative. On the other hand,
the fact that the units of X would be produced with resources
withdrawn from the production of some product Y whose price
also exceeded its marginal cost and hence the marginal revenue the
sale of its marginal units would generate implies that X's PC 6 is
less than X's LC (the allocative value of the units of Y that the
resources would otherwise be used by Y to produce)."

85. If we took account of the fact that goods are consumed together with complements, the relevant condition would require the weighted-average P/MC ratio for a good
and its complements to equal the weighted-average P/MC ratio for each of that good's
substitutes and its complements, where the relevant relative weights reflect the proportions
in which the respective goods and their complements are combined at the margin.
86. X's PC is infinitesimally higher than the value to Y's producers of the goods they
would otherwise have produced with the relevant resources since X has to bid these resources away from Y's producers.
87. This conclusion reflects the following three relationships:
(1) The private cost of a resource to a producer (X) that he must bid away
from a producer (Y) who would use it to increase the unit output of Y is
infinitesimally higher than the private value of the resource to Y (its marginal
revenue product [MRP] for him), which equals the relevant resource's marginal
physical product (MPP) multiplied by the average MR the sale of the units
produced would have generated for Y.
(2) The allocative cost of X's using the relevant resource equals its allocative
product in Y's hands, which equals the MPP of the resources in question for
Y multiplied by the average price for which the units in question could have
been sold-a mathematical product that equals the value of the goods in question to their consumers (given the fact that our assumptions that Y's consumers
are sovereign, maximizing non-monopsonists whose marginal acts of consumption generate no buyer surplus guarantees that the price of each unit equals its
equivalent-dollar value to its buyer and the fact that our assumption that neither
Y's production nor Y's consumption generates any externalities guarantees that
the marginal allocative product of any resource used to produce Y equals the
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Since, then, a good's PC will be less than its LC to the extent
that its factor-competitors are monopolists, MD(PCuo) tends to be
positive and hence MD(Pruo) tends to be negative on this account.
If Pj/MCx equals P,/MC,, the absolute value of MD(PBuo) will
just equal the absolute value of MD(PCuo), and MD(Plcuo) will be
zero. Accordingly, the distortion-analysis approach can also be used
to explain why the monopoly distortion in the Pic of reducing AP
costs by reducing UO will be zero if the following conditions are
fulfilled: P/MC is the same for all goods other than leisure, the
other Pareto-optimal conditions are fulfilled, leisure is exogenously
determined, and the production of marginal units of existing products never withdraws resources from QV-creating or PPR-executing
uses.
In practice, the production of marginal units of any good does
tend to withdraw resources from the "production" of leisure, and
some of the resources that are used to increase the unit output of
goods in production will also tend to be withdrawn from QV-creating and PPR-executing uses. Both of these facts complicate the
analysis of and change our conclusions about the likely size of
MD(Prctuo) and the MD(Pic) of decisions to reduce AP costs by
reducing unit output. These conclusions can be explained both
through traditional welfare economics analysis and through the
distortion analysis approach used by this Article.
Within the traditional welfare economics analytic-framework,
how does the fact that the production of non-leisure goods withdraws resources from the "production" of leisure88 affect the conclusion that MD(PiAuo) will be zero whenever the P/MC ratios of
goods other than leisure are equal and goods-seller monopolies are
the only type of Pareto imperfection? Within the traditional framework, this question can be answered in two straightforward ways.
First, since the price of leisure (P,) inevitably equals its marginal
cost to its "producer" (MCC), leisure will tend to be overconsumed
if the P/MC ratios of all goods other than leisure equal each other

dollar value of the units of Y it will produce to their buyers).
(3) Ex hypothesis, MRy is less than Py since Y is assumed to be a monopolist
who will choose to lower his price on his intra-marginal units when he lowers
it to sell additional marginal units.
88. This possible resource flow reflects the fact that individuals substitute goods for
leisure and that decreases in the prices of all goods that are not complements of leisure
tend to make individuals consume less leisure, controlling for the effect of the price-decrease on the real incomes of the individuals in question.
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but do not equal one. This occurs because in such a situation
(P/MC). will be less than (P/MC) for all other goods. Second, the
traditional approach also generates the argument that if P/MC for
all other goods is the same but greater than one, leisure will tend
to be overproduced (overconsumed) since the allocative value of
the last units of leisure consumed will be less than the allocative
cost of that leisure (the allocative product of the additional labor
that could have been substituted for the units of leisure)., 9

89. This argument is based on the following seven propositions:
(1) Since we are assuming that all employers are sovereign maximizers, the
marginal wage cost (MW) of each type of labor "La" (defined so that each
category of work refers to a given job-task performed with given skill and
industry) to its employers is equal to its marginal revenue product (MRP).
MRPL. = (MPPt )(MR), where "MPPL. " stands for the number of units of the
good (G) that the marginal unit of the type of labor in question produces and
"MR" stands for the average marginal revenue the worker's employer obtains
for the units of output produced by the marginal unit of labor. For simplicity,
I will now assume that the marginal unit of labor is defined to make
MPPJ = 1.
(2) Since we are assuming that no employer is a monopsonist, the gross wage
each employer pays the equally-skilled-and-industrious performers in any given
labor-category will equal the marginal-wage cost to each employer of the marginal unit of labor in that category.
(3) Since we are assuming that there are no taxes on the margin of income,
the net wage per unit of labor paid to each equally-skilled and industrious performer of any given job-task will equal the gross wage that each such individual receives.
(4) Since there are no taxes on the margin of income, the net wage per unit of
labor paid to each such individual equals the marginal cost of leisure (MC,) to
him.
(5) Since we are assuming that the consumption of leisure generates no external
benefits or costs, the allocative cost of the marginal unit of each type of labor
(MLC,, equals the private value to the worker who performs it of the leisure
he has to sacrifice to perform it.
(6) Since we are assuming that the buyer of the relevant unit of output is a
non-monopsonistic, sovereign maximizer whose consumption of the relevant unit
generates no buyer surplus and that neither the consumption nor the production
of the unit in question generates any externalities, the marginal allocative product of each type of labor (MLPt) equals (NPt )(P.) if we define the units
of labor in question to make their MPP equal one.
(7) Since we are assuming that the employer, as the producer of good G, is a
monopolist who will choose to reduce his price on his intra-marginal units to
sell his marginal unit, MR < Pc.
These seven relationships establish that in equilibrium the MLVtu (the marginal allocative
value of leisure), which equals MLC, (the marginal allocative cost of labor), will be less
than the MLP, (the marginal allocative product of labor) because:
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These results can also be established within the distortion analysis framework employed by this Article. Monopoly does not distort PB,, because leisure is consumed by its producer. Therefore, to
the extent that X is competitive with leisure as well as with other
material goods, 9' monopoly will deflate Piuauox because monopoly
will not deflate the PB of the resources the production of X withdraws from "leisure creation." This result is critical because it
implies that monopoly will deflate PCuox by a smaller absolute
amount than the amount by which it deflates the PBs that X's
producer can obtain by selling (as opposed to costlessly destroying)
the units. This conclusion that MD(PirAUO) tends to be negative to
the extent that the production of goods other than leisure withdraws resources from the "production" of leisure implies that monopoly tends to inflate the private profitability of reducing AP
costs by reducing unit output to the extent that the reduction releases resources for the production of leisure. The conclusion that
monopoly deflates the private profitability of increasing UO also
implies that monopoly tends to deflate on this account the private
profitability of a producer's reducing AP costs by any method that
has the consequence of inducing him to increase his UO.
These conclusions about the size of MD(P7;Auo) are reinforced
to the extent that the production of marginal units of some product
X also withdraws resources from QV-creating and PPR-executing
uses. Thus, if MD(PBAQv) is positive and MD(PBpP) is less negative than MD(PB6uo), the percentage by which monopoly deflates
PCAuo will be lower than the percentage by which it deflates PBAuo
to the extent that some of the resources used to increase the UO
are withdrawn from either QV-creating or PPR-executing uses as
opposed to UO-increasing uses. Indeed, if the production of marginal units of existing products withdraws more resources from
QV-creating uses than from PPR-executing uses9' and the absolute

(A) relationships (1) through (5) establish that MLVu = MLC. = MRPL. =
(MPP.O(MRG);
(B) relationship (6) establishes that MLCu

MLPu = (MWP)(Pa); and

(C) relationship (7) establishes that MRPu (MPPUJ)(MPa) < MLCu = MLPu =
(MPP )(P) by establishing that MRZ< PG.
90. In other words, to the extent that the production of marginal units of X withdraws
the resources it consumes not just from the production of units of output of other goods
but also from the "production" of leisure.
91. More resources are withdrawn from QV-creating uses both because a higher percentage of the economy's resources are devoted to QV-creating than to PPR-executing
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value of (the positive) MD(P~rtQv) is approximately the same as the
absolute value of (the negative) MD(PTtAPP.), monopoly will tend to
inflate PCuo to the extent that the production of marginal units of
existing products withdraws resources from both QV-creating and
PPR-executing uses.
In short, both the leisure-to-UO resource flow and the (QVplus-PPR)-to-UO resource flow tend to make MD(PrCAuo) negative,
and to the extent that MD(PnAUO) is negative, monopoly will inflate
the Pnt of reducing AP costs by reducing UOs. Hence, the fact that
the production of marginal units of output withdraws resources
from (1) the production of leisure and (2) the creation of QV
investments and the execution of PPR generates compounding monopoly inflations in the private profitability of reducing AP costs
by reducing UO.
Table IVA

(A)

MD(PCiu,)
Cost-

(1)

(2)

Category

PCsiuo

%MD(PC~uo)

$100

-25%

Foregone

(3)
I MD(PCA
4 uo)
-$25

Incremental
Revenue

uses and because a lower percentage of the resources devoted to QV creation as opposed
to PPR execution are the kind of "technical" resources that are relatively less suitable for
UO-increasing uses.

I
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Table IVB

MD(PBA±uo)
BenefitCategories

(A)

Non-AP
Costs Saved
for UOIncreasing
Uses

(B)

Non-AP
Costs Saved
for QVCreating
Uses

(C)

Non-AP
Costs Saved
for PPRExecuting
Uses

(1)
PB in Indicated Category

(2)
%MD(PB)
for PB in
Indicated
Category

(3)
MD(PB) for
PB in Indicated Category

(83%)$79.20
= $65.736

-25%

-$16.434

(13%)$79.20
$10.296

+75%

+$7.722

(4%)$79.20
$3.168

-6%

-$.19008

0%

$0

-25%

-$3.375

=

=

(D)

Non-AP
Costs Saved
for the "Production" of
Leisure

(1%)$80
$.80

(E)

AP Costs
Saved for
UO-Increasing Uses

(75%)$18
$13.50

(F)

AP Costs
Saved for
QV-Creating
Uses

(20%)$18
$3.60

+75%

+$2.70

(G)

AP Costs
Saved for
PPR-Executing Uses

(5%)$18 $.90

-6%

-$.054

(H)

Prevented P,
S, & ,IATE

$2

0%

$0

(I)

TOTAL

$100

=

=

-$9.63108
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Tables IVA and IVB illustrate this analysis. These tables look
different from their predecessors because the APCA option with
which this section is concerned involves decisions not to expend
resources rather than to expend resources. Hence, the PCs in Table
IVA consist solely of foregone incremental revenue, and the PBs in
Table IVB consist primarily of saved non-AP-cost MCs and secondarily of avoided AP costs (avoided damages).
Table IVB reflects a new assumption that 20% of the incremental cost of producing the foregone output would have been AP
costs-that $20 of the $100 in relevant PBs reflect prevented AP
costs. Otherwise, Table IV carries over most of the assumptions on
which Tables I and II were based.92
On the assumptions on which Tables IVA and IVB are based,
monopoly inflates the private profitability of reducing AP costs by
reducing the UO of the product to which Tables IVA and IVB
refer by $15.6892 by deflating the PC of the UO-reduction by $25
while deflating its PB by only $9.63108. This conclusion corresponds to the fact that monopoly would deflate Pit~uo for the incremental unit by $15.36892 Since we are assuming that the PBs of
the APCA marginal reduction in unit output just equal the PCs, the
preceding MD(Pir) = $15.36892 conclusion implies that monopoly
will cause $15.36892 of misallocation by making it attractive for
the relevant producer to execute his marginal unit-output reduction.
The total amount of misallocation monopoly will cause by inducing

92. In particular Table IVB continues to assume that
(1) the UO-reduction decision in question is a last incremental decision whose
PCs and PBs equal $100;
(2) 1% of the $80 in non-AP-cost-related resources that the relevant reduction
of output saves are subsequently devoted to the production of leisure;
(3) the $79.20 (measured in PC terms) of traditional factors of production that
the decision prevents from being withdrawn from alternative uses other than the
production of leisure are to be devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and
PPR-executing uses in 83-13-4 proportions;
(4) 10% of the $20 in AP costs that the decision prevents ($2) reflect prevented P, S, & ,IATE;
(5) the remaining $18 (measured in PC terms) of avoided AP costs that consist
of saved traditional factors of production are devoted to UO-increasing, QVcreating, and PPR-executing uses in 80-15-5 proportions; and
(6) %MD(PB~,J), %MD(PBoQv), and %MD(PBp ) are (-25%), (+75%), and
(-6%) respectively.
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UO reductions both by the producer and by others is likely to be
far higher than $15.36892.
The conclusion that monopoly inflates the private profitability
of such UO reductions reflects the fact that, although 100% of the
PCs of a decision to reduce UO are deflated by 25%, only
65.736% of the PBs such a decision generates are deflated by
25%: 4.068% are deflated by 6% rather than 25%, 2.8% are not
distorted at all, and 13.896% are actually inflated by 75%.
The preceding analysis assumed that the P/MC ratios of both
the product and its weighted-average counterpart for its competitors
were 1.25/1. Even if this assumption is accurate on average, it may
not be realistic in individual cases. To the extent that in an individual case the two ratios are lower than 1.25/1 (but still equal),
the monopoly inflation of the private profitability of APCA UO
reductions will be smaller than the entries in Table IVA and IVB
suggest because the entries in cells 2A and 3A of Tables IVA and
IVB will be lower and the difference between the entries in the
two cells 3A will be smaller. Of course, to the extent that the
relevant P/MCratios are higher than 1.25/1, the monopoly inflation
of the private profitability of APCA UO reductions will be larger
than the entries in Tables IVA and IVB suggest.
I believe that goods that are highly competitive tend to have
similar P/MC ratios. However, I should note that, to the extent that
the relevant product's P/MC ratio is lower (higher) than that of its
weighted-average competitor, (1) MD(P~rto) will be less (more)
negative than the previous analysis suggested and (2) monopoly
will inflate the private profitability of reducing AP costs by reducing UO by less (more) than the preceding analysis suggested, controlling for the average P/MC ratio of the products. Thus, if we
continue to assume that the average P/MC ratio is 1.25/1, the fact
that the P/MC ratio of the good is lower (higher) than 1.25/1 while
that of its weighted-average competitor is higher (lower) than
1.25/1 will make it necessary to (1) lower (raise) the percentage
figure in cell 2A of a revised Table IVA below (above) its counterpart in the original Table IVA, (2) raise (lower) the percentage
figure in cell 2A of a revised Table IVB above (below) its counterpart in the original Table IVB, and (3) adjust the entries in cells
3A of Tables WVA and IVB accordingly. When the P/MC ratio of
the good whose output may be reduced is lower than that of its
weighted-average competitor, the associated decrease in the absolute
value of the entry in cell 3A of Table IVA and increase in the
absolute value of the entry in cell 3A of Table IVB will tend to
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decrease the absolute value of the positive MD(Piu) for the APCA
decision and, in an extreme case, might even make that MD(Pir)
negative. By the same token, when the P/MC ratio of the good
whose output may be reduced is higher than that of its weightedaverage competitor, the associated increase in the absolute value of
the entry in cell 3A of Table IVA and decrease in the absolute
value of the entry in cell 3A of Table IVB will tend to increase
the absolute value of the positive MD(Pnr) for the APCA decision.
Although, therefore, there may be some cases in which
MD(Prc) is made negative by a combination of (1) a low average
P/MC and (2) a lower P/MC for the good whose UO may be
reduced than for its weighted-average competitors, I doubt very
much that this result occurs in more than an insignificant number
of cases.9 3 I will, therefore, assume that monopoly tends to inflate
the private profitability of APCA reductions in UO. Since I suspect
that the monopoly percentage-deflation of Pcutjo is greater than its
counterpart for the non-increase-in-UO-related components of the
P~r of other APCA decisions, I will assume that monopoly tends to
deflate the private profitability of other types of positive APCA
decisions to the extent that they induce their producer-makers to
increase their UOs.
4. The Relationship Between (A) MD(PBuo), MD(PBAQv), and
MD(PBaPR) and (B) MD(Ptc
i) for Different Kinds of APCAR
This section analyzes MD(PiTcc ) for APCA research into a
less-AP-cost-prone production-process or a less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location whose output has the same average dollar
value for its consumers that the "identical" output of its more-APcost-prone alternatives has for their consumers. This section also
analyzes MD(P761AR) for APCA research into a less-AP-cost-prone
product-variant or location whose output has a lower or a higher
average dollar value for its consumers than the "identical unit outputs" of the more-AP-cost-prone product-variants or locations have
for their presumably-somewhat-different consumers. The analyses
that follow all assume that the relevant researchers always possess
the relevant information about the way in which their likely product-variant or location discoveries will be evaluated by consumers.

93. To calculate the critical P/MC ratio, one would first have to determine the relationship between P/MC and the monopoly percentage-distortions in PBuo, PB Qv,PBar and
then determine on the other assumptions on which Table IVB is based the value of P/MC
at which MD(Piruo) becomes zero.
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All these analyses are based on the same assumptions on which
Sections C.1 and C.2 analyzed the monopoly distortion in the
private profitability of using the three "types" of discoveries just
described. Since monopoly produces significantly different distortions in the private profits that a producer would realize by shifting
to these three types of possible APCAR discoveries if he could do
so without paying any license fees94 and since the current otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumption implies that the PBs that the researcher will obtain by using his discovery himself or selling the
right to use it will equal the private profits users can obtain by
shifting to it,95 we will have to analyze MD(PB~Ac) separately
for the three cases just distinguished.

94. This conclusion reflects the fact that MD(Pr.) # MDPtVL) when ACE # 0.
95. The otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumption implies that neither consumer surplus (attributable either to the extra transaction cost the researcher would have to incur to practice perfect price discrimination when licensing his discovery or the monopsony power of
the discovery's users), nor union-based profit-sharing by researcher-workers, nor free-rider
externalities associated with "imperfections" in innovation law and/or tax law will reduce
the gains that the discovery gives the discoverer below the benefits it confers on its users.
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MD(PCPARc)
CostCategories

(1)
PC in Indicated Category

(2)
%MD(PC)
for PC in
Indicated
Category

(3)
MD(PC) for
PC in Indicated Category

(A)

Resources
Withdrawn
from UOIncreasing
Uses

(70%)$99
$69.30

=

-25%

-$17.325

(B)

Resources
Withdrawn

(20%)$99
$19.80

=

+75%

+$14.85

from QVCreating
Uses
(C)

Resources
Withdrawn
from PPRExecuting
Uses

(10%)$99
$9.90

=

-6%

-$.594

(D)

Resources
Withdrawn
from
LeisureProduction

(1%)$100
$1

=

0%

$0

(E)

TOTAL

$100

-$3.069

Fortunately, however, it will not be necessary to analyze
MD(PCuc~ja separately for each of the three cases. Table VA
illustrates the analysis of MD(PCA p) for all three cases on the
assumption that, AP costs aside, the discovered, less-AP-cost-prone
production-processes, product-variants, and locations will be just as
expensive to use or produce as their original, more-AP-cost-prone
counterparts. The entries in Column 1 of Table VA reflect our
initial assumptions about (1) the percentages of traditional factors
of production that are devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and
PPR-executing uses (80-15-5), (2) the specialization of resources
into types-of-use categories, as well as (3) the percentage (1%) of
any additional resources that are expended in some activity that
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will be withdrawn from the "production" of leisure. More specifically, the first two of these assumptions lie behind Table VA's
premise that, leisure aside, the traditional factors of production that
the relevant APCAR withdraws from alternative uses are withdrawn
in 70-20-10 proportions from UO-increasing, QV-creating, and
PPR-executing uses.
Table VB1

MD(PBAcJ,) for APCAR for Which the Associated
ACE = 0
BenefitsCategories

(1)
PB in Indicated Category

(A)

ACE Associated with
Use of
APCAR
Discovery

(B)

Prevented P,
S, & 4-ATE

(10%)$100
$10

(C)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
UO-Increasing Uses

(80%)$90
$72

(D)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
QV-Creating
Uses

(E)

PreventedAP-Cost
Resources
Devoted to
PPR-Executing Uses

(F)

TOTAL

(2)
%MD(PB)
for PB in
Indicated
Category

$0

(3)
MD(PB) for
PB in Indicated Category

0%

$0

0%

$0

=

-25%

-$18

(15%)$90
$13.50

=

+75%

+$10.125

(5%)$90
$4.50

=

-6%

-$.27

$100

=

-$8.145
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MD(PB,,AIR) for APCAR for Which the Associated
ACE < 0
BenefitsCategories

(1)
PB in Indicated Category

(2)
%MD(PB)
for PB in
Indicated
Category

(3)
MD(PB) for
PB in Indicated Category

(A)

ACE Associated with
Use of
APCAR
Discovery

-$20

0%

$0

(B)

Prevented P,

(10%)$120 =

0%

$0

S, & IATE

$12

(C)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
UO-Increasing Uses

(80%)$108
$86.40

=

-25%

-$21.60

(D)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
QV-Creating
Uses

(15%)$108
$16.20

=

+75%

+$12.15

(E)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
PPR-Executing Uses

(5%)$108
$5.40

-6%

-$.324

(F)

TOTAL

$100

=

-$9.774
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for APCAR for Which the Associated

BenefitsCategories

(1)
PB in Indicated Categories

(A)

ACE Associated with
Use of
APCAR
Discovery

$20

0%

$0

(B)

Prevented P,
S, & IATE

(10%)$80 =
$8

0%

$0

(C)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
UO-Increasing Uses

(80%)$72 =
$57.60

-25%

-$14.40

(D)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
QV-Creating
Uses

(15%)$72
$10.80

=

+75%

+$8.10

(E)

PreventedAP-Cost Resources
Devoted to
PPR-Executing Uses

(5%)$72
$3.60

=

-6%

-$.216

(F)

TOTAL

(2)
%MD(PB)
for PB in
Indicated
Categories

(3)
MD(PB) for
PB in Indicated Categories

$100

-$6.516

Table VA continues all the other relevant assumptions we have
been making-namely that %MD(PBuo), %MD(PBAQv), and
%MD(PB,,j are respectively (-25%), (75%), and (-6%) and that
PCapA is $100. In any event, as Table VA reveals, on the as-

sumptions Table VA adopts, MD(PCJA) is (-$3.069).
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Tables VB1, VB2, and VB3 illustrate the analysis of
MD(PBAcAPJ) for APCAR projects that respectively aim to discover
less-AP-cost-prone production-processes or less-AP-cost-prone product-variants or locations for which ACE = 0, ACE < 0, and
ACE > 0. Tables VB1, VB2, and VB3 differ only in the assumption they make about the ACE associated with the use of the discovery that the APCAR is aimed at making.' Table VB1 illustrates the analysis of MD(PB ..
cA) for an APCAR project aimed at
making a discovery for which ACE is zero (as cell 1A indicates)
so that the sum of the AP-cost savings that the APCAR project
generates (indicated in cells 1B though 1E) is $100. Table VB2
illustrates the analysis of MD(PB~,c,) for an APCAR project for
which ACE is (-$20) (as cell IA indicates) so that the sum of the
AP-cost savings that the APCAR project generates (indicated in
cells lB through 1E) is $120 (given that net PB,,cR is $100).
Table VB3 illustrates the analysis of MD(PB,cJ,,) for an APCAR
project for which ACE is (+$20) (as cell 1A indicates) so that the
sum of the AP-cost savings that the APCAR project generates (indicated by the entries in cells 1B through 1E) is $80 (given that
net PB,,cA is $100).
The entry in cell 3F of each table indicates MD(PBPcA) if we
ignore the tendency of the APCAR projects (illustrated by Tables
VB2 and VB3) to make it profitable for the users of the discoveries to alter their unit outputs and the possibility that monopoly
distorts the profits generated by such unit-output changes by a
percentage that differs from the weighted-average percentage by
which it distorts the other benefits. Thus, MD(PBpca1) is
(-$8.145) in the ACE= 0 case illustrated by Table VB1, (-$9.774)
in the ACE = (-$20) case illustrated by Table VB2, and (-$6.516)
in the ACE = (+$20) case illustrated by Table VB3.
Since MD(Pic,A)
in each of these cases equals
MD(PB pcA) - MD(PC ~pcA) and, as Table VA reveals,
MD(PC~ApcA) in each case is (-$3.069), the preceding conclusions

96. All three tables continue to assume that (1) the net PBs of the discovery in question equal $100, as cell IF in each table indicates; (2) 10% of the avoided-AP-cost "component" of those PBs consist of prevented P, S, & 4-ATE, as cell 1B in each table indicates and 90% of the relevant PBs consist of saved traditional factors of production, as
cells IC, ID, and 1E in each table jointly indicate; (3) the traditional factors of production that the use of an APCAR discovery saves by reducing AP costs will be subsequently devoted to UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses in 80-15-5 proportions,
as cells 1C, ID, and IE in each table respectively indicate; and (4) %MD(PBUO),
%MD(PBQV), and %MD(PBJ are respectively (-25%), (+75%), and (-6%).
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imply that MD(Prc,,,c
equals (-$8.145) - (-$3.069) = (-$5.076)
in the ACE = 0 case, (-$9.774) - (-$3.069) = (-$6.705) in the
ACE = (-$20) case, and (-$6.516) - (-$3.069) = (-$3.447) in the
ACE = (+$20) case.97
The differences in the conclusions we reached about
MD(PB ,, c,) and hence MD(Prc
) in these three cases reflect
the fact that monopoly does not distort ACE. Since, therefore, the
(non-existent) monopoly distortion in ACE differs from the weighted-average monopoly distortion in the other components of
PB ,, variations in ACE alter MD(PBICAO by changing the
amount of other private benefits that the last APCAR project of a
given size (with given PCAA generates (the amount of AP costs
it prevents).
The remaining task is to investigate when, why, and how the
preceding conclusions have to be adjusted to account for the tendency of some APCAR discoveries to make it profitable for their
users to change their unit outputs. No such adjustment is necessary
in the ACE = 0 case since the combination of the ACE = 0 assumption and the assumption that the discovery will not change non-AP
costs implies that the APCAR discoveries generated by projects in
this category will not induce their users to alter their unit outputs.
Therefore, in the ACE = 0 case, three conclusions will be justified.
First, the monopoly distortion in the private profitability of the last
APCAR project in this category is (-$5.076). Second, the last
APCAR project in the ACE = 0 category misailocated resources by
$5.076, given that our assumption that PitcAcA= 0 implies that
LE,,
= -YXD(PiccaR) = -MD(PftiAR).
Finally,
the total
misallocation that monopoly caused by inflating the private profitability of APCAR projects aimed at the discovery of avoidance
alternatives whose use will be associated with a ACE of zero will
exceed $5.076 to the extent that monopoly critically inflates the
private profitability of additional, intra-marginal projects in this
category as well as that of the marginal project about which Table
VB1 provides information.
Although the APCAR projects in the ACE= 0 category on
which Table VB1 focuses will not make it profitable for the users
of any discovery to alter their unit outputs, the projects in the
ACE < 0 and ACE > 0 categories on which Tables VB2 and VB3
respectively focus will tend to make it profitable for the users of

97. This paragraph ignores any change-in-unit-output-related distortions.
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the generated discoveries to change their outputs. Since the monopoly percentage-distortion in these change-in-unit-output-related
private profits differs from its weighted-average counterpart for the
other PBs that the research confers on the avoider, MD(PB,,c,)
in the ACE = (-$20) and ACE = (+$20) cases do not equal the entries in cell 3F of Table VB2 and Table VB3 respectively. Those
entries have to be adjusted to take account of the tendency of the
research to make it profitable for its users to change their unit
outputs.
Let me begin by analyzing the adjustment that must be made
to the entry in cell 3F in the ACE = (-$20) case represented by
Table VB2. Since we are assuming that the use of the APCAR
discoveries generated by research projects in this category will not
change non-AP fixed or variable costs, the fact that ACE = (-$20)
implies that the discovery will make it profitable for its users to
reduce their unit outputs. To analyze the significance of this fact
for the adjustment that should be made to the entry in cell 3F of
Table VB2, two relationships must be noted. First, as Section C.3
argued, monopoly tends to inflate the private profitability of the
associated UO reductions to the extent that the resources they release are subsequently devoted to leisure production, QV creation,
and PPR execution.98 Second, these inflated private benefits will
replace other private benefits-given our assumption that
PB,
-=
$100-whose private value monopoly deflates. These
relationships imply that the entry in cell 3F of Table VB2 has to
be made less negative to take account of the fact that the research
projects in the ACE = (-$20) category will tend to make it profitable for the users of the research to decrease their unit outputs. 99
Since, in reality MD(PBJ,,A) is less negative than (-$9.774) in
the ACE = (-$20) case, MD(PTC1.cAR) is less negative than
(-$6.705) in the ACE = (-$20) case. Hence, the last incremental
APCAR project in the ACE = (-$20) category will have increased
allocative efficiency by somewhat less than $6.705.1" Moreover,
98. This proposition holds if my assumptions about (A) the proportions in which the
freed resources will be devoted to these purposes and (B) the absolute size of
%MD(PB UO) and %MD(PBQV) are not critically biased in favor of this conclusion.
99. This conclusion reflects the fact that if one added a new row E* to cover the PBs
such APCAR generates by making it profitable for its users to expand their outputs, (1)
the entry in cell E*3 would be positive and the entries in cells lB through IE and hence
3B through 3E would all be absolutely smaller because the prevented-AP-cost savings in
each category would be smaller (given our assumption that total PB for the marginal
move in question would stay fixed at $100).
100. This conclusion reflects our assumption that Pit = 0 and consequently that
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although monopoly may still have caused misallocation by critically
deflating the private profitability of additional APCAR projects that
are aimed at discovering APCA alternatives whose use would be
associated with a ACE of (-$20), the tendency of such APCAR to
induce its users to reduce their unit outputs makes it somewhat less
likely that monopoly would deter the execution of allocatively
efficient APCAR projects in this category and reduces the amount
of such misallocation that monopoly generates by distorting the
private profitability of this category of APCAR.
The analysis of the adjustment that must be made to our original conclusions about APCAR projects aimed at discoveries whose
use would be associated with a ACE of (+$20) is exactly analogous to the preceding analysis of the ACE = (-$20) case. Since we
are assuming that the use of the APCAR discoveries in this category will not change fixed or variable non-AP costs, the fact that
ACE = (+$20) implies that the discovery will make it profitable for
its users to expand their unit outputs. Monopoly tends to deflate
the private profitability of the UO increases."0 ' The assumption
that PBmpARa is $100 implies that any profits that the marginal
discovery enables its users to realize by expanding their outputs
reduce the amount of private benefits that the marginal APCAR
project generates by decreasing AP costs by changing the identity
of the project that is marginal. The conclusion that monopoly will
deflate the private profitability of the UO increases the relevant
APCAR profits induce their users to effectuate therefore implies
that MD(PBpcAR) is actually somewhat more negative than
(-$6.516) in the ACE=(+$20) case that Table VB3 presents and
that MD(Pir4A for APCAR projects aimed at discoveries whose
use will be associated with a ACE of +$20 is somewhat more
negative than (-$3.447). It follows that the amount of misallocation
the last APCAR project in this category generates is somewhat
more than $3.447 and that the amount of misallocation that monopoly probably causes by deflating critically the private profitabil-

LE = YD(Pn).
101. In my judgment, monopoly deflates these profits by a higher percentage than it
deflates the private benefits that the use of the relevant APCAR discovery generates by
preventing AP costs.
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ity of intra-marginal APCAR projects in this ACE= +$20 category
tends to be larger on this account.

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that monopoly produces different distortions in the private profitability of different kinds
of APCA decisions. Specifically, the preceding analysis generated
the following conclusions:
(1) monopoly inflates the private profitability of reducing
AP costs by making a last incremental break-even shift to
a less-AP-cost-prone production-process or to a less-APcost-prone product-variant or location whose average dollar
value to its consumers equals the average dollar value of
its known, more-AP-cost-prone alternative to the latter's
consumers;
(2) (A) monopoly inflates to an even greater extent the
private profitability of shifting to a less-AP-cost-prone
and more-highly-valued product-variant or location;
(B) monopoly inflates to a smaller extent (indeed, conceivably deflates if the shift-induced UO-increase-related component of PBAvs is sufficiently large) the private
profitability of shifting to a less-AP-cost-prone but lesshighly-valued product-variant or location;
(3) monopoly inflates the private profitability of reducing
AP costs by reducing output;
(4) (A) monopoly deflates the private profitability of doing
APCAR aimed at discovering a less-AP-cost-prone
production-process or less-AP-cost-prone product-variant
or location whose average dollar value to its consumers
equals the average dollar value of its known, more-APcost-prone alternative to the latter's consumers;
(B) monopoly deflates even more the private profitability of doing APCAR aimed at discovering a less-APcost-prone product-variant or location whose average
dollar value to its consumers is significantly lower than
the average dollar value of its known, more-AP-costcost-prone alternative to the latter's consumers; and
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(C) monopoly deflates the private profitability of doing
APCAR aimed at discovering a less-AP-cost-prone
product-variant or location whose average dollar value
to its consumers is higher than the average dollar value
of its more-AP-cost-prone alternative to the latter's
consumers less than it deflates the private profitability
of doing APCA aimed at discovering less-AP-costprone production-processes or less-AP-cost-prone product-variants or locations for which ACE = 0.
For current purposes, these specific conclusions are less imporA) for different
tant than the general conclusion that MD(Prr
types of APCA moves is likely to be significantly different from
zero and that MD(PircJc,) is positive for some types of marginal
APCA moves and negative for others.
D. Some Preliminary TBLE Analyses of the Allocative Efficiency
of Various Tort Law Doctrines, Tort Law Institutions, and WorkerHealth-and-Safety Regulations
Part C concluded that in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy,
monopoly would cause APCA misallocation by critically distorting
the private profitability of marginal, intra-marginal, and extra-marginal APCA decisions of all types. This conclusion implies that
FBLE tort doctrines would not eliminate APCA misallocation in an
economy that contained imperfections in seller competition but no
other type of Pareto imperfection. Indeed, since in some such situations various departures from FBLE tort doctrine would reduce the
mean and variance of the distribution of aggregate distortions in
the private profitability of marginal APCA choices that would
otherwise be generated by monopoly, Part C's conclusion implies
that in one sense FBLE tort doctrines sometimes cause APCA
misallocation.
Part D analyzes the implications of this last conclusion for the
allocative efficiency in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world of (1)(A)
shifting from a strict liability plus contributory negligence regime
to a negligence plus contributory negligence regime, (B) dismissing
some cases on proximate cause grounds, (2)(A) determining negligence by comparing the allocative rather than the private costs and
benefits of avoidance, (B) supplementing tort awards with positive
and negative fines designed to offset the distortion in the relevant
actor's avoidance incentives, (3) altering tort law institutions in
various ways, and (4) accepting as allocatively efficient any work-

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

er-health-and-safety regime set up by a joint labor-management
worker-health-and-safety committee.
1. Monopoly and the Allocative Efficiency in an OtherwisePareto-Perfect Economy of (A) Shifting from Strict Liability to a
"Perfectly Defined" but "Imperfectly Applied" Negligence Regime
and (B) Dismissing Some Tort Suits on Proximate Cause Grounds
(A) Monopoly and the Analysis of the Allocative Efficiency of
Shifting from a Strict Liability plus Contributory Negligence
System to a Negligence plus Contributory Negligence Combination
When "Negligence" and "Contributory Negligence" Are Defimed in
a FBLE Way but Applied in the Current Non-FBLE Way
Assuming that the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect except
that the State must generate positive allocative transaction costs to
use tort law to internalize critically distorting externalities, how will
monopoly affect the analysis of the allocative efficiency of shifting
from a regime combining strict liability and contributory negligence
to one combining negligence and contributory negligence in which
the doctrines are "perfectly defined" but "imperfectly applied"? The
analysis in this section assumes that courts have corrected Learned
Hand's purported operationalization of negligence and contributory
negligence to account for the tendency of a relevant avoidance
move to reduce the AP-cost-related risk costs that the potential
injurer's traditional victims would bear if he were not liable."e2
The analysis also assumes that the courts have corrected the common law definition of contributory negligence so that a victim (V)
would be held contributorily negligent only if he were the mostallocatively-efficient potential avoider, not if he were an inferiorallocatively-efficient potential avoider. However, the analysis assumes that the courts have not corrected the way in which "negligence" and "contributory negligence" are applied. Courts continue
to assess for negligence or contributory negligence decisions relating to only some of the APCA moves available to injurers and

102. On this definition, a potential injurer I would be held negligent if he failed to
avoid despite the fact that the private cost to him of avoiding was lower than the sum of
(1) the amount by which the rejected avoidance move would have reduced weighted-average-expected accident-losses and (2) the risk costs that potential victims bear because they
do not know the amount of accident and pollution losses for which they would be uncompensated by the I if he were not liable. This formula "corrects" Hand's purported
operationalization because his formula ignored the relevant risk costs.
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victims respectively. In particular, courts assess the possible negligence of a producer-injurer's decision to reject a shift to a known,
less-AP-cost-prone production-process but not a producer-injurer's

decision to reject (1) a shift to a known, less-AP-cost-prone product-variant 3 (2) a shift to a known, less-AP-cost-prone loca-

103. Admittedly, in products liability cases, producers are sometimes held liable on the
ground that the product is "defective" either in the sense that the product-unit is a defective unit of a "non-defective" product or in the sense that the product-unit is a unit of a
product with a design that is "defective." However, I share my colleague William Powers'
conclusion that the concept of "product defect" in products liability cases is not "merely a
version of negligence parading under another banner." William J. Powers Jr., A Modest
Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639, 652.
First, the "product defect" doctrine has been applied only in cases in which the
allegedly defective product-variant increased consumption-generated as opposed to production-generated AP costs. Second, it seems to me that the two basic tests that courts have
used to determine whether a producer is liable because his product is "defective" are
clearly distinguishable from the FBLE test for negligence. The first of these tests--the
"consumer expectation" test--"provides that a product is defective if the product is more
dangerous than an ordinary consumer would contemplate." Id. at 653.
For two reasons, this test is not the same as the test associated with a FBLE negligence rule. The first reason relates to the fact that the individual-sovereignty Pareto-optimal condition is not fulfilled in the real world. As Powers notes, "when consumer expectations about safety" are "vague" or, "more importantly . . . oscillate between 'it will
never happen to me' and 'of course, some products are poorly made,"' the outcome of
the "consumer expectation" test will be different from the outcome of a FBLE negligence
test. Id. Thus, if consumer expectations ae vague or overly pessimistic, producers will not
be held liable under a "consumer expectation" test for "defectiveness" even if the relevant
producer's design or quality-control choices were negligent. Moreover, if consumer expectations are overly optimistic, producers will be held liable under a "consumer expectation"
test even if the producer's design and quality-control choices were not negligent. Id.
The second reason that the "consumer expectation" test is not the same as a FBLE
negligence test relates to the fact that some of the AP costs that the consumption of a
product generates will be bome neither by its buyer-consumer nor by someone whose
equivalent-dollar losses the relevant buyer-consumer will treat as his own. In such a situation, (1) the "consumer expectation" test will not make the producer liable for producing
the defective unit or defective model even if the producer's product-design or qualitycontrol choice was negligent because the relevant consumer will not underestimate the
amount of AP costs that his consumption of the unit will generate and (2) the producer
will often find it profitable to behave negligently if his negligence does not make him
liable. If a buyer-consumer places a negative value of less than one dollar on the average-equivalent-dollar loss that his consumption of the relevant product imposes on others,
the consumption-choices of consumers may make it profitable for a producer to reject an
allocatively efficient avoidance move he can reject without being held liable. In particular,
the consumption choices of consumers will tend to do so whenever the move's allocative
efficiency is critically affected by its tendency to reduce the AP costs the consumption of
his output imposes on third parties.
The second test the courts have used to determine whether a producer is liable in
products liability cases in which the product was "defective" is the so-called "risk-utility"
test. At first sight, the risk-utility test seems similar to the Hand formula for negligence.
The term "risk" refers to the increase in weighted-average-expected accident-costs (usually
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(3) the option of reducing his unit output or going out of

designated "PL" where "P" stands for the probability of the loss and "L," for the magnitude of the loss) generated by the allegedly defective product design or the allegedly
defective individual unit. The term "utility" refers to the benefits generated by the different attributes of the more-AP-cost-prone product-variant (whose sacrifice would certainly
be part of the burden or cost of shifting to the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant, usually
designated "B"). However, in practice, at least many of the courts that have used the
risk-utility test for "defectiveness" have not defined "risk" and "utility" in the way that
their counterparts would be defined under a negligence test. Thus, in practice, the "risk"
(increase in PL) is defined with hindsight at the time of the trial rather than with "reasonable" foresight at the time at which the manufacturer had to make his product-design
and quality-control decisions (rather than in terms of the reduction in PL that the manufacturer would have predicted at the time that he had to make his relevant decisions had
he done an allocatively efficient amount of research into this issue). Id. at 655. In practice, "utility" is defined solely in terms of the difference between the value of the relevant number of units of the more-AP-cost-prone product-variant and the value of the
relevant number of units of the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant. In other words, it is
defined in a way that excludes from consideration any non-AP-cost-related differences in
the cost of producing the less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or the cost of the stricter
quality-control procedure. Id. at 655-56. The courts, for whatever reason, have failed to
consider the relevant costs in practice.
My colleague Bill Powers believes that "the concept of defectiveness [that the courts
have applied] . . . is far closer to negligence than to strict liability." Id. at 652. However,
Powers would agree with my conclusion that the concept of defectiveness, as it has been
applied, is significantly different from a FBLE negligence concept even in cases in which
the purported defect raised the AP costs generated by the consumption as opposed to the
production of the good. I should add that my understanding of the relevant doctrines has
been enormously enhanced not only by the article cited above but also by its predecessor-William J. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TFX. L.
REv. 777 (1983)-and the numerous conversations I have had with Professor Powers both
about tort law and about legal justification and jurisprudence in general.
104. Admittedly, nuisance doctrine may make a producer liable because of the location
in which he undertakes his activity. However, under the relevant nuisance doctrines, negligence in location-choice does not appear to me to be either a necessary or a sufficient
condition for producer-liability. Roughly stated, a seller is held to be liable as a nuisance
if his activity is more-AP-cost-prone than the average activity in his locale. Since the fact
that an activity does not generate more AP costs (in some relevant sense-more total AP
costs, more AP costs as a percentage of total costs, etc.) in its actual location than the
average activity in its locale generates is perfectly compatible with the relevant producer's
location-choice or decision to stay in business' being rendered allocatively inefficient by
the AP costs he does generate (since his location-choice or activity may be less
allocatively efficient than his neighbors', AP costs aside), an activity's being more-APcost-prone in its existing location than the average activity in its locale is not a necessary
condition for the FBLE negligence (in other words, for the ceteris paribus allocative
inefficiency) of the relevant injurer's location-choice or decision not to exit. Similarly,
since the fact that an activity generates more AP costs in some relevant sense in its
actual location than are generated by the average activity in its locale is perfectly compatible with the relevant producer's location-choices or decision to stay in business' not
being rendered allocatively inefficient by the AP costs he does generate (since his location-choice or activity may be more allocatively efficient than his neighbors'), an activity's
being more AP-cost-prone in its existing location than the average activity in its locale is
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business altogether, or (4) the option of doing additional
APCAR'0 5.
I will first analyze the allocative efficiency of the shift on the
assumption that the economy is perfectly competitive; then I will
explain how monopoly affects that analysis. Both analyses will
assume that all injurers and victims are sovereign maximizers, that
judges and juries never make an error, that plaintiffs who make
unjustified claims have to pay the costs those claims impose on
defendants and the State, that plaintiffs always find it profitable to
make legally justified claims, and that "negligence" and "contributory negligence" are "perfectly defined" but "improperly applied"
in the above senses. The allocative efficiency of shifting from a
strict liability plus contributory negligence regime to a negligence
plus contributory negligence regime depends on the answer to the
following question: will the allocative-efficiency losses that such a
shift generates by decreasing the allocative efficiency of potential
injurer avoidance decisions exceed the sum of the allocative-efficiency gains such a shift generates by decreasing the allocative
inefficiency that potential victims cause by rejecting allocatively
efficient APCA moves and the allocative-efficiency gains the shift
generates by decreasing the mechanical allocative cost of processing tort claims?
I will begin by explaining the last of the three items in the
preceding formulation. On our current assumptions, a shift to negligence will clearly decrease the mechanical allocative cost of processing tort claims. This conclusion reflects two "facts." First, if
injurers and victims are sovereign maximizers, "court personnel"
make no errors, judges internalize to plaintiffs who bring unjustified claims the costs their claims impose on defendants and the
State, and all victims with valid legal claims find it profitable to
assert them, then no legal claims will ever be brought under a
negligence regime since no injurer will ever be negligent and no
victim will ever find it profitable to assert an unjustified tort claim.
Second, some legal claims will be brought in a strict liability re-

also not a sufficient condition for the FBLE negligence of the relevant injurer's locationchoice or decision to exit.
105. 1 am not aware of any case in which a producer has been held negligent for failing to make an APCAR expenditure. Even if, contrary to my own judgment, the failure
of the common law to assess'negative APCAR decisions for negligence can be justified
by the difficulty and cost of courts' making the relevant determinations, the fact remains
that, to my knowledge, no producer's decision to reject an APCAR expenditure has ever
been assessed for negligence.
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gime because sovereign, maximizing potential injurers will sometimes find it profitable to make decisions that impose AP costs on
others and their victims will always find it profitable to make
claims for the losses that injurers imposed on them."°
In the other direction, a shift from strict liability to an "imperfectly applied" negligence doctrine will tend to increase the amount
of misallocation that potential injurers' AP-cost-related decisions
generate by critically deflating the private profitability to them of
making allocatively efficient avoidance moves whose rejection
would not in practice be assessed for negligence. The shift would
lead, for example, to the rejection of allocatively efficient (1) shifts
to known, less-AP-cost-prone product-variants, (2) shifts to known,
less-AP-cost-prone locations, (3) reductions in unit output, and (4)
APCAR expenditures.

106. If more realistic assumptions are made, the effect of a shift from strict liability to
negligence on the mechanical allocative cost of processing tort claims will be far less
certain (though Chicagoans continue to assume that such a shift will inevitably decrease
such costs). Admittedly, even though in the real world potential injurers will sometimes
be negligent, a shift from strict liability to negligence will tend to decrease the allocative
cost of tort-claim processing by decreasing the percentage of accident and pollution losses
that generate legal claims by decreasing the percentage of such losses for which the injurer is in fact liable.
However, the shift to negligence will also affect the above percentage in other ways.
In one direction, the shift will tend to increase it by increasing the likely damage awards
that a successful plaintiff will obtain by increasing the ability of his lawyer to introduce
evidence of defendant wrongdoing and to decrease it by increasing the length of the associated trial and hence deterring lawyers from taking some cases on contingency fees and
plaintiffs from bringing some suits, regardless of the way in which their lawyers would
have to be paid. In the other direction, the shift to negligence will tend to increase such
costs by increasing (1) the numbers of accident-and-pollution losses that result because the
amount of injurer avoidance it deters will probably exceed the amount of victim avoidance it induces-see discussion, supra Subsection D.I(A), p. 405-and (2) the complexity
of the average tort trial or settlement negotiation by making it necessary for the parties to
litigate or debate the negligence issue.
The shift from strict liability to negligence will also affect tort-claim-processing costs
in an uncertain direction by changing in an uncertain direction the percentage of tort
claims that are settled as opposed to tried. Thus, on the one hand, the shift will tend to
reduce tort-claim-processing costs by promoting settlement by increasing the joint savings
of avoiding litigation by increasing the extra cost of going to trial. On the other hand,
the shift will tend to increase tort-claim-processing costs by deterring settlement by increasing the difference between the two sides' weighted-average-expected trial outcome
predictions through the introduction of another issue on whose favorable resolution both
sides are likely to be too optimistic. (The impact of the shift on the percentage of tort
cases that are settled is relevant because it is allocatively and privately cheaper to negotiate a settlement than to litigate.)
In any event, for the above reason, the impact of a shift from strict liability to
negligence on tort-claim-processing allocative costs is far less certain than the Chicagoans
believe if one adopts realistic assumptions about the parties and current tort law processes.
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Finally, a shift from a strict liability plus contributory negligence regime to a negligence plus contributory negligence regime in
which negligence and contributory negligence are "imperfectly
applied" will tend to reduce the amount of APCA-related
misallocation that potential victims generate by rejecting
allocatively efficient APCA moves whose rejection would not in
practice be assessed for contributory negligence."° The shift to
negligence will produce this result by reducing the frequency with
which an imperfectly applied "contributory negligence" doctrine
will critically deflate the private profitability of a most-allocativelyefficient potential victim avoidance move by reducing the probability that a victim will be able to recover from his injurer the loss he
could have avoided efficiently."° Indeed, since our assumptions
imply that an injurer who is liable for negligence will never be
negligent, the shift from strict liability to negligence will eliminate
the probability that victims will be able to recover their losses
from their injurers. Thus, the shift will not just reduce but will
eliminate the possibility that victims will misallocate resources by
rejecting allocatively efficient avoidance moves. Since, then, the
shift to negligence will again internalize to the victim the external
costs he would otherwise impose on his injurer by making decisions that are actually contributory negligent for which he would
never be held contributorily negligent in practice, the shift to negligence will tend to increase"° the allocative efficiency of potential
victim avoidance decisions.
This background should enable me to analyze the way that
monopoly will affect the allocative efficiency of shifting from a
strict liability plus "perfectly defined" but "imperfectly applied"

107. For example, a pedestrian who is injured in an automobile accident when crossing
a street at a crosswalk late on a dark night is unlikely to have the following decisions
assessed for contributory negligence: (1) living in the ill-lit neighborhood, (2) walking late
on that dark night at all, (3) choosing to cross the street at a dark comer rather than at a
better-lit comer, or (4) wearing dark rather than light or light-reflecting clothing.
108. In particular, the shift to negligence will produce this result by increasing the
frequency with which we can rely on Nature (the no-liability-for-any-injurer outcome)-as
opposed to the contributory negligence doctrine-to provide a potential victim with appropriate incentives to make a most-allocatively-efficient avoidance move.
109. The phrase "tend to" is included because it may be profitable for victims to make
some of the most-allocatively-efficient avoidance moves available to them even if all the

potential injurers are strictly liable. In particular, the moves may be profitable for the victims when they reduce some AP costs that would otherwise be generated by Nature at
the same time that they reduce other AP costs that would otherwise be generated by a
strictly-liable injurer.
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contributory negligence regime to a "properly defined" but "imperfectly applied" negligence plus contributory negligence regime. I
will start by investigating the way that the presence of imperfections in seller competition affects the analysis of the effect of such
a shift on the allocative cost of processing tort claims.
Monopoly will affect this analysis in three ways. First, since
the various monopolies in the economy will tend to deflate the
private cost to the parties and the State of the resources used to
process tort claims, the fact that seller competition is imperfect
implies that the allocative-efficiency analyst cannot assume that the
tort-claim-processing allocative-cost savings generated by a shift
from strict liability to negligence equals the private-cost savings the
shift conferred on the parties and the State. In other words, ceteris
paribus, the shift will be more allocatively efficient than would be
suggested by an analysis that assumes that the allocative cost of
tort-claim processing equals the private costs that victims, injurers,
and the State incur to process tort claims."'
Second, since monopoly will change the average allocative
products in their alternative uses of the resources that a shift to
negligence will save by reducing tort-claim-processing costs, the
presence of imperfections in seller competition will also affect the
analysis of the allocative-cost savings that the shift to negligence
will generate by reducing tort-claim-processing costs. In particular,
the analyst will have to consider the net effect that monopolies
have on the allocative product of the resources the shift to negligence will save. This shift reduces tort-claim-processing costs by
increasing the allocative product of those resources that are subsequently devoted to UO-increasing and PPR-executing uses (by
reducing the total amount of resources devoted to such uses). In
addition, the shift to negligence reduces the allocative product of
those saved resources that are subsequently devoted to QV creation
(by increasing the total amount of resources devoted to this type of
use).
Third, the presence of monopolies also affects the analysis of
the allocative-efficiency gains that a shift from strict liability to

110. The "private" costs that the State incurs will also understate the allocative cost of
State participation because the State's financing of its tort-claim-processing expenditures
will be allocatively costly regardless of whether it finances these expenditures by levying
transaction-costly and otherwise misallocative taxes on the margin of income, by printing
money and thereby generating misallocative inflation, or by eliminating other, allocatively
efficient expenditures.
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negligence generates by increasing the allocative-efficiency gains
that the shift generates by reducing the amount of revenues the
State must collect or the amount of alternative expenditures it must
forego to finance its tort-claim-processing activities. It will be
necessary to consider two ways that monopolies increase the
allocative-efficiency gains the shift to negligence generates by
reducing the costs the State must incur to resolve tort disputes: (1)
by increasing the misallocativeness of the taxes on the margin of
income that the shift to negligence will obviate by generating a
deflation in the private cost of leisure that compounds the deflation
the eliminated taxes would have caused and (2) by increasing the
misallocativeness of any reduction in expenditures the shift to
negligence obviates by increasing the allocative product of the
State's marginal expenditures-by giving the State another reason
to consume resources (preventing or combating monopoly).
Imperfections in competition will also affect the analysis of the
amount of misallocation that a shift from strict liability to an "imperfectly applied" negligence doctrine generates by deterring potential injurers from making allocatively efficient APCA moves. In
particular, monopoly will alter this analysis by making it necessary
to consider the monopoly distortion in the private profitability of
the moves whose rejection is not in practice assessed for negligence. If the economy and the tort law regime were otherwisePareto-perfect, the shift from strict liability to negligence would
always tend to increase the amount of APCA-related misallocation

that potential injurers generate by increasing
Given

monopoly,

the

effect

)I and hence on
IXD(PTA ...

of a

shift to

injurer-generated

IXD(Pc...)].1"
negligence

on

APCA-related

misallocation will be uncertain. This uncertainty results because, in
an economy that contains some imperfections in seller competition
but no other Pareto imperfection that distorts Prc,,,CA for the injurer
than the externalities that might be present in a negligence regime,
) for each relevant type of choice
the shift will change YXD(PA ...
from MD(PA...) for that choice-which is positive for some types
of last APCA choices and negative for others-to a YD(PIrA...)
sum that reflects both monopolies and the externalities that are
present in the economy.

111. In other words, by changing ,D(Pr..) for the various avoidance moves whose
rejection would otherwise not be assessed for negligence from zero to a negative sum
equal to the AP costs that the marginal or last incremental decision of the relevant type
will generate.
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Thus, the analysis of the effect of a shift from strict liability to
negligence on the APCA-related misallocation that injurers generate
will be far more complicated in an economy with monopolies than
in a perfectly competitive economy. In an economy that is not
perfectly competitive, the analysis will have to consider the following sorts of issues. First, what is the absolute and relative
allocative efficiency of the various types of avoidance moves not
covered by negligence that are available to potential injurers? In
other words, to what extent will the adoption of a negligence doctrine tend to deter potential injurers from respectively (A) shifting
to a known, less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location for
which ACE = 0; (B) shifting to a known, less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location for which ACE < 0; (C) shifting to a known,
less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location for which ACE > 0;
(D) reducing their unit outputs; (E) making an APCAR expenditure
aimed at discovering a less-AP-cost-prone production-process or a
less-AP-cost-prone product-variant or location for which ACE = 0;
(F) making an APCAR expenditure aimed at discovering a less-APcost-prone product-variant or location for which ACE < 0; and (G)
making an APCAR expenditure aimed at discovering a less-APcost-prone product-variant or location for which ACE > 0? Second,
what is the value of MD(Pn,...) for each of the above types of
APCA moves? Third, what is the formula for XD(Prr... ) for each
choice and what would the value of the formula for each be in an
otherwise-Pareto-perfect world that was "marred" by some imperfections in seller competition and the externalities generated by the
negligence doctrine? 1 2
112. I have resisted the temptation to illustrate such an analysis by assuming that the
only avoidance moves that the injurers might be deterred from making by the adoption of
the negligence doctrine can be analyzed as additive cases. Such a simplification would
disserve the goals this Article seeks to achieve since the only kind of APCA choice that
can be analyzed as an additive case-shifts to a known, less-AP-cost-prone productionprocess-is a choice whose rejection would be covered by the negligence doctrine under
analysis-is a choice whose 7D(Pit...) figure would not be directly affected by the doctrinal shift under consideration. For present purposes, it should suffice to point out that
since monopoly will almost certainly inflate the private profitability of several types of
avoidance moves available to producer-injurers-for example, of shifting to a less-AP-costprone product-variant or location for which ACE = 0-one cannot tell whether one would
increase or decrease injurer-avoidance-related misallocation by shifting from strict liability
to an "imperfectly applied" negligence doctrine defined in a FBLE way without undertaking a variety of empirical analyses into the effect of a shift on IXD(P
-...)J for all
types of APCA moves as well as on the number and allocative efficiency of the moves
in each category whose profitability a shift would critically reduce. For a discussion of
why the relevant analysis would be far easier in an additive case, see Appendix A, infra
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Finally, the fact that the economy contains some monopolies
will also affect both the structure of and conclusions generated by
the analyses of the impact of a shift from strict liability to an
"imperfectly applied" negligence doctrine on the misallocation that
potential victims cause when making APCA choices. Since the
necessary changes will parallel those already discussed in the context of potential injurer avoidance decisions, I will restrict myself
to discussing the one issue that is salient in the victim-avoidance
context that has no counterpart in the injurer-avoidance analysis."' The issue concerns the size of the percentage-distortion that
externalities would generate in the private benefits of a victim
avoidance move if injurers are strictly liable. Ceteris paribus, this
percentage-distortion will equal 100% minus the percentage of the
ex ante certainty-equivalent losses that a victim could prevent by
avoiding that the victim would be able to recover from his injurer
if the injurer were strictly liable. In other terms, this percentagedistortion would equal 100% minus the percentage of the losses the
victim could avoid that would otherwise have been caused by
Nature. Since the percentage in question will determine the magnitude of the negative distortion in the private benefits of victim
avoidance that the shift from strict liability to negligence will eliminate, it will affect the impact that such a shift will have on the
relevant IXD(P~ ... ) for potential victim avoidance moves in an
economy that contains imperfections in seller competition but is
otherwise-Pareto-perfect.
The preceding discussion has revealed the difference between a
FBLE analysis and a SBLE or TBLE analysis of a shift from a
strict liability plus contributory negligence regime to a negligence
plus contributory negligence regime when negligence and contributory negligence are defined in a FBLE way but applied in the
current non-FBLE way. I am not arguing that it will always, generally, or even ever be allocatively efficient to execute a SBLE analysis of this type of issue. The approach that is allocatively efficient
in the real world (TBLE analysis) will take account of the cost and

p. 433.
113. Strict liability is the doctrine that generates externality distortions in the private
profitability of those avoidance moves whose rejection will not be assessed for contributo-

ry negligence. This conclusion reflects the fact that, at least on our current assumptions,
XD(1iA... ) for victim avoidance moves will always be zero under negligence regardless
of whether the rejection of the move would be assessed for contributory negligence in
practice since no injurer will ever be negligent.
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inaccuracy of attempts to refine the relevant theoretical analysis
and collect and assess the significance of additional data. TBLE
analysis will also take into account the gains such attempts may
generate by improving the accuracy of any predictions and hence
the allocative efficiency of any related policies. However, it will
virtually never be ex ante third-best-allocatively-efficient to ignore
Second-Best Theory altogether. The analysis that is TBLE will
almost always be significantly different from FBLE analysis.
(B) Monopoly and the Allocative Efficiency of the MostAllocatively-Efficient "Proximate Cause" Doctrine One Could
Devise for an Otherwise-Pareto-Perfect World in Which TortClaim Processing Is Allocatively Transaction-Costly
According to the common law, a negligent or a strictly liable
injurer who would otherwise be liable for the AP costs he imposed
on particular victims may still be released from liability by the
trier of fact if the injurer's acts were not the proximate cause of
the loss. Although different courts have taken different positions on
the factors relevant to the determination of whether an AP-costgenerating choice was the proximate cause of a loss for which it
was a cause-in-fact, it is clear that the actual "proximate cause"
doctrine that has evolved is not so allocatively efficient as a variant one could devise."14 Of course, one could devise a variant
that was allocatively efficient-a variant under which (1) the proximate cause issue would be decided before the parties litigated the
other relevant issues and (2) the notion of "proximate cause"
would be operationalized to maximize allocative efficiency. This
subsection investigates the way that monopoly would affect the
analysis of the allocative efficiency of the most-allocatively-efficient proximate cause doctrine for an economy in which the only
Pareto imperfections not related to tort law doctrine were monopoly
and the allocative transaction cost of processing tort claims. In
Second-Best Theory terms, this subsection investigates the rele-

114. I do not mean to imply that the courts were trying to devise the most-allocativelyefficient proximate cause doctrine they could or that it is morally permissible or desirable
overall for courts to try to define this doctrine in such a way. Both the actual definition
and the "optimal" definition of this doctrine may be related to notions of the scope of
moral responsibility-notions for which allocative-efficiency analysis cannot provide an
algorithm. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the allocative efficiency of a
choice on the one hand and its moral permissibility and overall desirability on the other,
see Markovits, A Constructive Critique, supra note 1.
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vance of the presence of a second irremediable imperfection (monopoly) to the analysis of the allocative efficiency of introducing a
third, avoidable imperfection (a proximate cause rule and the
externalities it would prevent from being internalized to injurers) in
an economy which would in any case contain one irremediable
(arguable) imperfection (the allocative cost of processing tort claims
by
internalizing
potentially-critically-distorting
AP-cost
externalities).
I begin by assuming that the "tort-liability regime" in the relevant jurisdiction is FBLE, that it combines a negligence doctrine
that is both defined and applied in a FBLE way with a contributory negligence doctrine that is both defined and applied in a FBLE
way." 5 I then examine how the allocatively efficient approach to
analyzing the most-allocatively-efficient proximate cause rule or the
conclusions such an approach will generate will alter if the liability
regime is not FBLE. The liability regime might not be FBLE because the "transaction cost" or impossibility of resolving tort claims
in a FBLE way might make it TBLE to combine strict liability or
an imperfectly applied negligence doctrine with an imperfectly applied contributory negligence doctrine.
Monopoly does not alter the list of ways in which a proximate
cause rule can affect allocative efficiency: by changing (1) the
allocative cost of processing all tort claims, (2) the amount of
APCA-related misallocation that injurers generate, and (3) the
amount of APCA-related misallocation that victims generate. However, monopoly always alters the way in which these effects are
analyzed and usually alters the magnitudes and perhaps even the
signs of these effects.
I will first analyze the allocative efficiency of a maximally
efficient "proximate cause" doctrine in a FBLE negligence plus
contributory negligence jurisdiction on the assumption that seller
competition is universally perfect and all other Pareto-optimal conditions are fulfilled. I will then explain how the relevant analysis
and the conclusions it generates will change if the economy contains some monopolies. The analysis focuses separately on the
allocative cost of tort-claim processing, injurer-APCA misallocation,
and victim-APCA misallocation.

115. I have assumed that the FBLE tort law regime combines contributory negligence
with negligence rather than with strict liability because, on our current assumptions, a
shift from strict liability to negligence will reduce the allocative cost of processing all tort
claims.
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On our current assumptions, one need not even analyze the
impact of a proximate cause rule on the allocative cost of processing tort claims. Assuming that the transaction-costliness of resolving tort claims does not lead plaintiffs to bring unjustified suits
because they misjudge the validity of their claims or because they
hope to induce non-liable injurers to pay them off to avoid costly
litigation, no tort claims will ever be made and no such costs will
be generated regardless of whether some suits may be dismissed on
proximate cause grounds. This issue can simply be ignored if the
economy is perfectly competitive (or, indeed, if it is not).
However, for reasons already discussed,"' one can not ignore
the possibility that the relevant proximate cause rule may alter the
amount of misallocation generated by injurer-APCA decisions regardless of whether seller competition is perfect throughout the
economy. In a FBLE negligence plus contributory negligence regime, in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy in which seller competition is perfect, the proximate cause doctrine will always tend to
induce injurers to cause APCA-related misallocation. In particular,
on the above assumptions, the proximate cause doctrine will always
tend to deter allocatively efficient potential-injurer avoidance by
deflating the private profitability of some APCA moves to potential
injurers in circumstances in which their profitability would not
otherwise be distorted. Specifically, any proximate cause decision
will deflate the private profitability of an APCA move available to
a potential injurer whenever and to the extent that it might release
that injurer from legal responsibility for the AP costs the move
would tend to prevent. Hence, any proximate cause rule that causes
at least one case to be dismissed will tend to increase the amount
of APCA-related misallocation that injurers cause when seller competition is perfect throughout the economy.
Unfortunately, in a FBLE negligence plus contributory negligence jurisdiction with an economy that is perfectly competitive and
otherwise-Pareto-perfect, a maximally efficient proximate cause
doctrine will not generate any offsetting allocative-efficiency gains
by critically increasing the private profitability of allocatively efficient avoidance moves to potential victims. This conclusion reflects
the fact that on our current assumptions all potential victims will
find all allocatively efficient avoidance moves to be privately profitable, even if no claims they brought would be dismissed on prox-

116. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
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imate cause grounds." 7 Accordingly, given the other assumptions
used, if seller competition is perfect throughout the economy, the
analysis of the allocative efficiency of any proximate cause rule
that causes at least one case to be dismissed can ignore the victimAPCA-related misallocation issue.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that if seller competition is
universally perfect in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy that is
governed by a FBLE tort-law-liability regime, one can establish
that any proximate cause doctrine will be misallocative simply by
showing that such a doctrine will tend to increase the amount of
APCA-related misallocation that injurers cause. However, if seller
competition in the economy is not universally perfect, both the
structure of the relevant analysis and the conclusion that is warranted are altered substantially. Admittedly, the presence of imperfections in seller competition will not make it necessary to re-analyze
the effect of a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine on the
allocative cost of processing tort claims because no tort claims will
ever be made regardless of whether or not the economy is perfectly competitive. Similarly, imperfections in seller competition will
not make it necessary to re-analyze the effect of a maximally efficient proximate cause rule on victim-APCA-related misallocation.
Since victims will never be able to recover their AP-cost losses
from injurers in the absence of a proximate cause doctrine, the
introduction of such a doctrine will not affect any victim avoidance
decision or victim-generated APCA-related misallocation, regardless
of whether seller competition is universally perfect."8
However, the presence of monopolies will make it necessary to
restructure the analysis of the effect of a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine on injurer-APCA-related misallocation. Monopoly complicates this analysis because MD(Pi;,...) will be positive for some avoidance moves available to injurers and negative

117. This result reflects the following relationships: (1) the combination of the assumption that the liability of injurers is based on negligence and the assumption that no actor
will ever make a mistake guarantees that injurers will never be liable and hence that
victims will bear all AP costs they could have avoided by making an avoidance move
whose private cost to them was smaller than the reduction in AP costs it would generate;
and (2) the assumption that the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect guarantees that the
cost to a victim of any and all allocatively efficient avoidance moves available to him
will be lower than the amount by which they would reduce the AP costs he generated.
118. Monopolies will affect the amount of misallocation that victims generate when
making APCA decisions regardless of whether there is a proximate cause doctrine by
critically inflating and critically deflating the private profitability of different types of
victim avoidance moves.
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for others. This result implies that (1) in some cases proximate
cause dismissals will reduce YD(Prtc,,A) by introducing a negative
XD(Prtc) into a situation in which -D(Pr CA) would otherwise
equal a positive MD(P~rtcA)-will reduce injurer-APCA-related
misallocation by deterring injurers from making allocatively inefficient avoidance moves-and (2) in other cases, monopolies will
increase the amount of misallocation that proximate cause dismissals induce injurers to generate by rejecting APCA moves by causing those dismissals to raise what would be a negative
X'D(PitrpCA) = MD(PirApcA) rather than simply change XD(Pr"),)
from zero to the negative MD(PirrtcA) they would cause.
Obviously, then, even on our other current assumptions, the
presence of monopolies in the economy will require a significant
adjustment in the way one analyzes the effect of a maximally
efficient proximate cause doctrine on injurer-APCA-related
misallocation. When the economy contains monopolies, one will
have to do more than calculate the percentage by which a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine will deflate the private
benefits generated by the various types of avoidance moves available to an injurer and the number of avoidance moves of each type
that would be marginally profitable if no cases were dismissed on
proximate cause grounds. One will also have to take account of the
monopoly distortion in the private profitability of these various
types of avoidance moves and analyze the effect of the maximally
efficient proximate cause doctrine on IXD(PrTA... ) I for the avoidance moves available in an economy distorted by monopoly's
effect on the private profitability of these moves without a proximate cause rule.
Clearly, an analysis that takes the extant monopolies into account may reach different conclusions about the factors that a
maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine would make relevant
and the effect of such a doctrine on injurer-APCA-related
misallocation. In particular, unless it would be prohibitively expensive to identify on a case-by-case basis the type of avoidance move
that a proximate cause rule would deter and to calculate the
MD(PrPCA) for that move, it will be allocatively efficient to make
the resolution of proximate cause cases depend, inter alia, on these
factors. The presence of monopolies in the economy will almost
certainly alter our conclusions about the extent to which a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine will misallocate resources
by increasing injurer-APCA-related allocative inefficiency. If monopolies originally inflated the private profitability of most of the
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injurer avoidance decisions that the maximally efficient proximate
cause doctrine would deter, imperfections in seller competition may
actually lead to the conclusion that the doctrine will decrease rather
than increase injurer-APCA-related misallocation.
Perfectly analogous conclusions are justified if our initial assumption that the tort law liability of injurers and victims is governed by a combination of "perfectly defined" and "perfectly applied" negligence and contributory negligence doctrines is replaced
with an assumption that the prohibitive transaction cost of such
doctrines has led the jurisdiction to govern injurer and victim tort
liability by either (1) a combination of negligence and contributory
negligence doctrines that are defined in a FBLE way but applied in
a non-FBLE manner or (2) a combination of strict liability and a
contributory negligence doctrine that is applied in our current nonFBLE way. To establish this result, I will first delineate the way in
which the allocative efficiency of a maximally efficient proximate
cause rule should be analyzed if the economy is universally perfectly competitive and then explain why and how the relevant
analysis will change if the economy contains some monopolies.
The analysis of APCA-related misallocation in a perfectly competitive economy in which there is no proximate cause rule will
have to be adjusted in three different ways to account for the fact
that tort liability is governed by a non-FBLE set of liability doctrines. First, if injurer liability in the relevant jurisdiction is strict,
the analysis will have to consider the allocative cost of processing
the tort claims that will be made. Second, if injurer liability is
governed by a negligence doctrine that is not applied in a FBLE
way, the analysis will have to analyze the extent to which potential
injurers will generate APCA-related misallocation by rejecting
allocatively efficient avoidance moves whose private profitability
was critically deflated because their rejection would not in practice
be assessed for negligence. Third, since victim "liability" is governed inter alia by a contributory negligence doctrine that is not
applied in a FBLE way, the analysis will have to consider the
extent to which victims generate APCA-related misallocation by
rejecting allocatively efficient avoidance moves whose rejection will
not in practice be assessed for contributory negligence." 9

119. Such misallocation will occur regardless of whether the loss was also caused by
Nature, by a strictly liable injurer, or by an injurer who was liable only if held negligent
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Strictly speaking, the assumption that the processing of tort
claims is allocatively transaction-costly cannot be reconciled with
the assumption that all parties are sovereign. The discussion that
follows makes the required accommodation by assuming that injurers, victims, and triers of fact privately respond optimally to the
imperfections in the information available to them. The fact that
the liability rules are not FBLE will alter the analysis of the impact of a maximally efficient proximate cause rule in three basic
ways. First, non-FBLE liability rules will create a need to consider
the possibility that the proximate cause doctrine may affect the
allocative transaction cost of processing tort claims in either direction. Second, if the liability of injurers is determined by an "imperfectly applied" negligence rule, the analyst will have to consider
the way in which this imperfect rule would alter the impact of the
proximate
cause
rule
on
potential
injurers'
APCA
misallocation-namely, by altering both the value that the relevant
YD(PA... )s would have absent the proximate cause rule and the
impact that the rule would have on the YD(P7rA... ) figures. As we
have seen, these issues are salient because the amount of
misallocation a given policy choice generates tends to increase both
with the magnitude of its impact on the relevant IYD(Pn,...)I
figure and with the original magnitude of that figure. Third, if the
"liability" of victims is governed by an "imperfectly applied"
contributory negligence rule, the analysis of the impact of a proximate cause doctrine on potential victim APCA misallocation will
have to consider the fact that the YD(Pic,... )s would not be zero
in its absence for the same reasons that the analysis of the impact
of a proximate cause doctrine on potential injurer APCA
misallocation had to consider the fact that the imperfect application
of the negligence rule would distort the relevant YD(Pic,... )s for
potential injurers in the absence of a proximate cause doctrine.
Some additional comments should be made on the ways in
which a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine will affect
the allocative cost of processing tort claims. On our current assumptions, the proximate cause doctrine will tend to (1) reduce the
allocative cost of processing tort claims by deterring those claims
that will in the end be rejected on proximate cause grounds, (2)
reduce the allocative cost of processing tort claims by deterring
valid tort claims from being made, 20 (3) increase the allocative

120. The proximate cause doctrine will increase private costs to the victim of pursuing
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cost of processing tort claims by changing the cost of processing
the claims that are made in an uncertain direction,' and (4)
change the allocative cost of processing tort claims in either direction by altering in an uncertain direction the number and magnitude of valid claims."
The preceding list implies that it will not be possible to predict
the direction in which a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine will affect the allocative transaction cost of resolving tort
claims. Indeed, it is also not possible to predict on a priori
grounds whether the maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine
will increase or decrease allocative efficiency on balance. Under
the conditions we are now assuming, the maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine may be allocatively inefficient. Fortunately,
however, my uncertainty about this issue is not relevant in the
current context. The preceding analysis was executed not to establish the possible allocative efficiency of the maximally efficient
proximate cause rule. The analysis was executed to provide a basis
for the following investigation of the way in which the presence of
monopolies affects both the structure and the conclusion of the
analysis of the allocative efficiency of the maximally efficient
proximate cause rule.
As already indicated, the fact that the economy contains some
monopolies will require precisely the same alterations in analyzing
the allocative efficiency of a maximally efficient proximate cause
rule as it required in analyzing the allocative efficiency of shifting
from a strict liability plus contributory negligence regime to a

his valid claim and, thus, will deter valid tort claims from being made by making it
necessary for the victim to prove that his injurer's behavior was the proximate cause of

his loss.
121. Obviously, by making it necessary for the trier of fact to resolve an extra, proximate cause issue, the proximate cause doctrine will increase the allocative cost of processing any tort claims that victims pursue when the proximate cause issue is not decisive. However, if we relax our assumption that victims will never bring claims that will
be unsuccessful, the doctrine may also increase the allocative cost of processing tort
claims when the issue is decisive. Particularly, if it is maximally efficient to make the
proximate cause decision depend on such factors as the probability of the loss that occurred (P), the size of the loss that should have been anticipated (L), the foreseeability of
the loss, and the tendency of the relevant injurer to underestimate the reduction in the PL
his avoidance move would generate, i may be more expensive to resolve the proximate
cause issue than to resolve all the issue$ whose litigation would be obviated by a decisive
(negative) resolution of the proximate cause issue.
122. The proximate cause doctrine will alter the number and magnitude of valid claims
by deterring injurers from engaging in avoidance and by inducing potential victims to
engage in avoidance.
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liability regime combining negligence and contributory negligence
doctrines that are defined in a FBLE way but applied in the current non-FBLE way. Once more, the fact that the economy is not
universally perfectly competitive will preclude the assumption that
the effect of a maximally efficient proximate cause doctrine on the
allocative cost of processing tort claims equals its impact on the
total private costs that the victims, injurers, and State incur when
such claims are considered. In particular, the presence of monopolies requires the analyst to consider the extent to which the relevant private costs are distorted and the extent to which the State
will have to misallocate resources by levying additional taxes,
printing additional money, increasing its user charges, and/or reducing its other expenditures to finance its tort-claim-processing activities. Once more, the analyst will have to consider how monopolies
distort the private profitability of the various avoidance moves
available to injurers and victims when determining the way in
which the introduction of a preventable proximate-cause-doctrine
imperfection would, by affecting YD(Pir,...) for the various types
of avoidance moves available to potential injurers and potential
victims, alter injurer-APCA-related misallocation" and victimAPCA-related misallocation.'24 Clearly, then, the fact that seller
competition is not universally perfect in the relevant economy will
substantially affect the structure of a SBLE and TBLE analysis of
the allocative efficiency of a maximally efficient proximate cause
doctrine.
2.

Monopoly and the Allocative Efficiency of (A) Determining
Negligence and Contributory Negligence by Comparing the
Allocative Rather than the Private Benefits and Costs of
Avoidance and (B) Supplementing Traditional Tort-Damage
Awards with Positive and Negative Fines Designed to Eliminate
the Distortion in the Private Profitability of Avoidance to the
Relevant Potential Avoiders
This section analyzes the implications of Part C's analysis of
MD(Pc,,CA) for the allocative efficiency of making two related,

123. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the jurisdiction employed a FBLE nondistorting strict liability rule or an "imperfectly applied," independently distorting, negligence rule.
124. This conclusion reflects the fact that the relevant XD(Pn,.. )s would also be affected by the "imperfectly applied," independently distorting, contributory negligence rule
that governs victim "liability."
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fundamental changes in our AP-cost "regulatory" system. In particular, this section is concerned with the implications of Part C's
conclusions for the allocative efficiency of changing tort law (A) to
make negligence and contributory negligence decisions depend on
allocative rather than private benefit/cost comparisons and (B) to
make the payments extracted from injurers held liable counteract
the distortions in the private profitability of the most-allocativelyefficient avoidance option that was rejected rather than on the
private losses its rejection imposed on others.
It should be obvious that these changes would not be necessary
if tort law were FBLE and the economy were otherwise-Paretoperfect. In such a world, the private cost of any avoidance move to
any potential most-allocatively-efficient avoider would equal its
allocative cost, the private benefits any avoidance move would
confer on such a potential avoider would equal the allocative benefits it would generate, and a requirement that injurers held liable
compensate their victims for the losses the victims sustained would
equate the allocative efficiency and private profitability of all
allocatively efficient avoidance moves for the potential injurer and
would leave unprofitable all the allocatively inefficient avoidance
moves available to him. However, if tort law is not FBLE and if
the economy contains Pareto imperfections, such as the monopolies
on which this Article has focused,"z these relationships will not
obtain. In such a Pareto-imperfect world, comparisons of the private benefits and costs of avoidance will often come out differently
from comparisons of the allocative benefits and costs of avoidance.
In other words, in such an imperfect world, for the relevant avoidance move to be allocatively efficient, it is neither necessary nor
sufficient that PCcAs are lower than the amount by which the
avoidance move would reduce certainty-equivalent AP costs. Moreover, in such an imperfect world, a requirement that injurers who
have rejected allocatively efficient avoidance moves compensate
their victims fully for the losses imposed on them will, in general,
not make it profitable for injurers to make all allocatively efficient
avoidance moves and no allocatively inefficient avoidance moves.

125. Although distortions in the private benefits, costs, and profits of APCA moves
could be caused by monopoly alone, they could also be caused by any other non-tort-lawgenerated Pareto imperfection or by any imperfection in tort law itself. For current purposes, the etiology of the distortions is irrelevant.
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Subsection D.2(A) assumes that injurer liability in the jurisdiction is determined by a combination of negligence and contributory
negligence doctrines. Subsection D.2(B) assumes that injurer liability is determined by a combination of strict liability and contributory negligence doctrines. To ease the exposition, the analysis in
both subsections assumes that it will never be allocatively efficient
for a victim to avoid.
(A) The Allocative Efficiency of Basing Negligence and
Contributory Negligence Conclusions on Allocative Rather than
Private Benefit/Cost Comparisons
Part C explained why and how monopoly would distort the
private profitability of different types of avoidance moves even if
tort law were FBLE and the economy were otherwise-Pareto-perfect. Of course, tort law is not FBLE, the economy is not otherwise-Pareto-perfect, and many of the imperfections in question
either cannot be removed for political reasons or should not be
removed regardless of the values used to weigh the equivalentdollar losses and gains on which allocative efficiency analysis
focuses. However, these other imperfections will not reduce the
extent to which the private profitability of avoidance will be distorted if liability is determined by a combination of FBLE negligence and contributory negligence doctrines.
This conclusion is important for two reasons. First, regardless
of whether injurers are strictly liable or liable only if negligent, it
almost certainly will be TBLE to govern victim "liability" by a
contributory negligence doctrine that is perfectly defined and more
perfectly applied than the contributory negligence doctrine we currently employ. Second, for reasons this section will explore, it will
also often be TBLE to govern injurer liability by a negligence
doctrine that is perfectly defined in the sense of taking account of
victim risk-costs and more perfectly applied than the current negligence doctrine. In short, the preceding paragraph's conclusion is
important because it implies that even if the negligence and contributory negligence doctrines would not on their own critically
distort the private profitability of the most privately profitable
avoidance move available to a potential injurer or victim, other tort
law imperfections and non-tort-law-generated imperfections will do
so. As a result, potential avoiders will sometimes find it profitable
to make allocatively inefficient avoidance moves and will sometimes find it profitable to reject allocatively efficient avoidance
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moves even if their liability is governed by a FBLE combination
of negligence plus contributory negligence or strict liability plus
contributory negligence.
One way to respond to this problem would be to change the
definitions of negligence and contributory negligence to make the
relevant party liable if and only if the allocative benefit his rejected avoidance move would generate exceeds its allocative cost.
Since imperfections in seller competition cause (1) these allocative
benefits to differ from the private benefits that avoidance confers
on the relevant potential avoiders and (2) the relevant allocative
costs to differ from the private cost of avoidance to the relevant
avoider, any attempt to implement such a change in the definitions
of negligence and contributory negligence would require considerable economic analysis to be executed and data to be collected.
Even if one grants that adopting this proposal would reduce the
amount of misallocation that injurers and victims generate by making allocatively inefficient avoidance moves and rejecting
allocatively efficient avoidance moves, three allocative-efficiencyoriented counterarguments can be made against its adoption. First,
one could argue that, from the perspective of allocative efficiency,
such a redefinition of negligence and contributory negligence would
be prohibitively expensive to implement. Two mitigating responses
can be made to this contention. One is that to increase the
allocative efficiency of injurer and victim avoidance decisions, the
redefinition need not be implemented perfectly. To be TBLE, the
redefinition-proposal would have to instruct its implementers to
take into account allocative transaction costs when deciding how
much data to collect on the imperfections. The other is that, as
Section D.3 suggests, various institutional changes could be made
to decrease the cost and increase the accuracy of the adjustments
to private costs and benefits that the redefinition-proposal requires.
Second, one could argue that even if the adjustment would not
otherwise be prohibitively expensive, the proposal would be rendered allocatively inefficient by the cost or impossibility of informing the potential injurers and victims of the way the allocative
benefit and cost figures on which negligence and contributory negligence conclusions would be based differ from the private benefit
and cost figures to which they have greater access. This argument
is made more forceful by the fact that the distortions will vary
from type of avoidance move to type of avoidance move. Once
again, two responses can be made in mitigation. Even if in the
short run the relevant parties will not be able to anticipate the

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

consequences of the proposed redefinition for their likely liability,
they may become better-informed over time as court decisions
progressively reveal the kinds of adjustments that will be made in
different circumstances. In addition, even if it will never be
allocatively efficient to inform some parties of the relevant adjustments that will pertain to them, it may be allocatively efficient to
inform other parties. Although the cost or impossibility of informing private individuals or owners of Ma and Pa grocery stores may
make it allocatively inefficient to redefine negligence and contributory negligence as it applies to them, such redefinitions may still
be allocatively efficient in relation to large industrial concerns,
which can employ lawyers and economists to keep them informed
of the findings of the administrative agency that I will propose and
to carry out the appropriate adjustment-analyses themselves.
The third counterargument relates to the second. One could
argue that even if the selective-redefinition program just described
would otherwise be allocatively efficient, it might be rendered
inefficient if the redefinitions disfavored those to whom it applied.
Any such tendency would be unfavorable because it would cause
the program to deter parties from becoming more able to anticipate
the relevant adjustments, to create an artificial difference in the
survival chances of the "informable" and "non-informable" competitors in a given area of product-space, and to create an artificial
difference in the incentives to make QV investments in different
areas of product-space (to the extent that it is easier to convert
private costs and benefit figures into their allocative counterparts in
some areas of product-space than in others). Indeed, since the point
of the redefinition is to induce those to whom it applies to make
more-allocatively-efficient avoidance decisions, any tendency a
redefinition would have to disfavor those individual firms or areas
of product-space to which it applied would be perverse. Once
again, two responses can be made in mitigation. First, there is no
general reason to believe that the change in definition now being
contemplated will be against the interest of the parties to whom it
relates-the redefinition of "negligence" may be as likely to change
the court's conclusion from one of "negligent" to one of "not
negligent" as vice versa. Second, if that is not the case, the option
exists of redefining the concepts in all cases, regardless of whether
the relevant actors can anticipate the difference between an
allocative and a private benefit/cost comparison.12
126. Admittedly, however, if the redefinition is neutral, it will still create a bias against
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Although this conclusion is contestable, I do believe that the
kind of redefinition just proposed would be allocatively efficient if
combined with the changes in damage-plus-fine rules discussed in
Subsection D.2(B) and the institutional reforms discussed in Section
D.3.
(B) The Allocative Efficiency of Supplementing Traditional TortDamage Awards with Positive and Negative Fines Designed to
Eliminate What Would Otherwise Be the Distortion in the Private
Profitability of the Most-Allocatively-Efficient Avoidance Move
As the introduction to Section D.2 indicated, tort law requires
injurers held liable to compensate their traditional victims for the
full loss that the injurer's tortious act or activity imposed on them.
Unfortunately, in our highly-Pareto-imperfect world, such damages
will fail to eliminate the distortion caused by the combined effect
of the tort law imperfections and non-tort-law-generated imperfections in the private profitability to injurers of the avoidance moves
available to them. This distortion potential may either make it unprofitable for a potential injurer to make an allocatively efficient
avoidance move (despite the fact that he knows that he will be
required to compensate his traditional victims) or make it privately
profitable for a strictly liable injurer to make an allocatively inefficient avoidance move.
One way to respond to this distortion is to supplement traditional damage awards with a system of distortion-offsetting supplementary fines and subsidies. For example, take a situation in which
(1) a potential injurer could reduce the traditional (PL + R) (where
"P" stands for the probability of the relevant loss, "L" for the
magnitude of the loss, and "R" for the risk costs the possible loss
imposes on potential victims) by $100 by incurring $110 in avoidance costs, (2) the allocative cost of his avoidance is $120, and (3)
the allocative benefits his avoidance would generate are $130. Although the potential injurer would be held liable under the
allocative-benefit/cost-comparison definition of negligence I am
proposing, the finding of liability would not induce him to avoid if
its only consequence was to obligate him to compensate his traditional victims for their private loss of $100 despite the fact that the
avoidance move would have been allocatively efficient. The re-

those who are influenced by it to the extent that it provides them with no benefits for
their greater tendency to make allocatively efficient avoidance moves.
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maining imperfections in the system would still deflate the private
profitability of the relevant avoidance move to him by $20 since
they would deflate PC,,, by ($120 - $110 = $10), while deflating
PB,,cA by ($130 - $100 = $30). To offset this remaining distortion
and give the potential avoider appropriate incentives to avoid, the
traditional damage remedy would have to be supplemented with a
$20 fine." Alternatively, consider a situation in which (1) a potential injurer could reduce the traditional (PL + R) by $100 by
incurring $80 in avoidance costs, (2) the allocative cost of his
avoidance is $120, and (3) the allocative benefits of his avoidance
are $100. If such an individual were held liable under a strict
liability rule, a "payments policy" that consisted solely of a requirement that he fully compensate his traditional victims would induce him to avoid despite the fact that his avoidance would be
allocatively inefficient. The remaining imperfections in the system
would critically inflate the private profitability of the avoidance by
$30 by deflating its private cost by ($120 - $80 = $40) while deflating its private benefits by ($110- $100 = $10). To correct this
remaining distortion in the private profitability of the relevant
avoidance move and thereby deter the potential avoider from making an allocatively inefficient avoidance move, the State should
indicate that it would pay $30 of any loss that the potential injurer
caused by failing to avoid. The same set of objections can be
made to this proposal that were made to its predecessor. These
objections can be countered in the same way that I countered the
objections analyzed in Subsection D.2(A). Once again, my admittedly contestable conclusion is that one could increase allocative
efficiency by supplementing our traditional damage awards with
distortion-offsetting positive and negative fines. In other words, in
my judgment, the allocative cost of designing and implementing an
appropriately refined version of such a system would be lower than

127. For two reasons, this proposal should not be described as a "punitive damages"
proposal. First, the word "punitive" is inapposite because it implies that the fine is being
imposed because the party who is being required to pay it had evil intent or at least was
engaged in wrongdoing. Although many injurers who are required to pay a fine under the
scheme I am proposing would clearly be "at fault," others would not be. Second, the
word "damages" is inappropriate because the additional payment I am proposing to extract
from injurers in the situations in question is being paid to the State and not the victim. I
prefer a fine to additional "damages" because the fine would increase allocative efficiency
by reducing the misallocation that the State has to generate to finance its operations while
the damages would tend to misallocate resources by providing potential victims with an
incentive to become actual victims.
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the allocative gains it would generate by inducing injurers to make
more allocatively efficient avoidance decisions.
3.

Some Related Institutional Reforms

The kind of approaches to AP-cost "regulation" that this Article
argues are TBLE would be made more cost-effective if the econonic analyses and data collection required were executed by specially trained personnel on a systematic rather than case-by-case
basis. This kind of work would best be done by an administrative
agency. The kind of systematic data-collection and data-analysis
that agencies can perform should be particularly cost-effective in
the current context because the information on Pareto imperfections
and related distortions relevant to the resolution of various AP-costregulation issues in tort law and environmental law cases is also
relevant to the resolution of various antitrust, tax, and innovation
law-and-policy issues.
The ideal arrangement in many kinds of tort law and environmental law cases might be (1) to assign to courts the job of deciding cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and traditional damage issues as
well as determining the nature and private cost of the avoidance
options available to the injurers and victims involved in the case
while (2) assigning to an administrative agency the role of court
master on the relevant distortion and related civil-fine-calculation
issues. I will not address here the large number of complex partyparticipation issues that would have to be resolved before any such
approach could be adopted. However, given the need for expertise,
the existence of economies of scale in data collection and analysis,
the advantage of being able to collect data over time on a systematic basis rather than under pressure on a one-off basis, and the
fact that the data relevant for the TBLE resolution of a particular
tort case would be relevant for the resolution not only of other tort
cases but also of various antitrust, tax, and innovation policy-issues, I am confident that an arrangement of the type I am proposing will almost certainly be TBLE and desirable overall.
We live in an age of skepticism about expertise. Although
many supposed experts have lacked any real expertise and have
been insensitive to a variety of considerations to which their purported expertise did not relate, I am optimistic that administrative
staff can be trained to collect the data that distortion analysis reveals to be important. I am also optimistic that administrative hearing-examiners can be trained to use such data appropriately, appropriate recruitment-processes can be instituted, and inappropriate
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political influence as well as sloppy performance can be prevented
by reasoned-elaboration requirements, lifetime tenure, revolvingdoor policies, other politically-insulating provisions, and peer review.
4. The Allocative Efficiency of Assuming That Any WorkerHealth-and-Safety Regime That Is Recommended by a Joint
Labor-Management Worker-Health-and-Safety Committee Is
Allocatively Efficient
If one assumes that the labor members of any labor-management worker-health-and-safety committee are sovereign maximizers
of the equivalent-dollar welfare of the relevant company's workers,
the management members of such a committee are sovereign maximizers of the equivalent-dollar welfare of their company's shareholders and debtholders, and worker-health-and-safety regimes do
not affect the amount of externalities that might be borne by third
parties, FBLE analysis would predict that any worker-health-andsafety regime instituted by such a committee would be allocatively
efficient. This result at least partly accounts for the fact that (1)
most economists favor OSHA's accepting the worker-health-andsafety regimes adopted by such committees and (2) OSHA has in
fact adopted this approach.' 28
However, it should be clear that in an economy in which seller
competition is imperfect the regimes recommended by such a committee cannot be assumed to be allocatively efficient even if, monopoly aside, the economy is Pareto-perfect. In particular, the recommendations of such a committee would be unlikely to be maximally allocatively efficient in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy
that contains some imperfections in seller competition because, as
we have seen, (1) monopoly will distort both the private cost to
the company of protecting worker health and safety in various
ways and the private benefits that any related avoidance yields the
workers (for example, the wages that it prevents them from losing
by preventing their disablement) and (2) these two distortions will
cancel each other out only rarely and fortuitously.
Of course, it might be TBLE to accept the regimes recommended by such committees without making any effort to take
account of these distortions. However, particularly given the infor-

128. Admittedly, the agency's decision may have been motivated by non-allocative-efficiency considerations as well.
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mation-gathering and information-processing abilities of some of
the companies involved, I doubt very much that it will turn out to
be ex ante allocatively efficient to ignore in this context the complications that this Article has shown would clearly be SBLE to
consider.

Part D should have provided some insight into the way in
which the kind of TBLE analysis this Article has attempted to
justify differs from both the FBLE approach of the standard lawand-economics literature and the SBLE approach that would be
most allocatively efficient in a world in which perfect data could
be costlessly collected and perfect analyses could be costlessly
executed.
CONCLUSION

Virtually all extant allocative-efficiency analyses of particular
common law doctrines, statutes, or administrative regulations have
proceeded on the (usually implicit) assumption that, except for the
"potential imperfection" with which the legal provision was concerned, the, economy is Pareto-perfect. Obviously, this otherwisePareto-perfect assumption is inaccurate. Unfortunately, as The General Theory of Second Best has demonstrated, the inaccuracy of the
standard law-and-economics "otherwise-Pareto-perfect" assumption
prevents the arguments that incorporate it from justifying any conclusions that purport to apply to our actual, highly-Pareto-imperfect
world.
This Article has attempted (1) to explain in exhaustive detail
the way in which one type of Pareto imperfection-monopoly or,
of all
more
accurately,
seller-competition
imperfections
types-undermines traditional FBLE tort law arguments by distorting the private profitability of various types of accident-and-pollution-cost-avoidance (APCA) decisions and (2) to explore in a preliminary manner the way in which substantive tort law and various
AP-cost-"regulating" institutions should be reformed to take account
of the relevant distorting effects of monopoly if the goal is to
maximize allocative efficiency. These analyses should provide a
foundation for sequels to this Article that will execute full-blown
preliminary TBLE analyses of various doctrinal and institutional
issues-analyses that take considerable but not TBLE account of
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all relevant non-tort-law-generated Pareto imperfections (not just
"monopoly") and the fact that tort law doctrine and tort law processes are not FBLE.
I have already stated the bad news: the FBLE analysis of the
standard law-and-economics literature cannot justify conclusions
that are supposed to apply to the real world. I would like to close
with the good news: in my judgment, it should be possible to train
personnel and establish institutions that can increase allocative
efficiency and overall welfare in tort law and various other legal
contexts by taking Second-Best Theory into account.
At least from a social perspective, there is no justification for
ignoring The General Theory of Second Best in tort policy or in
any other policy context. Many academics have personal or political-philosophical motives for ignoring Second-Best Theory's message and dismissing its messengers. But the message is correct and
vitally important: the conclusions of law-and-economics studies can
not be relied on unless the analyses take Second-Best Theory into
consideration-indeed, unless the analyses' very structure reflects
the basic insights provided by The General Theory of Second Best.
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APPENDIX A

THE RELEVANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADDITIVE
AND NON-ADDITIVE CASES FOR THE PREDICTABILITY OF
THE EFFECT OF A POLICY THAT WOULD ELIMINATE OR
REDUCE ONE TYPE OF INDiVIDUAL-PARETO-IMPERFECTIONGENERATED DISTORTION IN PRIVATE PROFITS ON THE

MEAN OF THE RELEVANT

.D(PA...) DISTRIBUTION

Assume that one can predict the effect of a policy on the mean
of the distribution of individual-Pareto-imperfection-generated absolute distortions in the private profitability of one type of marginal
choice. It will be far easier to predict the effect of this policy on
the mean of the IYD(P7rA... )I distribution if the case in question
is additive rather than if it is non-additive. The problem with nonadditive cases is that no generalities seem particularly useful. For
example, the fact that the signs of MD(Pr...) and XD(Pr ... ) are
the same for a choice in which YD(PA ... ) is a non-additive function does not guarantee that eliminating one of the sets of imperfections in question will decrease IYXD(PLA...)I for the last choice
of that type, even if no other type of Pareto imperfection is present
in the economy.
I will illustrate this point with a unit-output example. To demonstrate the non-additive character of XD(Picuo), I will examine a
case in which two conditions are filled: (1) the only two extant
Pareto imperfections that distort PrtAuo are imperfections in seller
competition (which cause P/MC > 1) and externalities of production
(which cause MC*/MC > 1, where MC* equals private marginal cost
plus external marginal cost) and (2) all the resources that the producer of some good (X) purchases to produce his marginal unit of
that product will be withdrawn from the production of a marginal
unit of good (Y). In particular, I will proceed in four stages: (1)
determine MD(Pir;,u; (2) determine XD(Piuox) when there are
externalities of production; (3) determine XD(PAuox); and (4) point
out that the formula for YXD(PnAuo) is not additive-that
YD(Pru 0 x) # MID(luox) + XD(PrAuox)--indeed, that the formulae
for MD(Picuox) and XD(Pi;,uox) do not even appear in the formula
for YXD(PcAuox).
(1) Where MRx = MCx, MCx = MCx*, and MCy = MCy*,
MD(P vAuox) = MD(PBuox) - MD(PCAuox) = (PBAuox LBAUOX) - (PCAuox - LCAuox) = (MRx - Px) - (MCx -
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[MCx*/MCy*]Py) = (MC, - Px) - MC, + (MCx*/MC')PY

=

-Px + (MCx*/MCy*)Py = MC'([P'/MCy*] - [PX/MCx*]).
(2) Where

MCx = MRx,

MRx

=

Px,

MC, = P,,

and

MCx < MCx* and/or MC, < MCy*, XD(PTc,,,o) = XD(PBUOx) XD(PCAU0ox) = (PBUOx - LBAUOX) - (PCAuox - LCAuox) = (MRx -

Px) - (MCx - MCx*) = -(Px - [MCx*/MCy*]Py) = -Px +
PY(MCx*/MCy') = -PY([Px/Py] - [MCx,,MCy*]).
(3) Where MCx = MRx, MCx < MCx" and/or MCy < MCy*, and
Px > MCx and/or PY > MCy, YD(PrtAox) = XD(PBux) - XD(PCUuox)
= (PBAUOX - LBAuox) - (PCAUOx - LCAuox) = (MRx - Px) - (MCx [MCx*/MCY1]PY) = -Px + (MCx,/MCY*)PY = MCx,([PY/MCY'] [Px/MCxI) = MCx*([PY/MCv][MCy/MCy] - [Px/MCx][MCx/MCx*]).
(4) Note that the expressions for MD(PAuox) and XD(PtAUox) do
not even appear in the formula for XD(PTuox).

To demonstrate that, in the type of non-additive case that the
preceding example presents, the elimination of one individualPareto-imperfection-generated Prt distortion may not decrease the
relevant YD(Pnt) even when the sign of the eliminated distortion is
the same as the sign of the remaining distortion, I will trace
through the effect of eliminating XD(PnAUo,,x) on YD(PrtAuox) when
the only other extant Pareto imperfection is an imperfection in
seller competition and MD(PtAo,,x)

=

0. Assume that (1) all the

resources that would be used to produce marginal units of X would
be withdrawn from the production of Y, (2) both X and Y are
originally produced by imperfect competitors, (3) originally, both
the production of X and the production of Y generate external
costs, (4) acting on their own, the relevant monopolies would deflate Pirtox, 9 (5) acting on their own, the relevant externalities
would also deflate PTtAox, 130 and (6) imperfections in seller competition and externalities of production are the only Pareto imperfections present in the system that would individually distort
P7cAuox.

129. In other words, the relevant monopolies acting on their own would lead to too few
units of X being produced relative to Y from the perspective of allocative efficiency
because (Px/MCx) would be greater than (Py/MC,) if there were no externalities.
130. In other words, the relevant externalities would cause too few units of X to be
produced from the perspective of allocative efficiency because the externalities generated
by the production of X are a smaller proportion of the sum of the internal and external
marginal costs X's production generates than the externalities generated by the production
of Y are of the sum of the internal and external marginal costs Y's production generates.
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To see why, even on these assumptions, the internalization of
the externalities originally generated by the production of X and Y
could increase IXD(ThtAuoDI, assume that (7) in the absence of
externalities (if all conventionally external production costs were
internalized), the existing imperfections in seller competition would
produce an equilibrium in which $8 = Px > MCx = MCx* = $4 and
$9 = Py > MCy = MCy* = $8, (8) in the absence of imperfections in
seller competition, the existing externalities would produce an equilibrium in which Px = MCx = $1 < MCx* = $4 and Py = MCy =
$1 < MCy* = $8, and (9) in the original situation in which seller
competition is imperfect in both X and Y and the production of
both products generates externalities $6.50 - Px > MCx = $1 <
MCx* = $4 and $8.60 = $Py > MC. = $1 < MCy = $8. Assumption
(9) is based on three premises: (i) MC and MC* are horizontal
over the relevant range for both X and Y; (ii) the producers of X
will pass on 50% of any additional marginal costs of production
they have to incur because costs that were originally external have
been internalized; and (iii) the producers of Y will pass on 80% of
any additional marginal costs of production they have to incur
because costs that were originally external have been internalized
(a higher percentage because Y's producers are more competitive
than X's).
(A)
These assumptions imply the following results:
MD(PicAuox) = $4(9/8 - 8/4) = -($4)(7/8) = -$3.50, which is consistent with assumption (4) above; (B) XD(Prux) = $4(1/8 - 1/4) =
-$4(1/8) = -$.50, which is consistent with assumption (5) above;
and (C) the internalization of the original external costs generated
by the production of X and Y will increase IYD(Pitc 0x) I from
to
1$4(8.60/8 - 6.50/4)1 = 1-($4)(4.4/8)1 = 1-($2.2)1
IMD(P7tux)j = I-$3.50 I-see (A) above. Thus, in the non-additive case on which this Appendix focuses, the elimination of a type
of imperfection that would on its own distort the private profitability of the last choice of the relevant type in the same direction that
it would be distorted by the remaining imperfection on its own will
increase the total distortion in the private profitability of the last
choice of the relevant type in question. Crudely stated, this apparently paradoxical result reflects the fact that the critical individual
numbers in the formula for the remediable distortion-the numbers
that would affect XD(PiAuox) if the remediable imperfection were
not eliminated (in particular, [1/8] and [1/4] in our example)-are
less than one.
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I should emphasize that this result does not lead me to conclude that it will rarely, if ever, be practicable to predict the effect
of a policy on IXD(PtA ... )[ in a non-additive case. Although it
will admittedly be complicated to make such predictions in nonadditive cases, it will frequently be cost-effective to do so. The
point of the preceding example is to demonstrate that in non-additive cases no simple shortcuts will be available. One will have to
develop formulae for each relevant YD(PtA ... ) figure and collect
data on the pre-policy and post-policy values of each formula's
parameters.
By way of contrast, generalizations can be made about the circumstances in which the introduction or preservation of a preventable imperfection will reduce any XD(PrA... ) that can be expressed as an additive function. For example, in an additive case,
the following five conclusions apply to the effect of the introduction of preventable externalities (the preservation of remediable
externalities) on the mean and variance of a relevant
IYD(Pirc...)I distribution and presumably, therefore, on APCArelated misallocation when other distorting imperfections will remain after the externalities are eliminated:
(1) If the sign of XD(Pir) for the last choice of the type in
question is always the same as the sign of RD(P~r ... ) for
that choice, where "RD" stands for the distortion in the
relevant Prt that will remain (hence "R") if all externalities
are internalized-roughly speaking, if the correlation between the relevant XD(PrtA...) and RD(PrtA...) is
(+1.0)-the introduction or preservation of the externalities
in question and hence of the XD(PrtA...) will always increase IXD(P;tA..)j by IXD(Prc...)I;
(2) If the sign of XD(PcA ... ) is always the opposite to the
sign of RD(PA...)-in other words, if the correlation
between the relevant XD(PrA... ) and RD(PtA...) for the
different relevant actors is (-1.0)-the introduction or preservation of the externalities in question and hence of
XD(PitA... )
will
decrease
]XD(P7tA... ) ,
unless3
IXD(Pt...)I is more than twice the magnitude of IRD(pr.)1;' '

131. A numerical example may be helpful. Assume XD(P,.,) = +$8 and
RD(PtA... ) = -$3. On these assumptions, _D(Pr,. ) will equal +$5 if the externalities
are introduced or preserved and -$3 if they are not introduced or are eliminated. In this
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(3) If XD(Pic,...) and RD(PtA ... ) are randomly related to
each other and [XD(PrA...)[ is always smaller than
IRD(Pnt . )1, the introduction or preservation of the
externalities in question will have no effect on the mean of
the IXD(PirA )I distribution for all the marginal choices

in question but may tend to increase resource misallocation

of the relevant type by increasing the variance or some
other, more appropriate measure of the dispersion of the

distribution of relevant IXD(Pnt... )Is;'

(4) If XD(Pi,...) and RD(PrA ... ) are randomly related to
each other but IXD(Pn,...)[ is sometimes larger than
[RD(Pru ... )[ or, a fortiori, is sometimes more than twice
as large as IRD(P7A ... ), the introduction or preservation
of XD(P~,... ) will increase the mean as well as the variance of the j7D(Pt,,...)I distribution;"' and, relatedly,
case, the externalities will increase absolute XD(P~t.
) because absolute XD(PtA. ) is
more than twice absolute RD(Pr...)--because $8 is more than twice $3-and the
increase in absolute XD(It...)= ($5 - $3 -$2) will be equal to the absolute value
of
XD(PitA ... ) minus twice the absolute value of RD(PI...)-$8 - 2($3) = $2. On the
other hand, if XD(Plt...) = +$7 and RD(PltA...) - $4--put differently,
if

IRD(Prt ... )I < IXD(Px,...)I < 2RD(Pt,...)I-the introduction
IXD(Pir,...)I-in our

the externalities in question will reduce

IjD(Pr,...)I

by

the

absolute

value

of 21RD(PntA...

or preservation

of

example, will reduce

)I - XDUPlA... )j, which

equals the absolute value of 21-($3)1 - [$71, which equals $1, which is less
than
IXD(Pir...)I = $7
from
jRD(Pt
to
IXD(PrtA...)I 4.. )j = I-$41
JRD(r ... )I = 1$7 -$41 = 1$31. In such a case, the decrease in ]jD(PlrA
... )I
will equal 21RD(P...)I - IXD(Pr .)...)-in our case, 2($4) - $7 = $1.
132. To see why the introduction of the relevant imperfection will have no effect on
the mean of the relevant j, D(Pr,...)[ distribution but will increase its variance,
assume, for example, that XD(Pft...) is +$4 half the time and -$4 half the time, that
RD(Px,...) is +$8 half the time and -$8 half the time, and that the two distortions
in
question have the same sign half the time and the opposite sign half the time. In such
a
situation, the introduction of the XDs in question will move the economy from a position
in which ED(PrA... ) is +$8 half the time and -$8 half the time to a situation in which
,D(P~rA...) is +$12 one quarter of the time, +$4 one quarter of the time, -$12 one
quarter of the time, and -$4 one quarter of the time. The introduction of the relevant
externalities will therefore have no effect on the mean of the distribution of absolute
,XD(Pn
t... ) values (which will stay at $8) but will increase its variance.
133. The assumption that XD(PrtA .) and RDl(Pir...) are randomly related to each
other implies not only that they have the same sign half the time and the opposite sign
half the time but that there are no differences in their magnitudes when they have
the
same signs and opposite signs respectively. The textual assertion reflects the following
three previously established results: when XD(P ... ) and RD(Pft... ) are randomly related, (1) the introduction of XD(PnA...) will have no effect on the mean of
the
IZD(P ,...)I distribution in those cases where IXD(PIt....I < IRD(Pit ... )l-see
supra note 131; (2) the introduction of XD(Pnl...) will increase the mean of
the
,D(P,rA_.)I
distribution
in those cases where
IRD(PtI...)I < IXD(PIr ... )I
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(5) The extent to which YD(PrA...) and RD(P .. will
have to be negatively correlated for the introduction or
preservation of externalities to reduce the mean of the
IYD(PrcA... )I distribution will increase with the percentage of all cases in which IXD(P~rA...)j is bigger than
IRD(P7tA...)
as well as with the amount by which the
externality distortion exceeds the distortion that the remaining imperfections would generate in the absence of
externalities
when
IXD(PrtA... ) I
does
exceed
Hence, predicting the effect of a policy on the mean and variance of a relevant IY D(Pr~c...)[ distribution will be far easier
when the case in question is additive than when it is non-additive.

<21RD(P
_A)[ because, in the cases in this set in which the two distortions have
the same sign, the introduction of the externalities will increase IYD(Pnt. ... )I by
IXD(Pit,...)j while, in the cases in this set in which the two distortions have opposite
signs, the introduction of the externalities will decrease
I-D(PtA
)l by
2{RD(Pr... )I - IXD(Pni.. ) 1, which will be less than IXD(PtA...)I
when
IRD(rt .... ) < IXDIrT .... )I <2RD(Ptt.... )--see
supra note 131; and (3) the
introduction of externalities will increase the mean of the IXD(Pn ... )I distribution in
all cases where IXD(P7,.
)I > 21RD(PA.. )J-i.e., will increase IjDP7,... )I
by IXD(Prt,...)I when XD(PiA...) and RD(Pir ... ) have the same sign and will increase IXD(PtA... ) by IXD(P,...)I - 21RD(P% .... ), a difference that is greater
than zero, when the two distortions in question have opposite signs.
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APPENDIX B
AN ILLUSTRATION THAT REVEALS WHY THE BUYER SURPLUS DEFLATION OF PBAQV IS SMALLER THAN THE FACTORPRICE-DEFLATION-GENERATED INFLATION OF PBAQV

Appendix B illustrates the proposition articulated in its heading
by examining a case in which the following five conditions are
fulfilled:
(1) all the resources consumed by the use of the relevant
QV investment are withdrawn from the production of units
of old products;
(2) the demands for the new and relevant old products are
identical and linear and have a slope of one;
(3) each old product that loses some output when the new
product is produced loses only a marginal unit of output;
(4) all the products in question are sold through single
pricing; and
(5) the marginal QV investor faces constant marginal costs
when selling the new product.
In this case, it can be shown that the monopoly-induced factorprice deflation of the private cost of using a QV investment is
twice the consumer-surplus-related deflation of the private benefits
of using the QV investment.
Diagram II, on page 354, illustrates this conclusion. For simplicity, it assumes that all the costs of using the new QV investment are variable. In Diagram II, DDNO stands for the demand
curve faced by the sellers of all the products that are relevant to
this analysis-subscript "N" stands for the new product created by
the marginal QV investment in question, and subscript "0" stands
for the old products from whose production resources are withdrawn when the new product is produced. MRNo stands for the
marginal revenue curve each relevant seller faces, given that he
engages in single pricing. In keeping with our assumptions, DDNo
(line DEFC) is constructed to be linear with a slope of negative
one (to intersect the vertical axis at a 45* angle), MRNo (line DJB)
is constructed on the assumption that all relevant sellers practice
single pricing on the good they sell, and MCN.o (line ABC) is
constructed to be constant (horizontal at height AO = BL). These
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assumptions imply that the equilibrium output for each product is
AB since that is the output at which MR cuts MC from above, the
equilibrium price (average marginal revenue) for each product is
FL = JK, and both the equilibrium marginal revenue and cost for
each product are BL.
The assumptions (1) that all the resources the QV investor uses
to produce units of his new product are withdrawn from the production of units of the old products against which his new product
will compete, (2) that the use of the new QV investment reduces
the output of each of the old products whose output it does reduce
by one unit, and (3) that the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect
(which implies that the marginal rate of transformation of units of
old products into units of new products equals MCdMCo [is one to
one]) imply that the per-unit deflation in the private cost of each
unit of the new product that is produced is FB (the difference
between price and marginal revenue at the margin for each old
product-the difference between the allocative value and the private
value to its producer of each marginal unit of the old products
whose outputs are reduced when the new QV investment is used,
the difference between the private value to their alternative users of
the resources the QV investor will use to produce one unit of his
new product and the allocative value these resources would produce in their alternative users' hands). For this reason, MLCN is
horizontal at height FL in Diagram II.
To see what the preceding assumptions imply for the consumer-surplus-related per-unit deflation in the private benefits of using
the QV investment, two other points will have to be defined and
two other relationships will have to be noted. The two relevant
points-E and J-are respectively the midpoints of line segments
DF and DB. The two relevant relationships reflect the fact that
DDNo and hence MRNo are linear. Given this fact, the y-value of
the midpoint of DF--of point E-will indicate the average height
of DDN o between output zero and the relevant product's actual
output HF = AB, and the y-value of the midpoint of DB-of point
J-will equal the average height of MRNo between output zero and
the relevant product's actual output AB = HF. Hence, in Diagram
II, EK indicates the average height of each relevant product's demand curve between output zero and its actual output (the
allocative value of the average unit of the new product that is
produced [if we assume that there are no relevant wealth effects
over the relevant range]), and EJ = EK- JK (where JK is the price
of the good in question) equals the average per-unit consumer-
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surplus deflation of the private benefits that the use of the marginal
QV investment (the sale of the new product N) generates.
In terms of Diagram II, the preceding textual conclusion is that
on our current assumptions FB will be twice EJ. This result follows from five relationships: (1) AB = BC, (2) AB = HF, (3)
BC = FB, (4) BF = 2JF, and (5) JF = EJ. Obviously, if these equalities hold, FB = BC = AB = BF = 2JF = 2EJ.
I will now explain why each of these equalities holds. The
only two that are difficult to explain are equalities (1) and (4) in
the above list: (1) AB = BC and (4) I-IF = 2JF. These equalities
hold because when the relevant demand curve is linear, the marginal revenue curve generated by the single pricing of the seller
whose position it describes always bisects the horizontal line connecting the vertical axis and the demand curve in question. To
demonstrate this conclusion (in terms of Diagram I), note that area
HFLO equals area DBLO (since both equal the total revenue the
seller will obtain if he sets his single price at HO = FL). Note as
well that (1) area IFLO equals area HJBLO plus area JFB and (2)
area DBLO equals area HJBLO plus area DJH. The preceding
relationships imply that triangles JFB and DJH have the same
areas. Now note that angles DHJ and JFB are equal to each other
(since both are right angles) and that angles DJII and FJB are
equal to each other (since they are opposite angles formed by two
intersecting lines). These equalities imply that all three angles of
triangle JFB equal their counterparts in triangle DJH. Taken in
conjunction with this result, our previous conclusion that the areas
of these two triangles are equal guarantees that the two triangles
are congruent (identical in all respects), which in turn implies that
HJ = JF and that HF = HJ + JF = 2JF. This conclusion does not depend on angle HDE's being a 45* angle.
The three remaining equalities are easy to establish: (2) AB
equals HF by construction; (3) BC = BF because the assumption
that angle HDE is 45* implies that angle FCB is 45* (since angle
DAC is a right angle-has 90*-and the sum of the angles in any
triangle [including triangle DCA] is 1800) and the legs opposite
any two equal angles in a given triangle (here BC-which is opposite angle BFC-and FB-which is opposite angle BCF) are equal;
(5) JF equals El because the assumptions that angle HDE is 45*
and that DDNO is linear imply that angle JEF is 45* and, given that
fact, the same argument that established the equality between BC
and FB will establish the equality between EJ and EF.
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In any event, on the assumptions listed above, the consumer
surplus deflation of PBAQv will be one-half the monopoly (factorprice-deflation-related) inflation of PBQv. Even though in reality
the five assumptions listed above and hence, presumably, the conclusion that the relevant buyer-surplus deflation of PBQv is onehalf the factor-price-deflation inflation of PBAQv will often be inaccurate, there is no reason to believe that their adoption biases my
analysis in favor of my less specific conclusion that the relevant
buyer-surplus distortion is smaller than the relevant factor-pricedeflation distortion.
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APPENDIX C
THE TENDENCY OF MONOPOLY TO DEFLATE CRITICALLY

THE PX OF AP-COST-AVOIDING PPR (APCAR) FOR MONOPOLISTIC PRODUCERS WHOSE TORT LIABILIrY Is GovERNED BY "TRADITIONAL"

NEGLIGENCE-A

NEGLIGENCE

RULE THAT Is NOT APPLIED TO PPR
The text was based on the assumption that "tort" law was firstbest-allocatively-efficient. This Appendix relaxes this assumption by
assuming that the relevant injurer's (I's) tort liability is governed
by "traditional" negligence rather than by strict liability. Although
in a legal-transaction-costless world a negligence plus contributory
negligence tort law system in which all possible types of APCA
decisions were assessed for negligence would be as allocatively
efficient as a strict liability plus contributory negligence tort law
system, the "traditional" negligence plus contributory negligence
system is not in fact first-best-allocatively-efficient because, in
practice, many types of AP-cost-relevant decisions have never been
subjected to a negligence analysis-because, for example, Is have
virtually never in practice been held negligent for failing to do
allocatively efficient PPR that would have reduced AP costs or
indeed for failing to reduce their UOs, to go out of business altogether, to change the product-variant they produced to one whose
production or consumption generated fewer AP costs, etc. when
such choices would have been made allocatively efficient by their
AP-cost consequences. This Appendix will explain why monopoly
may cause AP-cost-related PPR misallocation when the tort liability
of the producers to whose production-processes the relevant research relates is governed by the traditional negligence doctrine-a
negligence doctrine that is applied in a more-restrictive-than-firstbest-allocatively-efficient way.
Monopoly will tend to have this effect when producer tortliability is governed by traditional negligence because under that
doctrine a producer (1) will not be held liable for failing to do
PPR into safer (i.e., less-AP-cost-prone) production-processes even
when the PPR in question would have been profitable for him if
he had to bear his (traditional) victims' AP costs but (2) will generally be held liable for failing to adopt a safer production-process
that has already been discovered if its use would reduce AP costs
by more than it would raise other costs. More specifically, when
tort liability is governed by the traditional, restrictively-applied
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negligence doctrine, monopoly will tend to deflate critically the Prn
of allocatively efficient PPR into less-AP-cost-prone productionprocesses (to deflate critically Pi,,Ac) if two conditions are fulfilled.
First, each producer who would have found the relevant
APCAR profitable if his liability were governed by strict liability
must be able to prevent the relevant discovery by refusing to do
the relevant research. This first condition would obviously be fulfilled if only one firm would be able to profit from APCAR even
if producers were strictly liable for the AP costs they generated
because impacted information available only to producers prevented
outside (independent) researchers from making the relevant discovery and the producer in question was the only actual producer
operating at a large enough scale to be able to finance or staff the
necessary research-operation. The first condition would also be
fulfilled if impacted information would prevent independent researchers from profiting from the relevant research, two or more
actual producers were in a position to do such research, and each
actual producer who was in a position to do such research either
could contrive to avoid such research (say, by threatening to retaliate against any researcher) or rely on analogues to natural
oligopolistic QV-investment disincentives to deter him and all
others from doing such research (in other words, could rely on the
fact that his potential APCAR rivals would not do such research if
he did not because they realized that if they did such research he
would do it too since he could no longer prevent the discovery of
a safer production-process by eschewing such research himself,
though the potential APCAR rivals in question would do such
research if he invested in APCAR since his research would preclude them from preventing the relevant discovery by eschewing
APCAR themselves).
The second condition that is relevant in this context relates to
the market share of the sales of the goods consumed of the only
possible production-process researchers or the combined market
share of a group of possible production-process researchers who
might all be able to profit if all engaged in the relevant research.
In particular, the traditional negligence doctrine will not critically
deflate the Pnr of PPR into less-AP-cost-prone production-processes
unless the market share of the only production-process researcher
in a position to do APCAR or of the group of production-process
researchers who might be deterred by contrived or natural
oligopolistic APCAR disincentives is sufficiently low for the fol-
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lowing condition to be fulfilled: (A) the gains that the relevant
researcher(s) can make by licensing the new, safer production-process to others (whom traditional negligence doctrine would make
liable for any AP costs they generated because they failed to use
the safer production-process once it was discovered) minus (B) the
loss he or they sustain because, post-APCAR, they have to incur
higher (non-AP-plus-AP) costs per unit to produce their own output
must exceed (C) the private cost of the APCAR itself.
To better understand this condition, two further relationships
should be noted. First, if we assume that the relevant licensees do
not possess monopsony power that will enable them to realize
some profits from the licensing agreement, the gains delineated
under "(A)" in the preceding paragraph will equal (i) the amount
by which the discovery would reduce the AP costs its potential
licensees would have generated had they produced the (lower)
output they would have found profit-maximizing post-discovery
(given the fact that the discovery would make them liable for any
AP costs they generated) had they not used the discovery minus
(ii) the amount by which the discovery would increase the private
non-AP costs its potential-licensee users would have to incur to
produce the lower output in question plus (iii) the profits that the
discovery's use will enable its potential-licensee users to make
(once the discovery of the less-AP-cost-prone production-process
has made them liable for the AP costs its use would prevent) by
expanding their outputs above the lower-than-pre-discovery output
they would have produced post-discovery had they not used the
discovery. Second, the loss delineated under "(B)" in the preceding
paragraph equals (i) the product of the post-discovery output of the
researcher(s) in question and the difference between the amount by
which the discovery increases the relevant product's marginal cost
(if for simplicity we assume constant marginal cost) and the
amount by which the discovery increases the relevant product's
price by raising all its producers' marginal costs and perhaps by
increasing the average buyer's preference for his most-favored over
his second-most-favored product-variant by inducing some sellers to
exit plus (ii) the amount by which the use of the discovery increases the fixed (non-PPR) production costs of the researcher(s)
plus (iii) the profits that the researcher(s) made pre-discovery on
the units of output they no longer produce post-discovery.
In any event, when the above two complicated conditions are
fulfilled, the fact that the negligence doctrine has never been applied to failures of producers to do APCAR (which may or may
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not be justified by transaction cost considerations and which may
or may not justify a general shift from negligence to strict liability
in allocative-efficiency terms) will critically deflate Pu for marginal
APCAR-Pn cAR. I should perhaps add that although this proposition is somewhat undercut by the recent development of the
doctrine of design fault, the preceding partial analysis of the effect
of monopoly on the Pit of production-process APCAR when producer tort-liability is governed by traditional negligence will also
apply to APCAR into less-AP-cost-prone product-variants.
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APPENDIX D
TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLs
%MD

Monopoly Percentage-Distortion

A

Marginal (in the Sense of Last)

XD

Aggregate Distortion

JD(PBAApc)

Aggregate Distortion in the Private Benefits
Yielded by a Marginal APCA Move

AP Costs

Accident and Pollution Costs

APCA

Accident-and-Pollution-Cost Avoidance

APCAR

Accident-and-Pollution-Cost-Avoidance Research

ARDEPPS

Arbitrarily Designated Portion of Product-Space

CE

Consumer Evaluation

DDIND

Industry Demand Curve

DD

Demand Curve

DDN

Demand Curve for a New Product

DD o

Demand Curve for an Old Product

FBLE

First-Best-Allocative-Efficiency

La

Labor

LB

Allocative Product or Benefit

Le

Leisure

LE

Allocative Efficiency

LC

Allocative Costs

MC

Marginal Cost

MD

Monopoly Distortion

MD(PBApeA)

Monopoly Distortion in the Private Benefit of a
Marginal APCA Move
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MD(PB0PR)

Monopoly Distortion in the Private Benefit of a
Marginal Production-Process-Research-Executing
Use

MD(PBQv)

Monopoly Distortion in the Private Benefit of a
Marginal Quality-or-Variety-Increasing Investment

MD(PB,,O)

Monopoly Distortion in the Private Benefit of a
Marginal Unit-Output-Increasing Use

MD(PB,.

)

Monopoly Distortion in the Private Benefit of
Marginal Choices

MLV

Marginal Allocative Value

MR

Marginal Revenue

MRIND

Industry Marginal Revenue Curve

MRN

Marginal Revenue Curve for a New Product

MRo

Marginal Revenue Curve for an Old Product

PIt

Private Profitability

P, S, &
,[ATE

Pain, Suffering, and Reduction in the Ability to
Enjoy

PB

Private Benefit

PBuo

Private Benefit of a Monopolist's Unit-OutputIncreasing Use

PC

Private Cost

PPR

Production-Process Research

PPS

Production-Process Shift

QV

Quality-or-Variety-Increasing

SBLE

Second-Best-Allocative-Efficiency

TBLE

Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency

UO

Unit Output

XD

Externality Distortion

